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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Notes Toward New Econarratologies
ERIN JAMES AND ERIC MOREL
T WO SIMPLE PREMISES  lie at the heart of this edited collection of original 
essays: first, that stories about the environment significantly influence experi-
ences of that environment, and vice versa, and second that scholars can do a 
much better job of understanding those stories and suggesting alternatives. 
Further, these essays acknowledge that understandings of narrative change as 
the environment changes—that the modern environmental crisis, in addition 
to being partly a crisis of narrative, also promises to have a strong effect on 
narrative and narrative theory.
As a forum for discussing the reciprocal relationship between environ-
ment and narrative, this collection explores what we call econarratology, or 
the paired consideration of material environments and their representations 
and narrative forms of understanding. This collection’s contributors suggest 
methodological possibilities within econarratology by examining the mechan-
ics of how narratives can convey environmental understanding via building 
blocks such as the organization of time and space, characterization, focaliza-
tion, description, and narration. They position narratives as important occa-
sions and repositories for the values, political and ethical ideas, and sets of 
behaviors that determine how we perceive and interact with ecological homes. 
They also query how readers emotionally and cognitively engage with such 
representations and how the process of encountering different environments 
in narratives might affect real-world attitudes and behaviors of those read-
1
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ers. They suggest that changing humans’ interactions with the environment 
requires not only new stories but also a better understanding of the ones that 
have long been in circulation. Moreover, they contend that today’s environ-
mental challenges necessitate revisions to models of narrative. Overall, this 
collection explores the ways in which econarratology expands and enriches 
the theory and interpretation of narrative.
PAIRING NARRATIVE AND ENVIRONMENT
Narratives have become a touchstone for scholarship within the emerging field 
of the environmental humanities. Collecting work in and across fields such as 
literature, philosophy, sociology, geography, anthropology, history, and sci-
ence and technology studies, research in the environmental humanities seeks 
to offer up an interdisciplinary and wide-ranging response to today’s environ-
mental challenges and emphasize the idea that these problems are not exclu-
sively environmental, but also deeply cultural. As Sverker Sörlin states, work 
in the environmental humanities suggests that “in a world where cultural val-
ues, political or religious ideas, and deep-seated human behaviors still rule the 
way people lead their lives, produce, and consume, the idea of environmentally 
relevant knowledge must change” (788). Thus far, work in the environmental 
humanities has tended to focus on key influential ideas that such interdisci-
plinary scholarship raises, such as the Anthropocene and the questioning of 
meaning, value, responsibility, and purpose in light of environmental crisis. It 
also tends to foreground its commitment to an earth-centered ethics of care 
and imagine alternatives to the destructive behaviors and attitudes that under-
lie environmental damage.
Unsurprisingly to the contributors to this collection, narrative has become 
a key site of inquiry for such discussions, as many environmental humani-
ties scholars recognize a crisis of narrative subtending today’s environmental 
crisis. In their introduction to the inaugural issue of Environmental Humani-
ties, a journal for that emerging field, the editors call for an “unsettling of 
dominant narratives” and a study of “new narratives that are calibrated to the 
realities of our changing world” (Rose et al. 3). In doing so, they pick up on 
Val Plumwood’s earlier observations in Environmental Culture: The Ecological 
Crisis of Reason (2002), where she cites a “dominant narrative of reason” that 
culminates in “global economic regimes that threaten the biosphere” as the 
primary cause of the modern environmental crisis (5–6). Similarly, in their 
introduction to Global Ecologies and the Environmental Humanities, Elizabeth 
DeLoughrey, Jill Didur, and Anthony Carrigan cite as a major theme of the 
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environmental humanities the role that narrative plays in “drawing attention 
to and shaping our ideas about catastrophic and long-term environmental 
challenges such as climate change, militarism, resource extraction, the pollu-
tion and management of the global commons, petrocapitalism, and the com-
modification and capitalization of nature” (2). They further suggest that “a 
critical study of narrative . . . is essential to determining how we interpret and 
mitigate environmental crisis” (25). Ursula Kluwick concurs, noting that pub-
lic understandings of environmental problems are “intrinsically tied to nar-
rative strategies” (503); her work thus focuses on calling attention to specific 
narratives embedded in climate change discourse. Foregrounding their ethical 
commitment to environmental care explicitly, Ursula K. Heise and Allison 
Carruth posit that a key question of environmental humanities scholarship 
is “which concepts of narratives from the environmental inventory will move 
environmentally oriented thought into the future, and which ones shackle 
environmentalism to outdated templates?” (3). These scholars all argue that we 
have told ourselves stories about the environment that permit and encourage 
destructive behavior and call for a better understanding of these narratives 
and the exploration of new, more environmentally responsible ones.
Ecocritics have hovered over the connection of narrative and environment 
for some time without explicitly reaching for narrative theory. Though what 
counts as ecocriticism remains open to discussion, ecocritics still frequently 
invoke some or all of Cheryll Glotfelty’s statement that “simply put, ecocriti-
cism is the study of the relationship between literature and the physical envi-
ronment. Just as feminist criticism examines language and literature from 
a gender-conscious perspective, and Marxist criticism brings an awareness 
of modes of production and economic class to its reading of texts, ecocriti-
cism takes an earth-centered approach to literary studies” (xviii). Strategically 
capacious, this framing of ecocriticism’s scope does more to propose a field 
of inquiry than a set of tools for working in that field. That field’s explicit 
attention to narrative has been diffuse and diverse,1 but one recent gesture by 
ecocritics such as Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann, inspired by new 
materialist scholarship that views the material world as possessing its own 
agency, has shifted the ecocritical conversation to read the earth as a text. 
Materialist ecocritics often write of the “narrative agency of matter” and speak 
of “storied matter,” arguing that “the world’s material phenomena are knots 
in a vast network of agencies, which can be ‘read’ and interpreted as forming 
narratives, stories” (8, 1). According to these scholars, today’s environmental 
 1. See, for examples, Ursula Le Guin’s “The Carrier Bag of Fiction,” Lawrence Buell’s The 
Environmental Imagination and Writing for an Endangered World, Terre Satterfield and Scott 
Slovic’s What’s Nature Worth?, Slovic’s Going Away to Think, and Daniel Wildcat’s Red Alert!
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crisis is not only a crisis of narrative; today’s environment is also capable of 
producing its own narratives.
Another set of voices has started paying attention to narrative with a more 
critical or skeptical stance, wondering whether narrative as a mode is irrepa-
rably thwarted by environmental problems. These include Timothy Morton, 
Claire Colebrook, and Timothy Clark, as well as the writer Amitav Ghosh. A 
major benefit to bringing narrative theory into conversation with such argu-
ments has to do with the specificity of its terminology; econarratology allows 
for cross-examining more skeptical claims on the basis of what definition of 
“narrative” they deploy—revealing that they often use the word nebulously, 
or in ways postclassical narratologies have complicated, or sometimes in ways 
that conflate the category of narrative with the novel. If, as Stef Craps and Rick 
Crownshaw discuss in their introduction to a special issue of Studies in the 
Novel, a variety of new and old novels seem to afford valuable insights on the 
plots and futures of climate change, econarratologists have reason to be opti-
mistic that the even broader mode of narrative has much still to contribute 
to crafting cultural responses to present and future environmental challenges.
Yet despite the prominent role that narrative plays in these environmental 
conversations, the perspective of narrative scholars is largely absent. Some 
have offered possible starting places. Heise, in her groundbreaking Sense of 
Place, Sense of Planet (2008), argues for attending to the “challenges” of “nar-
rative patterns” entailed by refocusing the scale of environmental concern 
from the local to the global (21, 22). Narrative formats such as the ramble 
in the nearby wild, she contends, seldom rise to the challenge of addressing 
the risk scenarios posed by destabilization of geophysical forces and patterns. 
But while this study has garnered intense ecocritical focus, Heise’s attention 
to narrative forms has been eclipsed by critics’ interest in her broader project 
of shifting scale. Heise repeats her call for sensitivity to narrative structures 
in her afterword to Bonnie Roos and Alex Hunt’s Postcolonial Green: Envi-
ronmental Politics and World Narrative (2010), in which she urges ecocritical 
scholars to consider the “question of the aesthetic.” She notes that ecocritical 
analyses “have often tended to assess creative works most centrally in terms 
of whether they portray the realities of social oppression and environmental 
devastation accurately, and what ideological perspectives they imply,” and that 
such assessments are undoubtedly necessary. But she also states bluntly that 
“if factual accuracy, interesting political analysis, or wide public appeal is what 
we look for, there are better and more straightforward places to find them 
than novels and poems.” Her primary interest thus lies in the “aesthetic trans-
formation of the real,” which she reminds readers has “a particular potential 
for reshaping the individual and collective ecosocial imaginary” (258).
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Nancy Easterlin shares Heise’s interest in what forms and media do. In her 
“biocultural” work, which brings together evolutionary history and cognitive 
science to bear on questions of literary theory, she admirably explains the mis-
guidedness of much ecocriticism that tries to find the genre or form that will 
“palliate the soul” to “culminate in an environmentally friendly perspective” 
(96).2 Instead, she explains the interest of narrative as an “agentive force,” writ-
ing that “integrating the actions and purposes of human groups within their 
prescribed domain, narrative brings into relation and coordinates sequence, 
causality, physical place, knowledge of interaction with human others, and 
self-concept” (139). In these terms, the stakes proliferate for studying narra-
tive workings more widely and not only specific narrative genres, especially 
as ecocritics mull over the complexities of nature-cultures and their networks.
Several of this book’s contributors also have attempted to yoke together 
environment and narrative in their previous work. Markku Lehtimäki explic-
itly merges ecocriticism and narratology in his essay, “Natural Environments 
in Narrative Contexts: Cross-Pollinating Ecocriticism and Narrative Theory,” 
which interrogates “the reciprocal relationship between conceptions of nature 
and modes of storytelling” (120). As for Easterlin and Brian Boyd before him, 
human evolution’s deep history presents Lehtimäki a point of confluence 
between subfields since it naturalizes the practices of narrative making that 
otherwise seem artificial. Further, he draws from rhetorical narrative theory’s 
terms to suggest that naturalizing narrative expands ecocritical attention to 
the aesthetic, “synthetic” concerns.
Most directly, this collection builds on Erin James’s The Storyworld Accord: 
Econarratology and Postcolonial Narratives, which first put forward the term 
“econarratology” as part of her interest in developing a method for studying 
mutual intelligibility across distances and cultures. Although James’s specific 
project draws in central ways from the work of cognitive narratologists gen-
erally and David Herman’s concept of storyworld in particular, she advances 
broadly that “econarratology embraces the key concerns of each of its par-
ent discourses—it maintains an interest in studying the relationship between 
literature and the physical environment, but does so with sensitivity to the 
literary structures and devices that we use to communicate representations of 
the physical environment to each other via narratives” (23). This articulation 
of econarratology usefully describes the various and sometimes conflicting 
combinations of ecocriticism and narrative theory. Whatever their differences, 
they follow James’s study in advocating for holding together concerns of con-
 2. Similarly, Brian Boyd’s work on “evocriticism”—his preferred term for a Darwinist 
mode of reading that interprets literature as an adaptive behavior of the human species—makes 
an illuminating pairing of narrative forms and environmental ideas.
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tent and form, and they point out the high environmental and social stakes 
for doing so.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONARRATOLOGY
The essays in this collection recognize three key directions in which econar-
ratology might develop beyond these promising origins. The first concerns the 
representation of the nonhuman in narratives. Narrative theory has tended 
to be deeply anthropogenic in its approach to narrative; see, for example, the 
emphasis on human communication and interaction in James Phelan’s defi-
nition of narrative (developed with Peter J. Rabinowitz, among others) as 
“somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose 
that something happened” (Phelan, Somebody ix). The rhetorical model’s cen-
tralized “somebody” is only one of many approaches to narrative that assumes 
human speakers. While narrative scholars agree that narrators and/or charac-
ters do not necessarily need to be human, all acknowledge that at the founda-
tion of narrative lies a rhetorical situation reliant upon human capacities for 
language. After all, narrators must narrate, and narratees must have the ability 
to receive a narrative. But two recent essays query how this anthropogenic 
genre can help readers better understand the relationship between humans 
and the organisms and material with which we share the world.
In “The Storied Lives of Non-human Narrators,” Lars Bernaerts, Marco 
Caracciolo, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck examine what they call the phe-
nomenon of “nonhuman storytelling.” Their interest lies in the paradoxical 
idea that “readers are invited to reflect upon aspects of human life when read-
ing the fictional life stories of nonhuman narrators, whether they are animals, 
objects, or indefinable entities” (68). Drawing on a long and diverse tradition 
of narratives that feature such narrators—including those by Franz Kafka, Italo 
Calvino, Julian Barnes, and Julio Cortázar, and nineteenth-century children’s 
stories, among others—Bernaerts et al. argue that narratives featuring nonhu-
man narrators highlight and even challenge readers’ conceptions of what it is 
to be human. They thus introduce a new conceptual framework for the study 
of nonhuman narration that relies upon a “double dialectic of empathy and 
defamiliarization, human and nonhuman experientiality” (69).
Bernaerts et al. identify a basic contradiction in stories featuring nonhu-
man narrators: narratives that represent nonhuman experientiality in impos-
sible ways (talking rats, narrating mathematical equations, etc.) task readers 
with thinking through the capacities and limitations of human experientiality. 
The writers thus argue that preexisting conceptual frameworks for interpret-
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ing narratives are not suitable for such texts. In particular, they push against 
Monika Fludernik’s idea of “natural” narratology that links narrativity to rep-
resentations of human experientiality and the corresponding categorization of 
“unnatural” narratives, or anti-mimetic texts, suggested by Jan Alber, Stefan 
Iversen, Henrik Skov Nielsen, and Brian Richardson that violate the physi-
cal laws and logic of human experience by representing scenarios, characters, 
temporalities, and spaces that cannot occur in the real world. As Bernaerts et 
al. write:
“Natural” narratology stresses the importance of human experientiality, 
while “unnatural” narratology stresses the anti-mimetic aspects of nonhu-
man narration. Between these two poles, something else happens as well 
. . . namely the projection of nonhuman experientiality. Often, if not always, 
nonhuman narrators use techniques of focalization, characterization, and 
consciousness representation to evoke nonhuman experientiality. Thus, non-
human narration cannot be reduced to the unnatural and the strange, since 
it is caught in a dialectic of empathy and defamiliarization, the familiar and 
the strange, human and nonhuman experience. (75)
According to Bernaerts et al., stories featuring nonhuman narrators are nei-
ther wholly “natural” nor “unnatural”; they exist in a liminal space in between, 
representing impossible scenarios and characters and yet calling attention 
to the experiences of humans. The slipperiness of these categories—human 
experience and nonhuman experience, “natural” and “unnatural”—provide 
scholars a productive set of terms and tools with which to investigate the 
relationship between the human and the nonhuman and its representation 
in narrative. In turn, environmental humanities and ecocritical ideas about 
the more-than-human, the “mesh,” and material agency add important new 
insight to complicate and sophisticate such analyses.
In “Narratology Beyond the Human,” David Herman’s interest lies not in 
nonhuman narrators, specifically, but in the place of humans in broader eco-
logical contexts. Situating his essay within recent work in cognitive science, 
evolutionary biology, and ecocriticism, Herman argues that fictional narra-
tives can serve as important imaginative tools for critiquing, dismantling, or 
reconstructing ideas about human selfhood in a modern world in which it is 
impossible to conceive of the human “self ” as isolated and unconnected to 
larger ecological and biotic communities. Using Lauren Groff ’s short story 
“Above and Below” as a case study, Herman argues that a “narratology beyond 
the human” can not only illuminate “how a given self-narrative locates the 
human agent in a transspecies constellation of selves” but also can “assist 
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with the construction of new, more sustainable individual and collective self-
narratives that situate the self within wider webs of creatural life” (131). Her-
man’s reading of Groff ’s story—and his theorization of a narratology sensitive 
to sustainability and the survival of wider biotic communities—enacts the 
very ethics of environmental responsibility and care for which environmental 
humanities and ecocritical scholars call.
We find a second direction for the development of econarratology in dis-
cussions of narrative ethics. When Glotfelty made connections between eco-
criticism, feminism, and Marxism in her definition of the field, she declared 
that ecocriticism, like its feminist and Marxist predecessors, has a pronounced 
ethical orientation. Her conceptualization of ecocriticism privileges the envi-
ronment in its analysis of literary texts, celebrating those that foster a sense 
of environmental responsibility among readers and critiquing those that per-
petuate damaging environmental attitudes and behaviors.
Narrative theory has not always shared this ethical stance. Indeed, early 
work in what narrative scholars now label “classical narratology” mostly 
avoided such ethical interests. Drawing heavily on Saussurean linguistics that 
separates langue (the abstract, semantic principles of language) and parole (an 
individual utterance of language), classical narratology attempts to character-
ize narrative langue, or the “code or set of principles governing the production 
of all and only narratives” (Prince 48). This early work—typified by Gérard 
Genette’s Narrative Discourse (1980)—focused on categorizing and classify-
ing common narrative structures and introduced an extensive new lexicon of 
terms for narrative analysis. But scholarship in subsequent “postclassical” nar-
ratology has broadened its perspective not only to consider narrative langue 
but also the effects of narratives on real-world readers. An important part of 
this postclassical shift has been rhetorical approaches to narrative that con-
ceive of such texts as purposeful communicative acts, in which narrative tellers 
seek to engage and influence the emotions and values of their readers. Accord-
ing to scholars such as Phelan, a narrative is a motivated act. Phelan states 
explicitly that “in telling what happened, narrators give accounts of charac-
ters whose interactions with each other have an ethical dimension” and that 
“the acts of telling and receiving those accounts also have an ethical dimen-
sion” (“Rhetoric/Ethics” 203). Consequently, for many postclassical scholars 
of narrative,3 a study of narrative must attend not only to narrative categories 
and classification but also to narrative as a multisided ethical interaction.
 3. Phelan develops this interest across multiple successive publications; for an example, 
see Living to Tell About It. Moreover, his interest in narrative ethics carries forward the work of 
his mentor Wayne C. Booth, whose books The Rhetoric of Fiction and The Company We Keep 
remain widely cited arguments about literary ethics. Not all work in narrative ethics is explicitly 
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We can view work by rhetorical narrative theorists, such as Phelan and 
Rabinowitz,4 in light of other postclassical narratological scholarship that 
studies the ethical and political dimensions of narrative, or the work that 
narratives do and the effects that they have on their audiences.5 Prominent 
among this work are those approaches to narrative that emphasize narratives 
as tools of ideology. Scholars of feminist narratology such as Susan L. Lanser 
and Robyn Warhol6 connect the structures of narratives to the social context 
of their writers to highlight that categories of sex, gender, and sexuality are 
relevant to the analysis of textual entities. While Lanser in “Toward a Feminist 
Narratology” acknowledges that the “technical, often neologistic, vocabulary 
of narratology has alienated critics of many persuasions and may seem par-
ticularly counterproductive to critics with political concerns,” she argues that 
feminism and narrative theory can productively inform each other, especially 
in terms of the role of gender in the construction of narrative and the impor-
tance of historical and cultural context for determining meaning in narrative 
(343). Similarly, narrative theorists invested in postcolonial literature and the-
ory such as Fludernik and Marion Gymnich explore how particular narrative 
structures can construct, perpetuate, or subvert categories of race, ethnicity, 
and class in a given narrative.
None of this work—rhetorical, feminist, or postcolonial narratology—
is explicitly environmental. But by foregrounding the ethical and political 
dimensions of individual narratives, and by positioning narratives as persua-
sive acts that engage and influence the attitudes and behaviors of their readers, 
they provide useful models for econarratological modes of reading sensitive 
to the ideological messages that particular narratives and narrative structures 
can encode in their representations of environments. They also stress the 
need to consider wider contexts of production and reception when analyzing 
narratives, thus opening up econarratology to reflections on the cultural and 
rhetorical, however. The work of Adam Zachary Newton and Martha Nussbaum put greater 
stress on the act of reading itself as ethically engaged through-and-through. For Nussbaum, 
see Love’s Knowledge. Newton’s Narrative Ethics lays the groundwork for his Levinasian take on 
narrative ethics, but his more recent books The Elsewhere: On Belonging at Near Distance and 
To Make the Hands Impure will perhaps be of greater interest to ecocritics for their emphases 
on place, corporeality, and materiality of books and speech.
 4. See, for example, their collaborative entries in the volume by Herman, et al.: Narrative 
Theory: Core Concepts & Critical Debates.
 5. Some narrative scholars, following the direction of Ansgar Nünning, label these 
approaches as “contextualist narratologies.” See Nünning’s “Surveying Contextualist and Cul-
tural Narratologies.”
 6. Warhol represents feminist narratology broadly in her contribution to Herman et al.’s Nar-
rative Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates.
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historical contexts of narrative tellers and readers in its analysis of narrative 
environments.
We find a third direction for the development of econarratology in a turn 
toward cognitive science. While ecocritics such as Glen A. Love and Dana 
Phillips have long suggested ecological literacy must be a central core of eco-
critical scholarship,7 ecocritics have tended to shy away from other forms of 
scientific knowledge, especially those dealing with human perception and 
imagination.8 Yet the ecocritical appeal of insights from embodied cognition 
(the idea that cognition is dependent upon the experience of the physical 
body in an environment) and enactivism (the idea that consciousness arises 
via a body’s interaction with its environment) are clear. As Alexa Weik von 
Mossner argues, the combination of ecocriticism, narrative theory, and cogni-
tive science “can give us a better understanding of how we interact with [envi-
ronmental] narratives on the mental and affective level in ways that are both 
biologically universal and culturally specific” (3). Caracciolo agrees, stating 
that ecocritical approaches to narratives informed by cognitive science help 
to explain “how the production and interpretation of stories fit into the larger 
picture of our meaningful encounters with the world” (“Narrative, Meaning, 
Interpretation” 368).
A cognitive turn will push studies of environment and narrative in several 
directions, foremost among these being enriched analysis of literary space. 
Inspired by cognitive studies that suggest that readers must mentally model 
and emotionally inhabit the context of a narrative’s characters to understand 
a narrative, narrative scholars such as Herman and Marie-Laure Ryan have 
introduced new categories of narrative space to consider alongside temporal 
categories of order, duration, and frequency. In the process, they add new 
terms to the narratological lexicon, including “deictic shift” (the process by 
which narrative interpreters relocate from the here and now of their reading 
environment to the alternative space-time coordinates of a narrative environ-
ment), “figures” and “grounds” (located and reference objects, respectively), 
and “topological” and “projective” locations (inherent or viewer-related rep-
resentations of space, respectively).9 The concept of “storyworld,” or a reader’s 
mental model of the context and environment within which a narrative’s char-
 7. See Love’s Practical Ecocriticism: Literature, Biology, and the Environment and Phillips’s 
The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and Literature in America.
 8. A notable exception here is Nancy Easterlin’s work on the imagination and perception 
of material environments. See especially chapter 3 of A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory 
and Interpretation.
 9. For a richer analysis of narrative space, see Herman’s “Spatial Reference in Narrative 
Domains.” See also Marie-Laure Ryan, Kenneth Foote, and Maoz Azaryahu’s Narrating Space/
Spatializing Narrative.
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acters function, is essential to these discussions of narrative space. Importantly 
for considerations of narrative environments, the concept of “storyworld” calls 
attention to the worldmaking power of narrative, or its potential to immerse 
or transport readers into virtual environments that differ from the physical 
environments in which they read.10 The study of space and place has been long 
central to ecocritical scholarship; as Lawrence Buell argues, “environmental 
criticism arises within and against the history of human modification of plan-
etary space” (Future 62). Indeed, a basic concern of ecocriticism is the process 
by which space, which connotes abstraction, is modified into place, which 
connotes value and meaning. The spatial turn in narrative theory, inspired 
by research into the cognitive processes of narrative interpretation, provides 
ecocritics with an invaluable vocabulary by which to better analyze human 
perceptions of spaces and places. Likewise, ecocritical considerations of the 
values of inhabited places introduces a useful cultural dimension to discus-
sions of narrative spaces.
In addition to encouraging narrative scholars to think through the ways 
in which readers simulate narrative space, cognitive science also has led nar-
rative theorists to develop their understanding of how narratives can affect 
the emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of readers by encouraging them to 
simulate the emotional states and experiences of characters and/or narra-
tors. Through Theory of Mind (ToM) and cognitive simulation theory—
respectively, Lisa Zunshine’s and Blakey Vermeule’s preferred terms for the 
mind-reading activity that they claim is essential to narrative comprehen-
sion—these scholars argue that narratives provide readers with safe spaces 
in which to “try on” the emotional states of others. They thus suggest that 
narratives help us improve our everyday interactions with real-life others, 
as they permit readers to project themselves into other consciousnesses and 
thus experience what it is like for others to move about the world. Suzanne 
Keen, in her work on narrative empathy, explores the potential of narratives 
to prompt the “spontaneous sharing of feelings, including physical sensations 
in the body, evoked by witnessing or hearing about another’s condition,” or 
encourage readers to feel “with another” (Empathy xx, xxi). As with rhetori-
cal, feminist, and postcolonial approaches to narrative, scholarship in cogni-
tive narratology and narrative empathy has not yet addressed environmental 
issues nor considered the uses of these models for analysis of narrative envi-
ronments.11 But as they query the potential for narratives to introduce readers 
 10. For further scholarship on narrative transportation/immersion, see Richard Gerrig’s 
Experiencing Narrative Worlds and work by Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock.
 11. Two notable exceptions involve scholarship on animals and graphic novels: Keen’s “Fast 
Tracks to Narrative Empathy” and Herman’s “Storyworld/Umwelt.” See below for further dis-
cussion of the latter.
12 •  E R I N J A M E S A N D E R I C M O R E L 
to new experiences and emotional states—including those linked to percep-
tions of and interactions with particular environments—they provide literary 
scholars with insightful and illuminating models for reading environmental 
experiences in narratives and studying the emotional effects of engaging with 
virtual worlds.
Cognitive ecocritical approaches to narrative will also enrich studies of the 
body and literature. Stacy Alaimo’s notion of trans-corporeality, “in which the 
human is always intermeshed with the more-than-human world,” has encour-
aged ecocritics to consider “the extent to which the substance of the human is 
ultimately inseparable from ‘the environment’” (2). Analysis of the intermesh-
ing of the body and its environment and the role that literature can/does play 
in that intertwining has much to gain from embodied and enactivist under-
standings of narrative comprehension. On a basic level, embodied cognition 
helps literary scholars better understand the readers’ emotional engagement 
with literary environments, as they foreground the ways in which reading 
narratives produce bodily, affective responses among readers. Scholars such as 
Caracciolo take this idea one step further, arguing that narrative comprehen-
sion demands that readers navigate the imagined environments of narratives 
via a virtual body and thus simulate or enact embodied engagements with 
environments in an “off-line” mode. Finally, cognitive approaches to narra-
tive and environment will also boost the empirical research that ecocritical 
scholars increasingly call for—see, for example, Weik von Mossner’s Affective 
Ecologies (2017) and Scott Slovic and Paul Slovic’s Numbers and Nerves: Infor-
mation, Emotion, and Meaning in a World of Data (2015). Cognitive scholars 
have amassed a rich corpus of empirical research via fMRI scans of the brains 
of individual readers and audience response studies, among other methods, 
that provides ecocritics with solid models for exploring how actual readers 
process and engage with narrative environments and how interaction with 
these virtual worlds may shape real-life attitudes, values, and behaviors.
We would like to flag two additional directions of new econarratologi-
cal work that are rich veins of analysis of narrative and environment. As she 
indicates in the subtitle of The Storyworld Accord: Econarratology and Post-
colonial Narratives, James’s initial discussion of econarratology in that pub-
lication focuses explicitly on postcolonial narratives. She argues that while 
econarratology is applicable to a broad range of texts from different historical 
periods and geographical regions, econarratological readings of postcolonial 
narratives “stand to offer up particularly rich insights into how people around 
the world imagine and inhabit their environments” and thus can play “an 
important role in a more sensitive and sustainable response to today’s envi-
ronmental crisis” (xiii). We can view James’s work in light of a growing cluster 
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of texts that, although they don’t use the term “econarratology,” pair ecocritical 
and formal readings of postcolonial narratives, including Jens Martin Gurr’s 
“Emplotting an Ecosystem: Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide and the Question 
of Form in Ecocriticism,” Kylie Crane’s Myths of Wilderness in Contemporary 
Narratives (2012), and Roman Bartosch’s EnvironMentality: Ecocriticism and 
the Event of Postcolonial Fiction (2013).12 Indeed, in a reversal of the largely 
Anglo-European and American origins of both narratology and ecocriticism, 
econarratology’s influences and early examples grow predominantly from 
analyses of postcolonial texts.
Non-Anglophone, indigenous, and postcolonial texts remain a crucial site 
of inquiry for econarratological scholarship. Environmental humanities schol-
ars emphasize the importance of cultural context in their work; DeLoughrey, 
Didur, and Carrigan in their introduction to Global Ecologies and the Environ-
mental Humanities forcefully argue that “a history of globalization and impe-
rialism is integral to understanding contemporary environmental issues” (2). 
This work draws heavily on the distinction between the “full-stomach” envi-
ronmentalism of the global North and the “empty-belly” environmentalism 
of the global South that historians Ramachandra Guha and J. Martinez-Alier 
draw in Varieties of Environmentalism (1997). The examples of environmental 
conflict that they discuss—including that of Project Tiger, the Indian national 
government’s conservation program that has led to the displacement of the 
Chenchus community in the southern state of Andhara as their home forest 
is set aside for tiger reserves, and imprisonment of Indians that have been 
caught protecting their communities by injuring or killing tigers—offer a 
powerful corrective to the narrative that “the countries of the South . . . are too 
poor, too narrow-minded, or too relentlessly focused on the short term to be 
Green” (xvii). Guha and Martinez-Alier’s work highlights not only the cultural 
and material contexts that produce environmental destruction and devasta-
tion, but also the idea that one’s perception of and relationship to an environ-
ment is culturally coded. As a result, they argue that environmental ethos is 
also culturally coded and dependent upon local contexts. Closer attention to 
the narratives that inform such site- and culture-specific contexts illuminates 
cross-cultural blind spots and fosters the production of new environmental-
isms sensitive to local attitudes, values, and behaviors. As language is one 
obvious example of such site- and culture-specific context, econarratology will 
benefit from expanding to consider the nuances of not only postcolonial and 
indigenous narratives written in English but also of non-Anglophone texts.
 12. While not explicitly focused on postcolonial narratives, Raul Lejano, Mrill Ingram, and 
Helen Ingram’s The Power of Narrative in Environmental Networks is an additional example of 
work that pairs environment and narrative, though chiefly in nonliterary contexts.
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Future econarratological scholarship also must expand beyond written 
narratives. Orality, and especially aboriginal and indigenous oral storytelling 
traditions, is an especially rich direction for such work because of the ways 
in which it demands that scholars pair textual analysis with the study of the 
immediate environment in which the narrative both is told and received. Oral 
storytelling requires physical proximity of storyteller to audience; as Isidore 
Okpewho writes of African oral traditions, “most public performances of 
songs and tales are done in such a way that there is no physical separation 
between performer and audience members” (63). Oral storytelling is also a 
physical medium, in which the body of the storyteller (and the bodies of the 
listening audience with which it interacts) are vital components to the trans-
mission and comprehension of narrative. These special components of oral 
narratives clearly connect traditions of orality to the interests of econarrato-
logical scholarship that we discuss above, including narrative spatialization 
and the focus on the body by new materialism scholars.
Future econarratological scholarship also will find much to discuss in 
visual narratives. As Marco Caracciolo’s essay in this collection suggests, cin-
ematic texts can be equally as creative in their representations of the nonhu-
man world as their purely literary counterparts. Other scholars have weighed 
in on the special potential of visual narratives to represent the nonhuman 
world in ways that purely literary narratives cannot. In “Storyworld/Umwelt: 
Nonhuman Experiences in Graphic Narratives,” Herman explores how the 
medium-specific properties of graphic narratives can represent what it is like 
for nonhuman characters to experience events. Herman posits that because 
graphic narratives “recruit from more than one semiotic channel to evoke 
storyworlds,” they stand to “emulate, with as much granularity or detail as 
possible, how other animals engage with their surrounding world” (160, 174). 
Herman does not argue that all graphic narratives represent nonhuman expe-
riences with some degree of accuracy; he places such texts along a continuum 
of anthropomorphization, with animal allegories at one pole and umwelt explo-
ration13 at the other pole. Yet in his discussion of umwelt exploration graphic 
narratives such as Nick Abadzis’s Laika and Grant Morrison and Frank Qui-
etly’s We3—texts that do not feature heavily anthropomorphized animals and 
that actively figure the “moment-by-moment experiences of nonhuman ani-
mals”—Herman suggests that visual narratives can not only represent animal 
 13. In using the term umwelt, Herman draws on German-Estonian philosopher-biologist 
Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of the “lived, phenomenal worlds . . . of creatures whose organis-
mic structure differs from our own” (“Storyworld/Umwelt” 159).
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consciousness in ways impossible in purely literary narratives but also chal-
lenge basic anthropomorphic assumptions of narrativity itself as a representa-
tion of experiencing human consciousness (178).
In her discussion of narratives and transspecies empathy in Affective Ecol-
ogies, Weik von Mossner makes a similar claim about the potential of visual 
narratives. She focuses on the 2009 documentary The Cove, which bears wit-
ness in a pivotal scene to the slaughter of hundreds of dolphins by Japanese 
fisherman harvesting dolphin meat. Weik von Mossner observes that the 
scene contains “no commentary, no narration, just long minutes filled with 
images of relentless, brutal slaughter” as the fisherman “over and over again 
drive their spears into the bodies of the trapped animals” (105). For Weik von 
Mossner, the scene’s visual and auditory cues are essential structures by which 
the narrative fosters empathy among viewers for the dolphins; she argues 
that scenes such as this are especially painful for human viewers to watch 
because of the tendency of those viewers to “empathize with nonhuman ani-
mals, feeling their joy, their fear, their terror and their pain” (106). She sug-
gests that human viewers see the writhing bodies of the dolphins and hear 
the animals’ anguished cries, and they develop a sense in turn of what it is 
like to be the subject of such animal cruelty. The film, according to Mossner, 
demonstrates that anthropomorphism “is not a necessary condition for our 
empathic responses to animals.” This argument is testament to the powerful 
potential of narrative to shift the real-life attitudes, behaviors, and values of 
interpreters.
Yet the visual and auditory cues upon which this display of suffering 
depend are much more difficult to represent in written narratives because, 
in such texts, they would be always packaged by a narrator and thus always 
rendered in human terms to some degree, even if that narrator is nonhuman. 
This opens up a rich line of questioning for transmedial econarratological 
scholarship: what role do nonlinguistic cues in visual narratives—including 
both cinematic texts and graphic novels—play in encouraging empathy among 
readers for actual nonhuman subjects? Is transspecies empathy possible in 
written narratives that do not feature graphic images and sounds that are such 
effective conduits to cognitive and emotional sharing? Indeed, does an accu-
rate portrayal of the “moment-by-moment experiences of nonhuman” lives 
depend upon semiotic channels other than the purely written? If transmedial 
narrative approaches open onto semiotic channels other than the purely writ-
ten, then econarratology has many permutations ahead of it as it incorporates 
a wider array of ways to experience narrative.
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IN THIS BOOK
Given these potential directions for the development of econarratology, we 
have grouped the essays in this collection into three thematic streams: 1) Nar-
ratology and the Nonhuman; 2) Econarratological Rhetoric and Ethics; and 
3) Anthropocene Storyworlds. Together, these parts address ripe sites of con-
nection and overlap between environment and narrative, including climate 
change fiction (or “cli-fi”), narratives of the Anthropocene, possible uses of 
narrative in environmental activism, representations of the nonhuman in nar-
ratives, and the influences that environmental crises stand to have on the way 
we tell stories. They also engage with a wide range of disciplines and aca-
demic interests beyond narrative theory, ecocriticism, and the environmental 
humanities, such as posthumanism, modernism, environmental conservation, 
the history of the novel, critical animal studies, environmental ethics, and res-
toration ecology.
The essays in the collection’s first part, “Narratology and the Nonhuman,” 
take cues from two conversations: 1) discussions of “unnatural narrative” and 
“unnatural narratology” by scholars such as Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Brian 
Richardson, and Henrik Skov Nielsen; and 2) posthumanist, new materialist, 
and material ecocritical scholarship by scholars such as Stacy Alaimo and Jane 
Bennett that grapples with the agency of humans and nonhuman matter. The 
essays pair these conversations in their analyses of representations of mate-
rial agencies and intermeshings of human and nonhuman agents in narrative 
and, in doing so, encourage narrative theorists to rethink binary oppositions 
of “natural” and “unnatural.” They also push narrative scholars to reassess the 
meaningfulness of human narrators and characters amid increasing attention 
to the seemingly “unnatural” agency of nonhuman materials, objects, and 
phenomena, and position various narrative structures as crucial and effective 
sources for understanding such agencies.
Jon Hegglund’s essay “Unnatural Narratology and Weird Realism in Jeff 
VanderMeer’s Annihilation” begins by charting the different uses of the term 
nature in ecocritical and narratological scholarship, most notably within 
materialist ecocriticism and unnatural narrative theory. Hegglund does not 
propose reconciling the two uses of the term but instead extends and critiques 
the foundational principles of unnatural narratology such that it might be 
adapted to better describe and interpret fictional narratives invested in the 
unpredictable and changing environments of the Anthropocene. Hegglund’s 
primary interest is the fundamental division of unnatural text and natural 
world within unnatural narrative theory, which he argues does not admit nar-
rative representations of the strange, transformative materialities of our cur-
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rent epoch. Yet he argues that scholars adapt unnatural narratology’s emphasis 
on the anti-mimetic to read the drama of emergent, nonanthropomorphic 
agency from a “weird” materiality, such as that we find in VanderMeer’s novel. 
Via his analysis of Annihilation, and drawing on object-oriented ontologist 
Graham Harman’s notion of “weird realism,” Hegglund fleshes out a “weird 
narratology” that analyzes nonhuman agency in narratives that foreground a 
blurring between human agents and material entities or environments in the 
Anthropocene.
In “Object-Oriented Plotting and Nonhuman Realities in DeLillo’s Under-
world and Iñárritu’s Babel,” Marco Caracciolo considers how recent literary 
and cinematic narratives leverage the dynamics of plot to engage with the 
many threads tying together human and material worlds. Caracciolo argues 
that plot is biased toward human-scale temporality, social interaction, and 
psychological causation; as such, he sees it as inherently anthropocentric. But 
he also sees the potential for plot to stretch to represent forms of human and 
nonhuman intermeshings that are grounded in natural and physical phenom-
ena. He reads DeLillo’s novel and Iñárritu’s film to highlight both texts’ use of 
plot to represent the interrelatedness of reality: DeLillo by blending the funda-
mental forces of matter with human emotions and Iñárritu by tracing, through 
the film’s disparate parts, a movement from the human to the nonhuman 
realm. Caracciolo’s discussion of the plot dynamics of each text suggests that 
natural phenomena are an invaluable formal resource for storytelling itself.
The essays in our second part, Econarratological Rhetoric and Ethics, con-
sider narrative as a transmission or transaction between storytellers and read-
ers contextualized by today’s environmental challenges. As such, they share an 
interest in rhetorical narrative theory as drawn from the work of Wayne C. 
Booth and James Phelan. The essays in this section explore the relevance of 
reading narratives in environmental activism and question what role reading 
narratives might play in our response to large-scale environmental problems 
such as global climate change.
In “Readerly Dynamics in Dynamic Climatic Times: Cli-Fi and Rhetori-
cal Narrative Theory,” Eric Morel examines recent conversations that imagine 
how fiction will influence how readers react to climate change. Morel argues 
that, while necessary and timely, this conversation curtails the second, also 
important question of whether and how climate change itself might come to 
influence reading. Morel suggests that the rhetorical narratological work of 
Phelan and Rabinowitz has much to offer environmental humanities scholars 
by way of lexicon and procedure when it comes to discussing climate condi-
tions’ relevance to readers’ responses to narrative content, especially in terms 
of rhetorical narrative theory’s framework of narrative audience and notions 
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of narrative progression and rules of configuration. By bringing reception his-
tory into contact with rhetorical narrative theory, Morel suggests a direction 
for ongoing compatibility between rhetorical narrative poetics and contextu-
alist narratologies.
In “A Comedy of Survival: Narrative Progression and the Rhetoric of Cli-
mate Change in Ian McEwan’s Solar,” Markku Lehtimäki explores two signifi-
cant challenges that climate change poses to narrative: how do writers best 
approach a problem of such global proportions with the novelist’s traditional 
toolbox? And, why should readers look to fictional narratives for answers to 
real environmental problems? Lehtimäki grapples with both of these questions 
in his analysis of the environmental rhetoric of Solar. He argues that, in Solar, 
the human race’s struggle for survival takes the form of an environmental 
comedy in which the protagonist, a comical and obnoxious Everyman, tries 
to save the planet—and especially his own skin—by developing new tech-
nologies for using solar energy. Michael Beard may not be the protagonist we 
would like, but he may be the one we deserve. Drawing on the work of Phelan 
and Joseph Meeker, Lehtimäki argues that this narrative’s comedy affords it 
metarhetorical potential, whereby narrative elements such as plot and charac-
ter make visible some of the complexities about climate change.
Greg Garrard’s “Ecocriticism as Narrative Ethics: Triangulating Environ-
mental Virtue in Richard Powers’s Gain” also makes use of Phelan’s work to 
encourage environmental scholars to put the ethics of telling, rather than sim-
ply the politics of the told, at the center of their research and teaching. Garrard 
suggests that rhetorical narratology can help correct the tendency in much 
ecocritical work to consider questions of telling as secondary to the environ-
mental implications of a text’s content, such that this work has tended to focus 
on issues of plot, characterization, and setting at the expense of discussions of 
narration and focalization. He also is suspicious of arguments within ecopoet-
ics that certain literary forms are inherently more “ecological” than others. As 
a corrective to such claims, Garrard stresses the need for analysis of the moral 
aspects of storytelling as a means of exploring a narrative’s staging of envi-
ronmental virtue and vice. Such staging, Garrard’s argument suggests, broad-
ens existing understandings of narrative ethics developed by scholars such as 
Adam Zachary Newton. Garrard illustrates his model of ecocritical narrative 
ethics with a formal analysis of Powers’s novel about toxic consumerism and 
corporate personhood.
Our final part, Anthropocene Storyworlds, features essays explicitly con-
cerned with the representation of modern environmental crises in narrative 
worlds. They thus take direction from Herman’s work on storyworlds, as well 
as recent scholarship in cognitive narratology by Herman and Marie-Laure 
 I N T R O D U C T I O N •  19
Ryan, among others. These essays explore how the particular environments 
and natural phenomena associated with modernity challenge traditional nar-
rative techniques and suggest new ones. They also question what conventions 
modern environmental narratives deploy, how a different set of representa-
tions may help readers better model storyworlds that appreciate the scale of 
problems such as global climate change, and what role such storyworlds may 
play in an environmental activism sensitive to the worldmaking power of 
narrative.
Alexa Weik von Mossner, in “Feeling Narrative Environments: Econarra-
tology, Embodiment, and Emotion,” investigates the link between narratives 
and “topophilia,” or the affective bond between people and place. Her essay 
explores the underlying narrative strategies in the evocation and imaginary 
experience of literary topophilia through readings of Sanora Babb’s memoir 
An Owl at Every Post and dust bowl novel Whose Names Are Unknown. Draw-
ing on recent work in affective and embodied narratology, as well as on psy-
chological and enactivist approaches to narrative, she argues that fiction and 
nonfiction texts engage not only their readers’ minds but also readers’ bodies 
in the affective evocation of literary environments, which potentially has fur-
ther value when thinking about narratives of environmental injustice. Ulti-
mately, she argues for a pairing of ecocritical modes of reading and cognitive 
and moderate enactivist approaches to narrative to focus better on how liter-
ary texts enable their readers to feel imaginary environments.
Matthew M. Low is similarly interested in readers’ modeling of narrative 
worlds in his essay, “Finding a Practical Narratology in the Work of Restora-
tion Ecology.” Low draws on the work of cognitive narrative theorists such 
as Herman and Ryan to argue that narratives of the prairie have the poten-
tial to serve two purposes. On the one hand, narration of, on, or about the 
prairie can have the effect of “reconstructing” for readers an ecosystem that 
has been reduced, in many places throughout the North American midconti-
nent, to less than one-tenth of a percent of its historic, presettlement extent. 
On the other hand, Low suggests, the theorizing of storyworlds by cognitive 
narratologists—and especially their classification of storyworlds as “recon-
structed” and “dynamic” models of evolving situations—mirrors how restora-
tion ecologists view the work of reconstructing the prairie. Low’s essay surveys 
how restoration ecologists such as Chris Helzer narrate the process of prairie 
reconstruction to assert that the acts of (re)modeling worlds on the ground 
and in the minds of readers can be concomitant and ought to be the dominant 
strategy for revitalizing our most neglected ecosystem. He thus explores the 
potential of a hands-on, applied cognitive narratology suited to environmental 
restoration.
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Astrid Bracke turns the collection’s readers to considerations of global cli-
mate change and genre by identifying the generic parameters of “cli-fi” in 
her essay “Worldmaking Environmental Crisis: Climate Fiction, Econarra-
tology, and Genre.” She surveys recent climate change novels to understand 
better how narratives can represent an environmental problem that stretches 
the limits of the imagination. Bracke argues that cli-fi narratives put readers 
through a two-step process: they first depict a textual world that is very close 
to the actual world in which readers read, and then extend this familiar world 
into the unfamiliar, without the narrator stepping in to explicitly guide readers 
into navigating this new space. Illustrating these claims via readings of Bar-
bara Kingsolver’s Flight Behavior and Nathaniel Rich’s Odds Against Tomorrow, 
and drawing heavily on Ryan’s principle of minimal departure, Bracke offers 
scholars a useful guide for discussing cli-fi in contrast to other genres, such as 
speculative or apocalyptic fiction. 
Finally, in “Narrative in the Anthropocene,” Erin James examines today’s 
environment from a broad, geologic scale to imagine how specific narrative 
techniques might help readers better understand conceptualizations of agency, 
time, space, and narration demanded by the Anthropocene. Taking cues from 
Gerald Prince’s imagining of a postcolonial narratology, she envisages a narra-
tology sensitive to matters commonly associated with our new epoch, such as 
the agency of the material world, the extremely long durations affiliated with 
environmental slow violence, new categories of spatialization demanded by 
representations of rising sea waters, and the collective narration necessitated 
by a new conceptualization of humans acting together, as a species, to enact 
global change. Her discussion of an “Anthropocene narrative theory” also asks 
how our definition of narrative itself may change in an age in which humans 
literally “write” the earth.
Our collection ends with an afterword by renowned environmental 
humanities and narrative scholar Ursula K. Heise.
Taken as a whole, the essays in this collection assert that the stories that 
we tell each other about the environment play a significant role in our percep-
tion of and interaction with that environment. They also assert the importance 
of our ability to analyze and understand those stories. They suggest that the 
vocabulary developed by narratologists could benefit environmental humani-
ties and ecocritical conversations, especially in helping environmental schol-
ars better account for the formal aspects of representations of environment in 
various types of narratives (novels, short stories, films, etc.). And they propose 
that environmental insights could broaden narrative theory, particularly in 
helping narrative scholars become more sensitive to issues of space and place, 
strengthening the connection between text and extratextual worlds of interest 
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to many narratologists, and expanding the repertoire of questions narrative 
theorists ask of narratives to include those that are explicitly and implicitly 
environmental.
Although the essays in this collection address a robust range of topics 
and methodologies for econarratological readings, we do not suggest that 
this range is complete; there remain significant issues to address. Additional 
growth areas for econarratology include, but are not limited to, the conven-
tions and consumption of digital narratives, greater focus on questions of 
environmental justice and the potential for econarratology as a base for forms 
of structural critique, the uses of econarratology in creative writing pedagogy, 
synergies between environmental history and the history of the novel, the 
role of storytelling in anthropological and sociological environmental stud-
ies (as well as the role of narratology in the environmental humanities more 
generally), the role of incorporating scientific methods into the study of nar-
rative and of environment and narrative poetry. Important future work also 
lies in additional scholarship on postcolonial and indigenous narratives, simi-
lar to that which was so important to early attempts to pair ecocriticism and 
narratology, and the visual narratives that dominate much of today’s popular 
culture. We also see much more room to expand upon some of the key con-
siderations at the heart of this cluster of essays, including questions of the 
human and nonhuman, analysis of narrative discourse and rhetoric in light of 
environmentalism, readings of narrative space and the worldmaking power of 
narratives, and explorations of new narrative structures and genres inspired by 
new environments. We present this collection to you as a conversation starter 
and invite you to join us.
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C H A P T E R  1
Unnatural Narratology and Weird Realism 
in Jeff VanderMeer’s Annihilation
JON HEGGLUND
I N T H E past few decades, nature has undergone a period of crisis in many 
disciplines and fields of inquiry, with narratology and ecocritical theory no 
exceptions. Though it is well beyond the scope of this essay to track these 
transformations exhaustively, I do wish to highlight their particular conver-
gences within the realms of postclassical narratology and materialist ecology, 
as well as indicate some narrative features that align with recent trends in eco-
critical philosophy. This focus is occasioned by the increasing attention to eco-
logical approaches to narrative and, to a lesser but still meaningful extent, the 
concern within materialist environmental thought on the importance of nar-
rative in understanding the planetary challenges of the Anthropocene epoch.
To begin with the adventures of nature in postclassical narratology, we 
need to go back to Monika Fludernik’s Toward a “Natural” Narratology (1996), 
which approached the systematic study of narrative not from the basis of lit-
erary texts but rather from a linguistic conception of spontaneous, oral, con-
versational narratives as studied by William Labov, among others. Already 
realizing the connotative messiness of the term natural, Fludernik signals a 
very specific usage of the word (as implied by the quotes around it in the 
title) that opposes it to the artificial, aestheticized qualities of literary nar-
ratives. For Fludernik, the salient criterion for narrative is not plot or genre 
but “experientiality,” that is, “the quasi-mimetic evocation of ‘real-life experi-
ence,’” which “correlates with the evocation of consciousness” and “reflects a 
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cognitive schema of embodiedness that relates to human existence and human 
concerns” (9). In response to the self-avowed “anthropomorphic bias” of Flud-
ernik’s model (9), several scholars, most notably Brian Richardson and Jan 
Alber, sought to highlight the many narratives in the world-historical corpus 
that seem to violate or contradict this normative notion of a mimesis based 
upon human experientiality, and in response, they adopted the provocative 
term “unnatural narratology.” For these scholars, unnatural narratology rep-
resents myriad narrative modes and methods that violate or contradict what 
seems to be “natural” in storytelling scenarios, highlighting the “non- and 
anti-mimetic” (Richardson 2) and the representation of the “physically, logi-
cally, or humanly impossible” in narrative (Alber 3). Though the practice of 
unnatural narratology has many distinctions among its advocates, the move-
ment as a whole encourages a methodology that resists the tendency to natu-
ralize a tacit bias toward the mimeticism and anthropocentrism implied by 
Fludernik’s notion of experientiality.
Meanwhile, nature has taken a longer, more complicated journey in eco-
critical and environmental thought. Through the 1970s and 1980s, nature was 
the (often unspoken) foundation of environmentally oriented literary studies. 
Indeed, the primary task of this movement was to set an authentic nature or 
wilderness over and against the artificial, destructive processes of industrial 
capitalism, urbanization, and commodity culture. Early forays into environ-
mental aesthetics, highly influenced by the nature writing of Henry David 
Thoreau, John Muir, Mary Austin, and Aldo Leopold, favored a mode of 
descriptive realism to render the particularity and intrinsic beauty of nature. 
In the last two decades, however, first with the rise of cultural studies and 
more recently with the awareness of the new geological epoch of the Anthro-
pocene, environmental aesthetics has become a more complex, ambivalent 
discourse, now intersected by feminism, postcolonial theory, science studies, 
posthumanism, and vitalist and object-oriented philosophies. In the 1990s, 
nature was increasingly seen as a production of culture and no longer synony-
mous with the real or material substratum of the world. As William Cronon 
puts it in his seminal 1995 essay, “The Trouble with Wilderness”: “As we gaze 
into the mirror it holds up for us, we too easily imagine that what we behold 
is Nature when in fact we see the reflection of our own unexamined longings 
and desires” (7). Recent materialist thought has questioned nature on an even 
more fundamental level, insisting that the material world is neither a purely 
ideological nor culturally variable construct. Thinkers as diverse as Bruno 
Latour, Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Timothy Morton 
have argued for an ontological model of nature that emphasizes its entangled, 
hybrid, and self-organizing aspects, in turn bringing the embodied human 
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subject down from the lofty perch of Cartesian separation from the world. 
Nature is no longer a pure, idealized Other to a normative human Self but is 
rather composed of the endlessly complex material interactions in which indi-
vidual and collective human and nonhuman life exists. Because both cultural-
ists and materialists reject a conventional, pastoral model of nature, however, 
the unqualified use of the term has fallen out of favor within many current 
ecocritical conversations.
This essay does not aim to reconcile these distinct uses of nature (but 
I think it is worthwhile to note at the outset that both unnatural narratol-
ogy and materialist ecocriticism are formed in opposition to a sense of nature 
as a normative concept). My goal here is more modest: to extend and cri-
tique the foundational principles of unnatural narratology in the hopes that 
its insights and orientations might be adapted to better describe and interpret 
fictional narratives particular to the geohistorical epoch of the Anthropocene. 
In particular, I focus on the articulation of unnatural narratology advanced 
by Jan Alber, whose succinct definition offers both a concrete touchstone and 
a useful bridge to the concerns of material ecocriticism. My contention is 
that, while Alber develops a complex and thoughtful taxonomy for unnatu-
ral narratology, its foundational division of unnatural text and natural world 
does not adequately admit narrative figurations of the strange, transforma-
tive materialities of the Anthropocene. Unnatural narratology is alive to the 
fundamental weirdness of narrative representation, but that attention has not 
yet been steered toward the very “unnaturalness” of the natural world itself. I 
would particularly like to press Alber’s notion of the unnatural as the narra-
tive projection of an impossible storyworld. The recognition of the Anthro-
pocene has prompted a reexamination of what may be possible in the natural 
world. The human transformation of nature has yielded very strange things 
indeed: a Europe-sized patch of floating plastics in the Pacific, poison-resis-
tant urban rats, post-Fukushima radioactive boars, the genetic “editing” of 
human embryos—the list could go on ad infinitum. Given that such actually 
existing weird materialities blur clear distinctions between the natural and the 
unnatural, implicating human agency along the way, it would seem that the 
ontological premises of unnatural narratology could stand for closer examina-
tion. The very notion of narrative mimesis (or anti-mimesis) becomes a mov-
ing target when the contours of reality can no longer be taken for granted as 
ontologically secure.
Through a reading of Jeff VanderMeer’s 2014 novel, Annihilation, I pro-
pose that unnatural narratology’s focus on the anti-mimetic might be mutated 
into considerations of how narrative dramatizes the uncanny nature of mime-
sis itself, based as it is on the shape-shifting materiality of the world. Bor-
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rowing from the philosopher Graham Harman’s notion of “weird realism,” I 
propose that unnatural narratology’s emphasis on the anti-mimetic might be 
adapted to read the drama of emergent, nonanthropomorphic agency from a 
“weird” materiality—hence I offer the idea of the “weird” as an adaptation of 
the “unnatural.” VanderMeer’s tale of an unknowable, distributed entity that 
has mysteriously taken over and transformed a region (referred to as “Area 
X”) meets Alber’s basic criteria of the representation of an impossible sto-
ryworld, but this label is complicated by the circumstance of the narrator, a 
biologist whose own embodied subjectivity is infiltrated by the environment 
of Area X itself. The narratological analysis of VanderMeer’s novel calls for an 
openness to the ways in which narrative actively and dynamically constructs 
distinctions between subjects and objects, figure and background, characters 
and storyworld. My reading focuses on two aspects of VanderMeer’s narrative 
in particular: 1) the narrative rendering of nonanthropomorphic, distributed 
agency and 2) the first-person narration, which offers a contingent, performa-
tive sense of the human constructed through the act of narration rather than 
the assumption of an ontologically distinct human “character” who precedes 
and subtends the novel’s storyworld.
FROM THE UNNATURAL TO THE WEIRD: 
NARRATOLOGY, MIMESIS, MATERIALITY
Unnatural narratology might be best described as a confederation of com-
mon interests rather than a strict methodological program. In a 2010 Narra-
tive essay collectively authored by three of its most prominent advocates (Jan 
Alber, Stefan Iversen, and Henrik Skov Nielsen), the authors propose that “the 
study of unnatural narrative seeks to describe the ways in which projected sto-
ryworlds deviate from real-world frames [and] tries to interpret these ‘devia-
tions’” (116). Unnatural narratology presents itself in opposition to narrative 
theory’s implicit bias toward mimesis. The mimetic model, in which narrative 
is presumed to be a form of representation that refers to a “possible world” 
and conforms to conventional physical and cognitive frameworks, has held 
an unspoken, even coercive, power over all narratological descriptions and 
theorizations of narrative. The villain in the unnaturalists’ story is “‘mimetic 
reductionism,’ that is, the argument that each and every aspect of narrative 
can be explained on the basis of our real-world knowledge and resulting 
cognitive parameters” (115). Unnatural narratology thus involves a cognitive 
reframing of narratives that consciously reject mimetic models of storytelling 
and a consequent exploration of how frames are revised, rejected, or blended 
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through the reader’s encounter with anti- or non-mimetic elements of a nar-
rative. In their reading of Robert Coover’s short story, “The Babysitter,” for 
example, they refuse any interpretive strategy that would assimilate the con-
tradictory events of the narrative into an overarching frame of mimesis—for 
example, that the logical impossibility of events can be explained by the sub-
jective fantasies of a character or narrator. Rather, they argue that “one way of 
responding to the interpretive challenges of unnatural narratives is to create 
new cognitive parameters by reshuffling and/or recombining existing frames” 
(118). The thrust of unnatural narratology, in this instance, is not to resolve 
contradictions in favor of real-world laws that mute or silence anti-mimetic 
elements; rather, it wishes to highlight and explore such contradictions as a 
productive challenge to mimetic and anthropomorphic models. Though it 
contains the word “nature” in its name, unnatural narratology is fundamen-
tally about modes of representation rather than any putative connections 
between the text and the material world.
It is the critique of mimesis that offers a bridge from unnatural narra-
tology to an ecocritical approach, as materialist ecocriticism likewise wishes 
to complicate and challenge naturalized ideas of “reality.” Alber isolates the 
narrative presentation of “physically, logically, or humanly impossible” sto-
ryworlds as the criteria for unnatural narrative. For simplicity’s sake, I group 
these three together under the rubric of “impossible storyworlds” (as a mate-
rialist approach would ultimately subsume the “logical” and the “human” into 
the realm of the “physical”). Alber claims that “the unnatural (or impossible) 
in such narratives is measured against the foil of ‘natural’ (real-world) cogni-
tive frames and scripts that have to do with natural laws, logical principles, 
and standard human limitations of knowledge and ability” (3). Expanding the 
scope of such narratives beyond their common association with postmodern-
ism, Alber “posit[s] a historically constant notion of the unnatural,” claiming 
that “the world we inhabit is dominated by physical laws, logical principles, 
and anthropomorphic limitations that are permanent and stable” (6, my ital-
ics). To be fair, Alber acknowledges that his notion of the natural is a “foil,” 
and one that makes claims primarily about “cognitive frames and scripts” 
rather than the materialities that subtend conventional understandings. Yet, I 
think it reasonable to challenge—given their use of the natural/unnatural dis-
tinction in the very name of their program—the nature of their “nature,” as it 
were. Though Alber’s goal is more pragmatically oriented toward narratology, 
he slips ontological premises into the program: the unnatural is clearly based 
on an accepted, stable, commonsense view of nature. Thus, while Alber’s goal 
is the elevation and serious consideration of narrative examples that violate 
real-world cognitive frames, this dynamic exists in a closed circuit between 
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the reader’s cognition and the narrative text, and in fact needs the bedrock of 
a “permanent and stable” reality to distinguish the rule-breaking exceptions 
of the unnatural. Unnatural narratology, to my mind, cannot afford to be so 
blithe in the easy importation of foundational ontological distinctions into 
conventionalized cognitive frames.
As the author of the book that advances the idea of “natural narratology,” 
Monica Fludernik makes perhaps the most obvious critique of the unnatural-
ists. In her response to unnatural narratology, Fludernik points out that the 
program’s basis in negation—of natural narratology, of mimesis—“ends up 
reinforcing the mimetic rather than escaping from its clutches” (Fludernik, 
“How Natural” 366). Maria Mäkelä extends this critique by arguing that, even 
if we take mimesis as a legitimate target of critique, the unnatural view reduces 
a complex, textured process into a one-dimensional straw man. Mäkelä insists 
that mimesis, as we understand it through realist fiction, is itself infused with 
the unnatural rather than diametrically opposed to it. Drawing upon Vik-
tor Shklovsky’s notion of defamiliarization, Mäkelä notes that “many realist 
conventions are peculiarly balanced between the cognitively familiar and the 
cognitively estranging.” (145). In Mäkelä’s view, mimesis is never a smooth, 
seamless process of reproducing a familiar, conventional “real world” through 
particular stylistic and narrative choices. Using Gustave Flaubert’s Madame 
Bovary as her touchstone, Mäkelä concludes that “realism would seem to be 
an art more of distortion than of reproduction” (153). Even while we should 
acknowledge that realism and mimesis are not identical, both concepts func-
tion as part of the same hegemony of narratology to which the unnaturalist 
approach takes exception. Thus Mäkelä’s point stands: even in their most con-
ventional forms, mimetic or realist narratives always carry their own cogni-
tively disruptive and defamiliarizing elements.
Like narratology, ecocritical approaches have had their own difficulties 
with mimesis. Ecocritics through the 1990s tended to place special powers 
within the “environment” (typically settings associated with an organic, green 
conception of nature). While rarely being so naïve as to claim that texts can 
mimetically represent worlds in a direct way, critics such as Lawrence Buell 
claim that ecocritically rich texts embody “a certain kind of environmental 
referentiality as part of the overall work of the text” (32). Buell, and others, 
claim that, while mimesis is never an absolute, textual representations can 
be more or less mimetic in their environmental representation: “Language 
never replicates landscapes,” Buell argues, “but it can be bent toward or away 
from them” (33). Dana Phillips takes on these claims of a “soft” mimesis of 
environmental writing, reminding us that, when it comes to “nature” or “envi-
ronment,” text and world are manifestly distinct. Phillips wonders “why envi-
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ronmental literature should be deputized to make the presence and reality 
of the natural world available to us by proxy, when that world lies waiting to 
be explored by bookworms and bold adventurers alike” (7). Buell and Phil-
lips are caught in something of a cul-de-sac as they circle round the question 
of mimesis: the former insisting on a constitutive relation between text and 
world, the latter sundering the relation altogether. Econarratology, specifically 
a weird, materialist narratology as I outline it here, points toward an escape 
route by shifting the question slightly: what happens when a text evokes a sto-
ryworld that itself draws our attention to the ontological messiness that pre-
vents a clear separation between the two? This is not to say that, for the most 
part, we don’t approach and experience such texts as representations—just 
like unnatural narratology, an ecomaterialist approach is focused on specific 
genres and narrative modes rather than narrative tout court—but such repre-
sentations do model relationships between human subjects and storyworlds 
that disrupt conceptual divisions of subject and object, human and nonhu-
man, active agent and passive object or environment.
A materialist ecocritical approach sees narrative as intimately tied with 
our understandings of material processes in the physical world, rejecting 
Cartesian dualisms that continue to structure such binary oppositions. Stacey 
Alaimo has approached these questions by theorizing that human embod-
iedness is a kind of “trans-corporeality, in which the human is always inter-
meshed with the more-than-human world” and “ultimately inseparable from 
‘the environment’” (2). Clearly, these trans-corporeal models of humanness 
challenge the normative Cartesianism of the narratological subject, and con-
versely, the teeming, vibrant, shapeshifting contours of the material world 
complicate notions of “setting” or “environment” as the passive, inert back-
ground for a drama of human or anthropomorphic action. Serenella Iovino 
and Serpil Opperman address the entanglement of human and material worlds 
in narrative (if not quite narratological) terms. Drawing on the example of 
cancer-causing wastes in Naples, Italy, which effect agency through human 
and animal bodies as well as the collective social fabric, they ask: “Who is 
the storyteller of these stories narrated through and across bodies by man-
ifold material–discursive agents, such as toxic waste, sick cells, individual 
organisms, and social forces? Who is really ‘the narrating subject’ if things—
collectives, assemblages, actants—are narrative agencies?” (459). Iovino and 
Opperman do not rigorously theorize a model of narrative but suggest that 
“the narrative potentialities of reality” can issue from an “intrinsic performa-
tivity of elements” (459). Narrative, in their view, need not be composed of 
anthropomorphic agents possessing something like a consciousness or subjec-
tivity; rather, their focus on material cause-and-effect relations (within which 
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human actions are a subset) “broadens the range of narrative agencies” (149). 
This has implications for our understanding of fundamental narrative catego-
ries such as “character,” “setting,” and “storyworld”: characters need not be 
human, settings need not be backgrounds, and storyworlds need not be filed 
under “mimetic” or “impossible.”
While such scenarios may be of interest to the anti-mimetic proclivities 
of unnatural narratology, a key difference should be noted. Unnatural nar-
ratology approaches the anti-mimetic in a somewhat black-and-white way: 
the narrative presence of, say, a talking chair, is clearly a “crossover” from 
one recognized frame of human experience to another, and so a blending 
of frames takes place in this particular narrative instance. The basic catego-
ries of “real world” and “impossible storyworld” remain fixed, however, and 
our ontological footing is unshaken. In narrative scenarios that I will refer 
to as “weird,” there is no such reassurance. To put this in terms of cognitive 
theory, frames that are knocked askew are unable to be fully restored to a 
stable, conventionalized position. Weird narratology, as I envision it, is aimed 
at narratives that foreground a blurring between narrative agents and mate-
rial entities or environments—whether this blurring is visible at the level of 
discourse, story, or in the case of more interesting examples, such as Annihila-
tion, both. Although writing from the disciplinary perspective of philosophy, 
the object-oriented ontologist Graham Harman gives a name to this dynamic 
in his readings of H. P. Lovecraft: weird realism. In his book of the same name, 
Harman reframes “realism” at an ontological rather than a representational 
level: “Reality itself is weird,” Harman writes, “because reality itself is incom-
mensurable with any attempt to represent or measure it” (51). In addition to 
troubling a clear ontological divide between the solidity of the material world 
and unnatural experiments of representation, Harman reframes realism as a 
descriptive rather than aesthetic mode, with “weird” narratives attempting to 
render a real, if unaccountably bizarre and unstable, world. Where unnatural 
narratology begins its analyses from a normative notion of the human, and 
its distinction from nonhuman elements of a storyworld—even as it may blur 
or erase these distinctions in the analysis of an individual narrative—a weird 
reading enters a narrative with no such assumptions in place. Granted, most 
readers will bring normative cognitive frames to bear on a narrative, but the 
key difference here is that weird realist narratives have the power to transform 
those frames so that the assumed stability of “the world” is no longer a stable, 
normative point of reference. Weird narratology can thus be instrumental in 
accommodating a more flexible, emergent understanding of agency and cau-
sality that does not depend upon the primacy of human, or even strongly 
anthropomorphic, actors.
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WEIRD STORYWORLDS
Narratology already has many tools that could be put to use for the read-
ing of weird narratives. One such concept is Porter Abbott’s articulation of 
emergence, which gives narratologically minded readers a way to think about 
how narratives such as Annihilation track the transformations of background 
into figure, or “setting” into “character.” Abbott describes “emergent behav-
ior” as “the coming into being of objects or patterns that are not the result of 
a centralized authority or plan or guiding hand or pacemaker or any other 
kind of overarching control, much less an intention, but instead are the result 
of innumerable local interactions” (228). This describes VanderMeer’s story-
world more or less accurately. The novel scaffolds a relatively conventional 
narrative mode (first-person retrospective narration) onto a radically unstable 
and ultimately unknowable storyworld, which is presumed to have some form 
of agency and sentience that resists easy anthropomorphism or explanation 
by an agent of “overarching control.” The narrator, a biologist who is one of 
four members of an expeditionary team assembled by a governmental agency 
known as the Southern Reach, recounts her experiences on the twelfth expe-
dition into a region known as Area X, a wilderness that has been strangely 
transformed by a mysterious “event” decades earlier. Since that time, unac-
countable things—sometimes benign, sometimes violent and catastrophic—
have happened to both the ecology of the place and to the humans who have 
ventured into it. For example, each member of the previous expedition, one of 
whom was the narrator’s husband, mysteriously disappeared within Area X, 
only to reappear months later and shortly thereafter develop “inoperable, sys-
temic cancer” that proved fatal within months (38). Other reports of strange 
creatures and happenings within Area X have filtered through to the biologist, 
generating mysteries about the nature of Area X and the causes of its transfor-
mation—in short, the reader enters the novel focused on an ontological mys-
tery of the storyworld: What is this place? Is it an environment, or an acting 
agent in its own right? How did it come to be transformed in such a way to 
upset fundamental laws of nature?1 In contrast to a stable, referential, objec-
tive storyworld—what David Herman refers to in Story Logic as “topologi-
cal space”—our sense of spatiality is undone at the outset. First, a landmark 
appears that is not commensurable with the putative topological space of the 
storyworld, as it doesn’t appear on the expedition’s “official” maps. Second, 
there is a semantic inconsistency or mistake: the narrator describes a hidden 
 1. Many early reviews of the novel highlight this blending through the use of terms such 
as “ecological uncanny” and “weird ecology.” See Carroll, Rothman, and Tompkins.
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structure that “plunges into the earth” as a “tower” (and to which other char-
acters refer as a “tunnel”). VanderMeer begins with a hint of the instability 
to come, a vertiginous unhinging of figure, ground, and the relation between 
the two. While the narrative presents a plausible, realist spatiality on the sen-
tence level, it undermines any notion of a normative “real world” from which 
mimetic representation may or may not be derived. There is nothing osten-
tatiously anti-mimetic in the early pages of the novel, but the background of 
Area X and the semantic ambiguity of the tower/tunnel distinction generate 
a sense of uncertainty poised between “real world” and “anti-mimetic” cogni-
tive frames.
The early pages of Annihilation fold a logical impossibility into the laws of 
the storyworld itself: that Area X is itself is a massively distributed, sentient 
being akin to what Timothy Morton describes as a “hyperobject.”2 As such, 
it is both a backgrounded frame that we are likely to code as “environment” 
or “setting” as well as a narrative actant or figure—a character of sorts. When 
the explorers attempt to identify the underground tower, they are unable to 
ascribe its existence to any kind of anthropomorphic agency, as the anthro-
pologist in the group remarks that its model is “hard to identify” and that 
“the materials are ambiguous, indicating local origin but not necessarily local 
construction” (5). VanderMeer opens up a narrative gap that we are increas-
ingly invited to fill with the hypothesis that these unexplained phenomena 
issue from a massively distributed entity. This hypothesis is further supported 
by the biologist’s observation of various animals in Area X, which seem on 
occasion to be “possessed” with an unseen agency at odds with their species-
driven behavior. At one point, a wild boar charges the group, but as it comes 
closer, “its face became stranger and stranger. Its features where somehow 
contorted, as if the beast was dealing with an extreme of inner torment.  .  .  . 
I had the startling impression of some presence in the way its gaze seemed 
turned inward and its head willfully pulled to the left as if there were an invis-
ible bridle. . . . It veered abruptly leftward, with what I can only describe as a 
great cry of anguish, into the underbrush” (12). The boar acts not according 
to the traits of its species but is instead described as being manipulated by 
some other “will” at odds with the boar’s natural behavior—an agency visibly 
 2. In fact, VanderMeer’s fiction and Morton’s theoretical work have been mutually sus-
taining. Morton has used VanderMeer’s fiction as an imaginative evocation of hyperobjects, 
and VanderMeer in turn has retrospectively acknowledged the mutual resonance: “After I wrote 
Annihilation, I started seeing reviews that mentioned your work in connection with it; that’s 
why I picked up Hyperobjects, and the thing that was fascinating to me is that it appealed to 
both the organic and the mechanical sides. The mechanical side made me understand what I 
had written better because the very term ‘hyperobject’ kind of encapsulated what was going on 
organically in Annihilation.” See Hageman et al., “A Conversation.”
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emergent but in no way attached to a discrete, identifiable entity. Other ani-
mals—an unseen, unidentified creature that moans at night, a dolphin with 
human eyes—index an emergent nonhuman agency through a blending of 
anthropomorphism and unknowable difference, prompting the biologist (and 
the reader) to impute complex, if still unknown, agency to actions or traits 
that violate commonsense, mimetic understandings of animal behavior.
The centerpiece of nonhuman, emergent agency in the novel is an entity 
that resides deep within the aforementioned tower. The biologist dubs this 
creature “the Crawler,” as it moves slowly up and down the spiral interior, 
shooting an incandescent “ink” of tiny, hand-shaped spores in cursive script 
along the inner walls of the structure. The uncanniness of the tower is sug-
gested from the novel’s opening lines, but its relation to the environment of 
Area X and the Crawler within is foregrounded by the biologist’s attempts 
to identify the boundaries where environment gives way to agency, and vice 
versa. The first thing that the party notices when descending into the tower 
is the writing on the wall: it looks “oddly organic,” which piques the curiosity 
of the biologist. Her instinct is to “parse the lingual meaning” of the script 
(which reads like a deranged adaptation of a Puritanical sermon),3 when her 
companion asks what the letters are made of. The biologist reverts to a sci-
entific way of seeing, noting that the words were made from a substance that 
looked “like rich green fernlike moss but in fact was probably a type of fungi 
or other eukaryotic organism” (17). Soon the words are no longer language but 
“a miniature ecosystem” populated by translucent creatures “shaped like tiny 
hands embedded by the base of the palm” (17). As she peers in for a closer 
look, a nodule bursts open and sprays her with “spores,” which she inhales 
(17). This material incursion transgresses the separation between a Cartesian 
observer-narrator and a passive material environment, and from this point, 
we are cued to treat the narrator as both a human witness of events and an 
emergent agent whose actions and perceptions may be a function of the dis-
tributed entity at work in Area X. This hybridity is theorized by William Con-
nolly, as he describes human agency in contrast to Cartesian self-possession; 
it is, rather, an “emergent phenomenon, with some nonhuman processes pos-
 3. An excerpt of the writing that is revealed to biologist is as follows: “Where lies the 
strangling fruit that came from the hand of the sinner I shall bring forth the seeds of the dead 
. . . to share with the worms that gather in the darkness and surround the world with the power 
of their lives while from the dim-lit halls of other places forms that never could be writhe for the 
impatience of the few who have never seen or been seen. . . . Why should I rest when wickedness 
exists in the world. . . . God’s love shines on anyone who understands the limits of endurance, and 
allows forgiveness.  .  .  . Chosen for the service of a higher power .  .  . in the black water with the 
sun shining at midnight, those fruit shall come ripe and in the darkness of that which is golden 
shall split open to reveal the revelation of the fatal softness in the earth . . .” (31–33).
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sessing attributes bearing family resemblances to human agency and with 
human agency understood by reference to its emergence from nonhuman 
processes of proto-agency” (23). To put this in the context of Annihilation: 
functionally, there is an anthropomorphic narrator within a projected story-
world, but ontologically, there is no categorical, material distinction between 
the weird, nonhuman entities and the supposedly human itself. From this 
point on, the biologist self-consciously interrogates the boundaries between 
subject and object, human and environment, and the narrative takes on a ver-
tiginous quality as the narrator tries to both understand the emergent agen-
cies within Area X as well as within herself.
NARRATORIAL HUMANISM
One might reasonably counter: even if elements in the storyworld are invested 
with some agency, doesn’t the first-person character-narration implicitly 
privilege a normative model of the human? Yes and no. From cognitive and 
rhetorical perspectives, we have little trouble placing our narrative in this 
frame: cognitively, as we default to the well-worn convention of first-person 
retrospective narration; rhetorically, as the communicative situation is fore-
grounded by reference to the recording of observations in her field journal 
as well as the direct address of the reader as “you.” After the initial establish-
ment of these frames, however, the narrative works to erode our confidence 
in the category of the human through the narrative description of the sto-
ryworld, and indeed, through the narrator’s retrospective description of her 
own embodied experientiality within the storyworld. Just as the storyworld 
features entities in a constant state of morphism, so, too, does the biologist 
exist in a state of ontological uncertainty as one emergent agency among oth-
ers. Yet, authorial readers still engage the narrative through an entirely anthro-
pomorphic frame, even as the human content of the narrator is indeterminate 
or absent. Rather than give us a simulation of a narratorial perspective or 
consciousness from the point of view of “Area X,” or the Crawler, or whatever 
other agency is at work, VanderMeer chooses to filter perception through the 
flimsy, uncertain, constantly transforming perspective of a human narrator 
who is herself constantly interrogating the production of boundaries between 
human and nonhuman entities.
It should be said at the outset that the narration in Annihilation is con-
spicuously retrospective from the novel’s opening; that is, it is not merely nar-
rated in the past tense, but attention is drawn to this gap when the narrator 
comments at the end of the first paragraph: “Looking out over that untroubled 
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landscape, I do not believe any of us could yet see the threat” (3). She also 
implies a catastrophic conflict when she remarks of her companions, “I would 
tell you the names of the other three if it mattered, but only the surveyor 
would last more than the next day or two” (6). While these retrospective pro-
lepses alert the reader that the narrator speaks from the other side of signifi-
cant story events, there are not initially any references to any change in her 
condition from the narrated-I to the narrating-I. In the novel’s initial pages, 
the retrospective narration draws attention to the story, in that the reader is 
cued to anticipate important events in the storyworld rather than changes 
in the mode of narration or the reliability of the narrator herself. From the 
moment that she inhales the spores on the wall of the tower/tunnel, however, 
the biologist’s entanglement with Area X begins to become more of a con-
cern in her own narration. Eventually she focuses the act of observation on 
herself rather than directing the distanced gaze of science exclusively upon 
the environment of Area X, and the narration becomes more self-referential. 
Within about four pages after her initial contact, the biologist wonders at least 
ten times if the spores are having an effect on her, what those effects might 
be, and if she will be able to distinguish her own “self ” from the agency of 
the spores, or indeed of the complex, distributed entity that comprises Area 
X. This presents a conundrum for the reader. It would seem that a narrative 
presented by a first-person narrator runs the risk of filtering the mysterious, 
emergent agencies of the storyworld through the anthropocentric mold of 
human consciousness, thus presenting a clear boundary between the human 
narrator and the nonhuman storyworld. Alternatively, the narrator could be 
presented as patently unreliable, leaving the reader to infer a “truth” through 
the gaps in the biologist’s reading and/or reporting of events. Annihilation 
offers a more complex stance on its narrator, however, by both preserving her 
observational reliability while casting doubt upon her own identity as a nor-
mative, embodied human subject.
The temporal distance between the narrated-I and the narrating-I, and 
the knowledge that the narrating-I may have been compromised or altered 
by contact with Area X opens up questions about reliability. I take Phelan’s 
point in Living to Tell About It that reliability is not a binary state. As Phelan 
argues, “A given narrator can be unreliable in different ways at different points 
in his or her narration” (52). In the case of the biologist, this is not a merely 
formal question. The narration gives the authorial audience cause to trust the 
biologist’s observations as a scientist even as we may doubt her motivations as 
a flesh-and-blood, psychologically realistic human character. While this dis-
tinction may point toward a largely unreliable narrator, the particularly com-
plex moments of unreliability are in fact essential in cultivating the reader’s 
40 •  J O N H E G G LU N D 
empathy in the absence of more conventional psychological traits of a mimetic 
character. For all of the ontological doubts cast upon the biologist-as-human, 
the typological category to which we refer—her role as scientist—gives her 
account a strong degree of reliability. Ralf Schneider, discussing the cognitive 
processes that go into our understanding of characters in literary narrative, 
posits that the reader conventionally “tries to apply top-down categorization as 
a preference rule” (617). That is, readers bring existing knowledge of social and 
cultural categories to a text as they “try to establish a holistic mental model of 
the character early on.  .  .  . The model will possess a number of well-defined 
features from which expectations, hypotheses, and inferences as well as expla-
nations concerning that character’s behavior can be generated” (619). The 
biologist presents an unconventional example of this: because the narrative 
contains a paucity of individuating details, we stay at that top-level categoriza-
tion throughout the narrative and think of her as a capital-S Scientist, thereby 
granting her a relative level of epistemological reliability when her role as a sci-
entist is foregrounded. Importantly, as the novel proceeds, these scientific acts 
of observation, hypothesis, and experimentation are turned toward her own 
embodied self, so that a direct relationship is established between her doubts 
about the purity of her humanness and the degree to which we believe she is 
giving a reliable account of the storyworld, both in terms of what she observes 
in Area X and the ways in which she herself has been changed by Area X.
One area in which her reliability is patently in doubt, however, is in her 
motivations for volunteering for the expedition. Perhaps the most important 
piece of background information that we learn about the biologist is that 
her husband was a member of the previous expedition to Area X, and that 
he returned in a significantly altered state and subsequently died of cancer 
shortly thereafter. Although this is one of the only details that individuates 
the biologist, she is careful to assert that it does not cloud her objectivity as 
a narrator: “I have hoped that in reading this account, you might find me a 
credible, objective witness. Not someone who volunteered for Area X because 
of some other event unconnected to the purpose of the expeditions. And, in 
a sense, this is still true, and my husband’s status as a member of an expedi-
tion is in many ways irrelevant to why I signed up” (37). Of James Phelan’s six 
types of unreliability, this appeal by the narrator falls most strongly into the 
category of underreading—an instance, according to Phelan, “when the narra-
tor’s lack of knowledge, perceptiveness, or sophistication yields an insufficient 
interpretation of an event, character, or situation” (52).4 The biologist under-
 4. See Phelan’s discussion of the six types (misreporting, underreporting, misreading, 
underreading, misregarding, underregarding) from Living to Tell About It, 49–53.
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stands that her grief for her late husband is not irrelevant to her own desire to 
join an expedition, but she appears to deceive herself as to the extent of this 
reason. This repression, however, appears not to affect her “reporting” capa-
bility, the insufficiency of which would cast doubt on all of her observations 
about Area X. Her unreliability is centered on her interpretation of her own 
emotional life, which draws upon cultural biases (“scientists should not be 
emotional”) that can even strengthen the reader’s impression of her observa-
tional acumen. Moreover, even when she discusses her emotional life, her use 
of euphemism (“some other event”) and qualification (“in many ways” and “in 
a sense”) attest to her concern for empirical accuracy while understating the 
degree of emotional attachment to her husband. Given that we tend to trust 
her observations, the cracks in the facade that relate to her own emotional life 
do not damage her overall reliability as a narrator so much as they convey an 
involuntary emotional response all the more compelling for her attempts to 
suppress it. This complex rhetorical performance adds up to a degree of nar-
rational humanness that satisfies conventional expectations even as the nature 
of her material being is thrown into ontological doubt.
While the act of narration—or, put rhetorically, the attempt to commu-
nicate—takes center stage through the climax, the novel concludes with a 
reminder of narrative’s inescapable materiality. Toward the end of the novel, 
the biologist reveals that, while bunkered in the lighthouse, she has “spent 
four long days perfecting this account you are reading, for all its faults” (127). 
The material artifactuality of the narrative is given a deeper significance when 
the biologist discovers a secret room in the lighthouse, accessible through a 
trap door. She discovers “a huge mound” that occupies the space of the room, 
“a kind of insane midden” containing “hundreds of journals” written by pre-
vious explorers of Area X (which reveals that there have in fact been many 
more than twelve expeditions) (70). The biologist picks up and reads some of 
them, including her husband’s, seeing them as so many unread communica-
tions—but ultimately regards them as physical artifacts involved in their own 
material transformations. She notes that “the walls of the room were rife with 
striations of mold, some of which formed dull stripes of red and green. From 
below, the way the midden spilled out in ripples and hillocks of paper became 
more apparent. Torn pages, crushed pages, journal covers warped and damp. 
Slowly the history of exploring Area X could be said to be turning into Area 
X” (74). This decomposing pile of journals comprises a narration that can-
not escape its own vibrant, transforming, transitional materiality, as it slowly 
morphs from subjective human voices narrating their observations about Area 
X into objects that themselves become part of the uncanny ecology of Area X.
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The biologist recognizes this in her last act of the novel, as she leaves her 
journal on top of the decomposing pile before departing up the coast, deeper 
into Area X. By leaving her narration with the others, she acknowledges that 
any subjective account cannot transcend or be detached from the material 
ecology of Area X. If it is a human narrative, it is also a transient one—a tran-
sience reflected by the biologist’s continuing awareness of her transformation 
from a Cartesian subject of knowledge into something else entirely: “Observ-
ing all of this has quelled the last ashes of the burning compulsion I had to 
know everything . . . anything . . . and in its place remains the knowledge that 
the brightness is not done with me. . . . The thought of continually doing harm 
to myself to remain human seems somehow pathetic” (128). Interestingly, even 
as the biologist relinquishes her own hold on a categorical humanness, the 
novel concludes with a flurry of first-person statements—including eighteen 
uses of “I” in the final 195 words—reasserting a functionally human identity in 
her own narration. The novel’s final sentence—“I am not returning home”—
stands apart as a final one-line paragraph, encapsulating this uncanny per-
sistence of the narrating subject forever alienated from a homologous space 
of self-identity. The novel ends with a character narrator in a transformation 
away from the human, increasingly animated by an agency that is both her 
and not-her, both “environment” and material actant. At the same time, we 
cannot forget the ecological materiality of the narration itself, the black-and-
white, lined journal with its inked-in pages recording the narration we are 
reading, slowly rotting on top of a pile of other notebooks, turning her story, 
and the stories of her predecessors, into deliquescent, moldering pulp.
CONCLUSION
In my reading of Annihilation. I’ve outlined the narrative mechanics that ren-
der fundamental interpretive frames ambiguous at the most basic, conceptual 
level. This “weirdness all the way down” stands in contrast to the reliance on 
a “permanent and stable” real-world reference demanded by unnatural nar-
ratology. Of course, one could argue that, by reading a work of literature, my 
approach cannot but reinscribe a representational model that falls short of the 
materialism advocated by ecocritical thinkers. Even so, VanderMeer’s narra-
tive figuration of emergent agency demands that the reader actively consider 
the cognitive processes by which we separate figure from background, agent 
from environment, narrator from storyworld. To use Karen Barad’s language 
in her discussion of entangled material phenomena under scientific observa-
tion, at some point the reader makes an “agential cut” between subject and 
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object, even if that cut is provisional and contextual. In contrast to the “Carte-
sian cut,” which takes the subject/object distinction “for granted,” the agential 
cut acknowledges the presence of an apparatus (say, fictional narration) that 
“enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and 
semantic) indeterminacy” (140). The “agential cut” is post hoc, arbitrary, not 
natural. That is, we have to proceed as if this subject/object divide describes 
the morphic qualities of the phenomena under consideration, even if we know 
the material realities are more complex than a narrative rendering can admit. 
Where Barad is concerned with the scientific practice of quantum physics, 
an analogous operation is at work in fictional representation: the sequential, 
nominative medium of language can only resolve into a communicative act if 
certain protocols and conventions are followed.
Unnatural narratology has been a useful corrective to a kind of creeping 
mimeticism adopted by much postclassical narratology. Yet, as it is presently 
constituted, it is not well suited to an econarratology that no longer accepts a 
transhistorical, unchanging, “backgrounded” model of physical reality. Per-
haps a more robust dialogue can emerge around the very question of mimesis, 
material agency, and the contingency of the “human” as a narratological cat-
egory. These questions, moreover, should be relevant not only to prose fictions 
but to other narrative mediums as well: film, serial television, videogames, to 
name a few. The age of the Anthropocene itself demands a reframing of agency, 
temporality, and futurity—and the more narratology can address these dimen-
sions at the intersection of literary analysis and planetary, ecological concerns, 
the more relevant it will become to twenty-first-century intellectual culture.
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C H A P T E R  2
Object-Oriented Plotting and 
Nonhuman Realities in DeLillo’s 
Underworld and Iñárritu’s Babel
MARCO CARACCIOLO
I T I S  fairly uncontroversial to say that narrative is a human practice that 
reflects human beliefs, values, and even the cognitive and physical makeup 
of our species. As inherently social animals, we tend to use stories to model 
everyday interactions among human subjects. Indeed, as researchers in both 
narrative theory (Herman “Stories”) and psychology (Mar and Oatley) argue, 
narrative is geared toward the representation of intersubjective experience—
the complex blend of cultural knowledge and cognitive skills that constitutes 
our engagement with other subjects.
But how does narrative handle processes and realities that fall beyond this 
domain of human action? How does it represent what several theorists refer 
to as the “nonhuman” (Grusin)—for example, phenomena that resist reduc-
tion to anthropocentric terms and/or question culturally widespread concep-
tions of the human? Examples of these phenomena include the timeline of the 
universe or the evolution of life on Earth, the interactions among subatomic 
particles, but also socioeconomic or environmental dynamics that destabilize 
a certain conception of the human subject as dualistically separate from the 
material world. Such realities take us to the outer limit of narrativity, the place 
where story borders on other discourse types—for instance, description or 
scientific explanation. Within the field of ecocriticism, Lawrence Buell was 
among the first to identify this anthropocentric bias of narrative, which led 
him to focus on nature writing—a genre that lies on the borderline of nar-
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rativity. This essay explores two case studies that, unlike Buell’s, do not relin-
quish narrative but rather use narrative form itself as an experimental probe 
into the nonhuman world. The narratives in question are Don DeLillo’s novel 
Underworld (1999) and Alejandro González Iñárritu’s film Babel (2006).
My emphasis on experimental narratives ties in with the movement of 
“unnatural narratology,” which calls attention to texts that challenge conven-
tional storytelling strategies (see Alber et al.; Alber, Nielsen, and Richardson). 
I don’t completely endorse the claims of scholars working within this move-
ment, and I find their concept of “unnatural” somewhat unwieldy, but I do 
admire their effort to expand the corpus of narratology. In that respect, my 
case studies have much in common with unnatural narratology. My focus is on 
the notion of plot, which I define—building on a long narratological tradition 
(discussed by Kukkonen)—as narrative’s organizing principle. Synthesizing 
various lines of work in narrative theory, I discuss plot as the fourfold logic—
at the same time temporal, causal, thematic, and affective—behind narrative 
composition. In particular, I investigate what I call “object-oriented plotting,” 
or cases in which an object takes center stage in a narrative and partly pushes 
plot beyond its anthropocentric comfort zone. The adverb “partly” reflects 
the tentative nature of this process: object-oriented plots do not (and can-
not) completely eradicate the human element in narrative. Yet these narratives 
are able to evoke a sense of what ecophilosopher Timothy Morton calls “the 
mesh,” or the constitutive intertwining between human realities and nonhu-
man processes (Ecological Thought 30). Such object-oriented plots decenter 
the human by using, at the level of narrative structure, a stand-in or “material 
anchor”—to borrow a term introduced by cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins 
(Cognition in the Wild; “Material Anchors”)—for nonhuman phenomena. In 
both my case studies, these material anchors are human-made objects that 
transcend their everyday usage as mere tools and thus elude anthropocentric 
grasp, serving as a reminder of our embedding in a more-than-human world. 
In Underworld, the material anchor is a baseball hit into the stands during a 
famous game between the Giants and the Dodgers in 1951. The baseball ties 
together the novel’s storylines, signifying the enmeshment of human history 
and physical realities. A similar role is played in Babel by a rifle, which sets 
off the plot through the accidental wounding of an American tourist in North 
Africa. This event will have consequences as far as Mexico and Japan, but it is 
presented as a mere accident, thus uncoupling the film’s plot from any clear-
cut sense of psychological causation.
The notion of causality is key to my argument, since—as I explain in the 
next section—it straddles the divide between the human and the physical 
world. Both my case studies are characterized by a loosening of the connec-
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tion between causation and psychological notions such as agency and inten-
tionality: the plot is symbolically driven by epistemological uncertainty (in 
DeLillo’s Underworld) or chance (in Babel) as a strategy for displacing nar-
rative’s bias toward human interaction. This move, in turn, has ramifications 
for the other dimensions of plot: it complicates the narrative’s temporality 
through nonlinear structures, it inflects the texts’ overall thematic coherence, 
and it shapes their affective dynamic.
The term “object-oriented plotting” is inspired by the philosophical trend 
initiated by Graham Harman under the heading of “object-oriented philoso-
phy” and developed in recent years by theorists such as Ian Bogost and Timo-
thy Morton (Hyperobjects). While some of the assumptions and claims made 
by these thinkers are debatable, their rejection of anthropocentric models is 
stimulating, not least because of the important challenge this rejection poses 
to narrative theory. Material objects, of course, have always played a role in 
narrative through their symbolic association with wealth and power. In the 
terminology of A.  J. Greimas’s actantial theory, objects can serve either as 
(literal) “objects of desire” or as “helpers” in a protagonist’s quest. But stan-
dard quest narratives would not be an instance of object-oriented plotting as I 
define it here, because the sought-for object is subordinated to human inten-
tionality: it constitutes a desire to be fulfilled, or a means toward reaching a 
certain goal. The upshot is that a plot that revolves around material objects 
is not necessarily object-oriented. For instance, “it” or object narrators in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature (see Blackwell; Bernaerts et al. 
82–88) mainly serve an ideological or didactic function; objects in the realist 
novel contribute to characterization or to authenticating a fictional represen-
tation, as Roland Barthes’s well-known account of the “reality effect” suggests. 
In these and in many other cases throughout literary history, the foreground-
ing of objects instrumentalizes the nonhuman, and thus subordinates it to the 
human: these narratives confirm, rather than question, an anthropocentric 
understanding of the world.
On the contrary, a plot is object-oriented when it challenges the subject/
object dualism that is at the heart of Greimas’s model, revealing the fragility 
and permeability of the culturally drawn boundaries of the (human) subject.1 
Arguably, this destabilizing dynamic has become salient in—and distinctive 
of—contemporary narrative practices because of the influence of scientific 
worldviews and ecological thinking. This chapter should thus be seen as a 
pilot study, engaging with two contemporary narratives in different media 
 1. For futher discussion of Greimas and the subject/object divide, see also Caracciolo, 
“Notes.”
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(print and film) while paving the way for a broader examination of contem-
porary narrative’s engagement with the nonhuman world. With its focus 
on experimental texts, my argument contributes to current narratological 
approaches in two areas: work on experimental narrative within the already 
mentioned field of unnatural narrative theory, and work investigating modes 
of narrative’s engagement with realities beyond the human (Bernaerts et al.; 
Herman, “Narratology beyond the Human”). This chapter should thus be seen 
as an extension of the “econarratological” research program recently outlined 
by Erin James. But whereas James focuses on spatial references in narratives 
and how they may draw readers into the storyworld, I will devote my atten-
tion to the temporal progression of narrative and how it is sustained by plot.
PLOT AND MODES OF CAUSATION
Described in broad strokes, plot is narrative’s organizing principle, the set 
of strategies through which the narrated events and existents are integrated 
into an emotionally meaningful whole. Plot is a complex notion, though, and 
a closer look at narratological work on plot—as surveyed recently by Karin 
Kukkonen—reveals that four distinct dimensions feed into narrative orga-
nization: temporal relations between events (i.e., what comes before what); 
causal relations between characters and events (i.e., who performs what action 
and for what purpose); thematic coherence (i.e., what the story is about and 
what function or “point” it has within a larger communicative act); and affec-
tive dynamics (i.e., why the story is interesting and emotionally satisfying). 
Narrative theorists tend to assign a different weight to these dimensions: for 
instance, E. M. Forster’s classic account of plot foregrounds causation, while 
James Phelan’s rhetorical approach privileges affective dynamics emerging in 
the interaction between authors and audiences. Emotion plays an even more 
significant role in Patrick Colm Hogan’s “affective narratology.” Here, however, 
I’m less interested in singling out the basic element of plot than in explor-
ing the interrelation between temporality, causation, thematic coherence, and 
affectivity. I thus build on the assumption that plot is an emergent phenom-
enon and that choices at the level of any of these four factors will have impli-
cations for the others as well.
The anthropocentric bias of narrative examined in the previous section 
is a case in point, since it inflects each of these factors. Yet causality is in 
a particularly interesting position. In their treatment of causation (Richard-
son; Kafalenos), narratologists tend to subsume all cause-effect relations in 
narrative under a single model or understanding of causality. Emma Kafale-
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nos, for instance, argues that “meaning is an interpretation of the relations 
between a given action (or happening or situation) and other actions (happen-
ings, situations) in a causal sequence” (1). In this definition, “action”—which 
implies agency and intentionality—is used interchangeably with “happening,” 
which does not imply agency or intentionality. Hence, Kafalenos builds on 
the assumption that causality is fundamentally the same whether it involves 
minded agents or nonhuman entities. Dannenberg (26–27) complicates 
this monolithic view of causation by introducing Mark Turner’s distinction 
between causation as progeneration, causation as action, and causation as 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The first builds on the biological con-
cept of “lineage” to understand causal relations, as if an event could generate 
another event; the second refers to causation as direct, embodied manipula-
tion of objects; the third focuses on the external conditions that make an 
event possible. This conceptualization is an important step forward, but for 
the purposes of this essay, it is still not fine-grained enough: what is missing 
is a clearer distinction between psychological and nonpsychological modes of 
causation. Some cause-effect relations logically imply human or anthropomor-
phic agency and intentionality, whereas others don’t. The former are typically 
more central to the dynamics of plot, but nonpsychological modes of causa-
tion can also come into play. As an example, consider the following passage 
from Don DeLillo’s Underworld:
My son used to believe that he could look at a plane in flight and make it 
explode in midair by simply thinking it. He believed, at thirteen, that the 
border between himself and the world was thin and porous enough to allow 
him to affect the course of events. An aircraft in flight was a provocation too 
strong to ignore. . . . All he had to do was wish the fiery image into his mind 
and the plane would ignite and shatter. (88)
The narrator’s son looks at the plane and conjures up the image of its mid-
air explosion. The gesture of looking implies psychological causation—a rela-
tion between a mental state (the child’s destructive impulse) and real-world 
events (his pointing his eyes at the plane). The notion of action, of which 
the child’s looking is an example, thus occupies the middle ground between 
the mental and the physical world: through actions, mental causes turn into 
observable effects. This much seems uncontroversial. What happens in this 
passage, however, is that the child’s desire falls flat, and the plane does not 
explode. That this is unsurprising for the reader shows that another mode 
of causation underlies our interpretation of this passage: the knowledge that 
the action performed by the child (looking at the plane) is not sufficient to 
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bring about the desired effect, because this fictional world—which operates 
under what Richardson (38) would call a “naturalistic” causal regime—is gov-
erned by physical laws similar to those at play in the real world. Such laws are 
central to our understanding of causal relations among objects and bodies: 
human agency is subject to the constraints and affordances of the physical 
world, and it has to take them into account in order to match desired effects 
and actual consequences. Psychologists use the term “naïve physics” to refer 
to people’s intuitive understanding of the ways in which the world is likely to 
“behave” when we interact with it in certain ways (see Proffitt). Clearly, this 
child’s desire goes against the grain of naïve physics—and its failure is unsur-
prising because of this.
We may want to unpack the notion of causation even further. There are 
many forms of causation that cannot be reduced to the psychological model. 
For instance, we have causal relations between natural phenomena, like 
humidity and fog. Further, we have causation in the domain of socioeco-
nomic phenomena that emerge from a network of human cultural practices 
and material conditions (for instance, one can say that malnutrition causes 
an increase in infant mortality rates). Finally, some causal relations blur the 
dividing line between human intentionality and physical factors. Consider 
the case of a plane accident where the pilots did not respond appropriately 
to a system malfunction that would have been relatively harmless in itself. 
In the Air France 447 crash of June 2009, the autopilot disengaged at cruis-
ing altitude because ice crystals clogged the so-called “pitot tubes,” leading to 
inconsistent airspeed measurements. According to the investigators, the pilots’ 
decisions, and not this temporary malfunction, resulted in an aerodynamic 
stall and the fatal impact with the Atlantic Ocean (see Smith). Through its 
complex causal history, the accident exemplifies the interconnection between 
human action, technology (computer-assisted flight), and natural phenomena 
that operate beyond human intentionality (the ice crystals).
Because of how it extends on both sides of the divide between human and 
nonhuman realities, causality is an ideal place to start if one wants to theo-
rize object-oriented plotting. Narrative may put pressure on the psychological 
model of causation, integrating into its workings causal elements that do not 
involve agency or intentionality. In turn, this is likely to have reverberations at 
the level of narrative’s temporal organization, thematic coherence, and affec-
tive dynamics. Over the following pages, I examine how this process plays out 
concretely in my case studies. In the next section, I use the notion of “material 
anchor” to show how in Underworld and Babel physical objects underpin the 
plot’s nonlinear temporality. I then turn to how, through material anchors, 
nonhuman realities begin emerging in, and affecting, the overall progression 
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of narrative. In the final section, I look at the thematic meanings and affective 
dynamics generated by object-oriented narrative strategies.
MATERIAL ANCHORS AND NONLINEAR TEMPORALITY
In the wake of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, one of the cen-
tral tenets of cognitive linguistics has been that abstract ideas and relations 
are typically understood by mapping them onto more concrete objects and 
events. An interesting example—discussed by Edwin Hutchins (“Material 
Anchors”)—is that of people lining up to order at a café or to buy theater 
tickets. The line uses the customers’ bodies and physical position in space to 
encode an abstract relation of precedence. The action of lining up for some-
thing is thus the result of the blend between a state of affairs (bodies forming 
a line) and an abstract ordering principle (who comes before whom). Another 
way to put this is to say, following Hutchins, that the physical line is a material 
anchor for conceptual structure: it allows us to keep track of abstract relations 
in a convenient, human-scale way.
In narrative, objects can also function as material anchors, making mani-
fest and at the same time grounding at the diegetic level the abstract pattern 
of plot. This strategy is reminiscent of T. S. Eliot’s concept of “objective cor-
relative,” except that what is made material is not (or at least not exclusively) 
an emotional state—as in Eliot’s account—but the overall organization of plot. 
This kind of narrative signposting becomes particularly important when the 
plot is uncoupled from a sense of overarching human intentionality and cannot 
be straightforwardly mapped onto the progression of characters’ beliefs and 
desires (a notion central to Marie-Laure Ryan’s account of plot). In this case, 
material anchors help readers keep track of the events and their chronology.
My case studies are a straightforward example of this use of material 
anchors. Underworld’s multiple storylines are presented in anti-chronological 
order: after a prologue set in 1951, the novel moves backward from 1992 (Part 
1) to 1951–1952 (Part 6). This temporal arrangement can be seen as a meta-
phorical journey into the past of Nick Shay, the protagonist: his youth was 
marked by a criminal act whose exact nature is revealed only at the end of the 
novel. However, this is only one strand in the plot, and the text consistently 
undermines a Nick-centered reading by bombarding us with a multiplicity of 
characters and episodes that have little do with the protagonist’s life trajec-
tory. Further, the novel’s six parts are interspersed with three “Interludes” set 
in 1951 and entitled Manx Martin 1–3 (I say more about the function of these 
interludes below).
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Babel, on the other hand, is divided into three storylines unfolding in 
different parts of the world (Morocco, the US–Mexican border, and Japan). 
Frequent chronological shifts mark the narrative in the form of strategically 
placed transitions from one setting to another; retrospectively, we understand 
that these transitions imply a flashback or flashforward. For instance, about 
eight minutes into the movie, we see a young Moroccan boy, Yussef, firing a 
rifle at a tourist bus in the desert (see Figure 1). This is only meant as a test 
shot, since the bus is quite far and both Yussef and his elder brother, Ahmed, 
are convinced that the rifle has a shorter range. (We find out in a later scene 
that the bullet does reach the bus, wounding Susan, an American tourist.) 
After Yussef and Ahmed have fired the rifle, a cut takes us to the interior of a 
house, where a Mexican nanny is taking care of two children (Susan’s children, 
we will soon infer). The nanny is talking on the phone with what we under-
stand to be the children’s father. That phone conversation takes place much 
later than Susan’s wounding in the film’s chronology, after she has been taken 
to the hospital: we will see the same scene from the father’s perspective at the 
end of the movie. The transition from one spatial setting to another is thus 
accompanied by an unacknowledged temporal shift, a flashforward.
One might expect the presence of various storylines and locales in both 
Underworld and Babel to complicate readers’ understanding of the over-
all plot pattern. I suggest drawing here on Arnaud Schmitt’s work on mul-
tilinear storytelling and the narratological challenges it poses. According to 
Schmitt, plots may bring together multiple storylines in two ways: through 
what he calls “knots,” or places where different storylines merge (with pre-
viously separate characters coming together in the actuality of the fictional 
world), and through less specific “connectors,” or clues suggesting the pos-
sible convergence between two storylines, even though this convergence may 
remain a purely “hermeneutical line,” in Schmitt’s terminology (i.e., a readerly 
hypothesis).
In both my case studies, there is an overabundance of connectors, but very 
few knots in the strict sense; even the metaphor of the “storyline” (to which 
the notion of knot is clearly related) fails to capture fully the plot’s peculiar 
narrative logic. In Underworld, individual episodes often feature some of the 
same characters, but it is difficult to establish any sense of clear-cut linearity 
because of the many gaps in the sweeping temporal arc traced by the novel. 
Babel has more limited temporal scope, but its overall organization is simi-
larly mosaic-like, with the individual subplots remaining separate: we never 
see Susan coming home to her children, and the Japanese section is tied to the 
rest of the film only by a thin thread (one of the characters was the previous 
owner of the rifle fired by Yussef).
Fig 1
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The scarcity of knots means that the narrative pattern becomes not just 
more complex but also more abstract, because it never coheres into one or 
more salient action sequences that can stitch together the various episodes. 
Importantly, this process shifts the emphasis from the goal-directedness of 
psychological causality—the traditional focus of plot—to a sense of thematic 
interrelatedness. As Schmitt himself puts it, “Diegetic connectors generate the-
matic connection” (85). This is what happens in both Underworld and Babel—
two plots kept together more by the proliferation of thematic echoes than by 
a stringent teleology. To compensate for this uncoupling of plot from goal-
oriented actions, both narratives use what we may see as “material anchors” 
in Hutchins’s sense: a baseball in Underworld, a rifle in Babel. These material 
objects circulate in the fictional world, passing from one character to another 
and forming a network of connections (or rather connectors) that help the 
reader navigate the multiplicity of characters and situations. Just like the physi-
cal bodies standing in line signify an abstract relation of precedence, the mate-
rial history of these objects reflects—and at the same time embodies—the plot’s 
unifying principle. These material anchors may be human-made objects, but 
they resist being seen as mere tools, pointing instead to a complex network 
of interactions crisscrossing the divide between human-level and nonhuman 
realities. Indeed, the critique of human mastery implicit in these objects is 
made more forceful by their human origin. Hence, we have what I call “object-
oriented plotting” when, first, diegetic objects are used as material anchors for 
plot; and, second, these objects become associated with thematic and affective 
meanings that challenge narrative’s inherent anthropocentrism.
FIGURE 1. Yussef takes aim at the bus in Babel
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UNCERTAINTY, HYBRIDITY, CHANCE: 
NONHUMAN CAUSAL HISTORIES
What kind of objects are the baseball and the rifle? First of all, they are human 
artifacts invested with emotions and associated with various networks of cau-
sation in the psychological sense. In Underworld, this seems to take the form 
of a classical quest narrative. In 1951, the Giants won the National League pen-
nant in a historic baseball game against the Dodgers; however, the ball, hit 
into the stands on the decisive home run, has vanished. As the game enters 
collective memory and achieves quasi-mythical status, the missing baseball 
becomes an object of desire for many fans, including the novel’s protagonist, 
Nick Shay. A memorabilia collector, Marvin Laundy, claims to have tracked 
down the ball in a search described as “hard, fierce, thorough and consuming” 
(DeLillo 175). But for all his efforts Marvin doesn’t have definitive evidence 
that the ball in his possession is the real ball. He explains that he was able to 
reconstruct the ball’s “line of ownership” up to a man named Charles Wain-
wright, but “not back to the game itself ” (181). Marvin adds: “I don’t have the 
last link that I can connect backwards from the Wainwright ball to the ball 
making contact with Bobby Thomson’s bat” (181). Despite the uncertainty sur-
rounding the authenticity of Marvin’s ball, Nick decides to buy it for the hefty 
sum of $34,500. This economic investment reflects the ball’s (causal) power 
to evoke a sense of personal resonance and even emotional attachment, as 
Nick himself acknowledges: “I didn’t buy the object for the glory and drama 
attached to it. It’s not about Thomson hitting the homer. It’s about Branca 
making the pitch. It’s all about losing” (97).
Yet, in the novel’s narrative economy, the baseball becomes more than a 
simple fetish invested with emotional meanings. Because the characters can-
not establish the ball’s authenticity, the narrative template of the quest fails 
to capture the full significance of this object: it is as if the ball asserted its 
“thingness”—its incommensurability with human emotions and desires—
through the uncertainty of its line of ownership. Toward the end of the novel, 
Nick thinks: “Sometimes I know exactly why I bought it and other times I 
don’t” (809). This paradox is inscribed in the novel’s own narrative structure 
through the interludes, which focus on Cotter Martin, a child cast by DeLillo 
in the role of the ball’s first owner. Cotter was at the stadium during the game 
between the Giants and the Dodgers, and was able to seize the baseball while 
in the stands. However, the baseball was soon to be confiscated by Cotter’s 
alcoholic father, who sold it to Charles Wainwright. This is the missing link 
in Marvin’s reconstruction, and the “proof ” of the authenticity of his ball. 
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But neither Marvin nor Nick will ever become privy to what we, as readers, 
learn from the interludes. Readers will, of course, be aware that this narra-
tive strategy is the result of DeLillo’s intentional choices, but those choices 
strongly hint at the more-than-human significance of the ball: by evading 
the characters’ desire to control its causal history, a material object seems to 
take over the logic of the narrative itself. This object resists human attempts 
at knowing or mastering its existence, and yet it governs the novel’s compo-
sition: it figures in the prelude (which narrates the 1951 baseball game), in 
all the interludes, and it is frequently referenced or discussed by the charac-
ters elsewhere. Seen from this symbolic perspective, the novel is uncoupled 
from a sense of goal-oriented directedness and consigned to the vagaries of 
an unconscious object.
Moreover, the baseball is fundamentally hybrid, since it cuts across the 
boundary between human life and nonhuman processes. In an important epi-
sode, we see Nick Shay holding the baseball and inspecting it closely:
The ball was a deep sepia, veneered with dirt and turf and generational 
sweat—it was old, bunged up, it was bashed and tobacco-juiced and stained 
by natural processes and by the lives behind it, weather-spattered and char-
actered as a seafront house. And it was smudged green near the Spalding 
trademark, it was still wearing a small green bruise where it had struck a 
pillar according to the history that came with it—flaked paint from a bolted 
column in the left-field stands embedded in the surface of the ball. (131)
With the material traces inscribed on its surface, the ball embodies a history 
that is not only human but chemical as well. At the heart of this passage is 
a productive tension between these poles—a tension perhaps best exempli-
fied by the simile comparing the ball to a “weather-spattered and charactered 
. . . seafront house.” The analogy between two inanimate objects (the baseball 
and the house) is expressed through a psychologizing metaphor, that of the 
“charactered” house—a paradoxical back-and-forth pointing to the constitu-
tive intertwining of human “lives” and “natural processes.” The same idea is 
reiterated more succinctly at the end of the novel, when Nick describes the 
baseball as “a beautiful thing smudged green near the Spalding trademark and 
bronzed with nearly half a century of earth and sweat and chemical change” 
(809). Human sweat stands on the same footing as earth, and both appear 
tied together by “chemical change”—that is, by underlying physical processes. 
Through its uncertainty and hybridity, the baseball thus stands in for a more 
abstract idea: the enmeshment of the human lifeworld with nonhuman causa-
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tion. As a material anchor, the baseball introduces notions of uncertainty and 
hybridity into the plot progression, partly displacing the more familiar logic 
of human intentionality and teleology that we have come to expect in a novel.
Something similar happens with the rifle in Babel—though here it is the 
idea of chance that comes to the forefront. One of the characters in the Japa-
nese section of the film was the first owner of the weapon; after a hunting 
trip in Africa, he gave it to his Moroccan guide. The rifle was later sold to 
a shepherd and ended up in the hands of the man’s two young sons, one of 
whom accidentally shoots Susan while testing the weapon. Due to Susan’s hos-
pitalization, she and her husband are unable to travel back to the US as they 
had initially planned. The Mexican nanny in charge of their children is thus 
forced to take them with her to her son’s wedding in Mexico. This excursion 
goes awry when, on their way back to the States, the nanny is arrested by US 
border officers as an illegal immigrant. The children narrowly escape death by 
dehydration during a botched escape attempt.
The film’s three geographically distinct subplots thus trace the tragic con-
sequences of a Japanese tourist’s well-meaning gift. The narrative explicitly 
foregrounds the role of chance in this event sequence: the impression is that 
nothing happens because the characters wanted it, but because the circum-
stances conspired as if against any human intentionality. Even Susan’s wound-
ing is framed as an accident, and it is difficult to assign full responsibility to 
Yussef as he seems genuinely convinced that the bullet cannot travel as far as 
the tourist bus. Eventually, that shot will quite literally backfire when Yussef ’s 
brother, Ahmed, is fatally wounded in a shootout with the Moroccan police. 
In the world of Babel, everything goes wrong for reasons that may be com-
pounded by human negligence (a rifle ending up in the hands of two boys) 
and misunderstandings (the police’s mistaking the boys for terrorists), but can 
ultimately be ascribed only to the sheer chance of the bullet hitting Susan. This 
device has something in common with the poetics of chance and coincidence 
explored by Richardson (chap. 4) and, more recently, Dannenberg (chap. 4). 
What is specific to Babel, however, is that the coincidence plot fuses two levels 
of nonpsychological causality: the nonhuman mechanics of physical causa-
tion—the strict but blind laws governing the bullet’s trajectory—and the net-
work of globalization, which makes it possible for a rifle bought in Japan to 
alter the lives of people located as far as Morocco and North America. Babel’s 
rifle dovetails with the indeterminate history of DeLillo’s baseball, of course. 
Both objects challenge a purely anthropocentric conception of plot: their nar-
ratives move beyond human agency, calling attention to the mesh of human 
and nonhuman causation.
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A FEEL FOR THE NETWORK
We have seen above that plot is a four-dimensional construct, with temporal 
relations, causality, thematic connectedness, and affective dynamics all con-
tributing to a narrative’s overall organization. My analysis of Underworld and 
Babel so far has focused on nonlinear temporality and nonpsychological cau-
sality, but the setup of both narratives has clear ramifications in thematic and 
affective terms as well. Let’s start from the thematic level. Both the novel and 
the film foreground the fictional world’s interconnectedness, even as they put 
this idea to significantly different uses. In Babel, the rifle is a symbol of a glo-
balized reality in which a gift received from a Japanese tourist in North Africa 
can fire a bullet whose consequences are felt as far as Mexico. Neil Narine 
investigates this dimension of the narrative, aligning it with a larger trend of 
“global network” films that attempt to portray, and at the same time critique, 
the socioeconomic interrelatedness of today’s reality: how the West relies on 
the exploitation of marginal subjects (the Mexican nanny) or on the commod-
ification of developing countries as tourist destinations (the Moroccan desert 
visited by Susan and her husband). Babel reflects on the consequences of this 
increasing globalization at the level of individual experience. The reference to 
Babel shouldn’t go unnoticed: the biblical tower is a symbol of human hubris 
but also, crucially, of fragmentation and lack of communication; the film sug-
gests that the dizzying interconnectedness of globalization results, paradoxi-
cally, in a sense of personal isolation and trauma (another keyword of Narine’s 
analysis). The Japanese subplot is perhaps the most explicit in this respect: it 
focuses on Chieko, the deaf daughter of the Japanese man who was the first 
owner of the rifle. Traumatized by the suicide of her mother, Chieko commu-
nicates using sign language and spends most of her time with her deaf friends, 
being largely ignored by the rest of society: her silence serves as a psychologi-
cal equivalent of a distressed, dysfunctional globalized reality.
Following Narine, the fact that an object, the rifle, and not a human agent 
supplies the plot’s underlying causal logic could be read as a symptom of the 
objectification and depersonalization brought about by today’s world. Seen in 
this light, the film’s unsettling object-oriented plotting could be reconnected 
with human—perhaps even humanitarian—concerns. For instance, Rita Bar-
nard argues that in Babel what “enables us to connect the three stories and 
three social locales is ultimately an intense, overarching affect: a kind of glo-
balization of compassion that arises from a profound sense of human isolation 
and physical vulnerability” (9). I agree with Barnard about the role of affective 
dynamics in bringing the plot strands together, but I think the resulting affect 
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is likely to be more complex than Barnard’s reference to compassion suggests. 
We do sympathize with the characters, of course. But because we are unable to 
assign blame for the film’s dramatic events, it becomes difficult to rationalize 
the sense of tragic foreboding that accompanies the viewing. In Babel, every-
thing seems to go wrong, and for no (human) reason in particular. No amount 
of compassion can cancel out the dehumanizing power of the plot’s chance-
driven logic. This tension is neatly summarized by the last scene, in which 
Chieko, naked, is embraced by her father on the balcony of their Tokyo apart-
ment. The camera undermines the warmth and affection of this final gesture 
by zooming out to reveal a cold expanse of night sky and dark skyscrapers 
towering threateningly over the two characters—a symbol, perhaps, of human 
frailty in front of nonhuman realities (see Figure 2). The film thus builds on 
a complex blend of sympathy and unease toward the unforgiving logic of the 
world beyond the human. Through the affective structure it generates, Babel’s 
object-oriented plot can be said to put viewers—or at least willing viewers—in 
touch with the depersonalizing network of human/nonhuman interactions, of 
which globalization is an important manifestation.
Underworld brings to bear on its object-oriented plotting a different, and 
possibly even richer, understanding of “interconnectedness.” Nick, the pro-
tagonist, works in the waste management business. Early on in the novel he 
explains that he “traveled to the coastal lowlands of Texas and watched men 
in moon suits bury drums of dangerous waste in subterranean salt beds many 
millions of years old, dried-out remnants of a Mesozoic ocean. It was a reli-
gious conviction in our business that these deposits of rock salt would not leak 
radiation. Waste is a religious thing” (88). But Underworld, a novel set for the 
most part during the Cold War, is also obsessed with nuclear power. In a key 
passage, Marvin—the memorabilia collector—draws a link between the base-
ball and the atomic bomb: “They make an atomic bomb, listen to this, they 
make the radioactive core the exact same size as a baseball” (172). The base-
ball, in itself nothing more than the human residue of a recent past, is thus 
associated with phenomena whose scale far exceeds the human (the “salt beds 
many millions of years old” in Nick’s remark), or with the physical forces har-
nessed by the atomic bomb. In this way, the novel participates in what Mark 
McGurl calls a new “cultural geology”—namely, “a range of theoretical and 
other initiatives that position culture in a time-frame large enough to crack 
open the carapace of human self-concern, exposing it to the idea, and maybe 
even the fact, of its external ontological preconditions, its ground” (380).
A similar interest in geological history emerges in a comment made by 
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ymous commentator refers to the solid black pages that divide the novel’s 
parts and remain clearly visible when the book is closed, resembling geologi-
cal strata:
[DeLillo] has plumbed the depths of a dangerously complex time and an 
equally convoluted place. . . . This archaeology is our history. It is symbolized 
by the strata lining the edges of the book. Much as we would read the his-
tory of rocks or trees through the lines indelibly etched into granite canyons 
or across sylvan boles, we can only trace our lives, our histories, through 
the lines we have inscribed, lines that intersect (somewhat arbitrarily) with 
friends, lovers, enemies, and the random face or fact that emerges, unbid-
den, at odd yet appropriate moments. (Customer 1998)
The baseball summarizes, and inscribes into the novel’s own stratified narra-
tive structure, this nexus between the human and the nonhuman world. As 
the online reviewer’s comment implies, affect is crucial to the plot’s dynamic. 
A sense of wonder at the sheer scale of reality runs through DeLillo’s novel, 
from the prologue’s statement that “[longing] on a large scale is what makes 
history” to the “word that spreads a longing through the raw sprawl of the 
city” in the very last paragraph (11, 827). This is the sublime of hyperconnec-
tivity—a feeling of awe at the density and depth of the connections between 
human history (the baseball, the protagonist’s past) and material processes 
(nuclear radiation, the waste left behind by past civilizations). This feeling 
operates at multiple levels: it infuses the protagonist’s experiences while sus-
taining the reader’s interest in DeLillo’s handling of such a vast, and multi-
faceted, narrative material. Object-oriented plotting thus becomes bound up 
with an affective dynamic: through its narrative strands converging on the 
baseball, its hybrid causal history, and its symbolic connections with waste 
and the atomic bomb, Underworld is able to open up emotionally resonant 
perspectives on the nonhuman world.
CONCLUSION
This chapter makes a first and admittedly preliminary attempt at theorizing 
stories in which the pattern of what we call “plot” is attuned to nonhuman 
realities. Narrative is a human practice, of course, and as such it is inevitably 
geared toward human interests and values. Yet storytelling always participates 
in a broader “cultural ecology” (Zapf): by entering into dialogue with other 
areas of culture—for instance, scientific knowledge—it may engage in a recon-
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ceptualization of humanity’s position vis-à-vis physical realities that transcend 
individual human existence, or even the existence of the human species. It is 
this kind of reconceptualization that takes place in contemporary narratives 
such as Underworld and Babel. In both cases, the plot progression is tied to a 
physical object crisscrossing multiple storylines and replacing, or at least com-
plementing, narrative’s traditional focus on human intentionality and agency. 
The tension that derives from this operation is highly productive in terms of 
both the thematic issues it raises (the network of globalization or the hybrid 
“mesh” of causality) and the affective dynamics it generates.
This attunement between narrative and nonhuman realities is, like every-
thing else in narrative, the result of a complex interplay between textual cues 
and readers’ interpretive interests and propensities. To some extent, just as 
narrative is always keyed to human characters and themes, nonhuman phe-
nomena can never be completely extraneous to it: after all, we live in a world 
populated by nonhuman animals and objects that are often causally impli-
cated in human endeavors. However, narratives differ in the degree to which 
they call attention to, and integrate into their own workings, this causal effi-
cacy of nonhuman entities. My case studies in this chapter display a high level 
of attunement to the nonhuman, but other narratives may be more subtle 
and ambiguous, and still raise analogous questions. Nor is this phenomenon 
unique to the twentieth century: while various areas of contemporary sci-
ence highlight the interrelatedness of human and nonhuman phenomena, 
other historical periods reached a partly similar insight via dialog with other 
cultural practices. In my essay “Naïve Physics,” for example, I observed how 
the same narrative pattern underlies Italo Calvino’s “posthuman” engagement 
with the Big Bang and Dante’s religious cosmology.
The specific nature of the “object-oriented plotting” I investigate in this 
chapter shouldn’t escape us. On the one hand, Underworld’s baseball and 
Babel’s rifle put us in touch with nonhuman realities through the meanings 
they take on in the course of the narrative. On the other hand, these objects 
are prototypical examples of human-scale entities that can be directly manip-
ulated since they are geared toward the size and sensorimotor skills of the 
human body. In Underworld, the importance of Nick’s physical handling of 
the baseball is repeatedly emphasized: it is when manipulating the ball that 
Nick hits upon the idea of the enmeshment of human and geological history. 
In his own words: “How the hand works memories out of the baseball that 
have nothing to do with games of the usual sort” (132). In Babel this embod-
ied dimension is perhaps less explicitly thematized, but it is still hinted at by 
the rifle—an object that not only affords bodily interaction but dramatically 
wounds Susan’s body.
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This foregrounding of physical interaction with the world through mate-
rial objects confirms intuitions about the centrality of embodied patterns in 
human meaning-making (Gibbs)—including narrative form (Kukkonen and 
Caracciolo). In the case of object-oriented plotting, the involvement of bodily 
experience—of characters, but also potentially of readers—poses something of 
a paradox: the same material entity appeals to the makeup of the human body 
while problematizing the anthropomorphic agency that we tend to associate 
with embodiment as an existential and cognitive condition. The body is thus 
used as a vehicle toward our understanding of realities that in some funda-
mental way challenges (a certain conception of) human embodiment. This 
pattern, which I have already observed in other contexts (Caracciolo “Naïve 
Physics”; “Bones in Outer Space”), deserves being explored more systemati-
cally than I do here. The account of object-oriented plotting I outline should 
also be significantly expanded, taking into consideration a wider range of con-
temporary narratives.2
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C H A P T E R  3
Readerly Dynamics in 
Dynamic Climatic Times
Cli-Fi and Rhetorical Narrative Theory
ERIC MOREL
FR OM THE  New Yorker, to TIME Magazine, to the New York Times, commen-
tators heralded the arrival of climate fiction, or cli-fi, in twenty-first-century 
popular print and visual culture with variants of the question suggested by 
Dan Bloom to himself and five others in a New York Times debate: “Will Fic-
tion Influence How We React to Climate Change?” Bloom is advocating for 
a category of works he hopes can move minds and hearts. Such questions, 
unfortunately, often take forms that effectually underestimate both fiction 
and reading. Bloom’s own question notably elides the activity of reading—
though presumably it precedes the other action of reacting. And if the answer 
to Bloom’s question were to turn out negative, then the value of these fictions 
(and presumably reading them) would become altogether uncertain, if not 
imperiled. When the debate dwells on the merits of individual works as politi-
cal silver bullets (or, in its Mr. Hyde version, as ideological miseducation)—
or on the appropriateness of fiction media as sources of ethical instruction, 
tout court—the assumption of reading’s transparency curtails other thought-
provoking and relevant questions. I depart from these existing conversations 
by pursuing these other questions, such as how different interpretive strate-
gies influence what readers take away from cli-fi, and what the continuing 
publication of cli-fi might signal about expectations readers apply to narrative 
interpretation.
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As other scholars have noted, there are “problems with the definition of 
climate change fiction” (Craps and Crownshaw 1). Though not coined by Dan 
Bloom, it was more widely disseminated by him to aggregate works especially 
suggestive of global warming. There are those who are skeptical of the term 
overall1 and others like Adam Trexler who object that what is being named 
is not so new (“The Climate Change Novel”). Notwithstanding these skepti-
cisms, others including Antonia Mehnert attempt to make the term more use-
ful by narrowing its application. Mehnert writes of her interest “in works that 
explicitly engage with anthropogenic climate change. In these books, meteoro-
logical phenomena do not just provide the background setting against which 
the story unfolds; climate change significantly alters and is a prevalent issue 
for characters, plot, and setting” (38). As my argument elaborates, I am wary 
of background/foreground content distinctions. I propose to deal with cli-fi’s 
problem of definition differently, using a two-step move. First, I think it is crit-
ical to maintain a record of “cli-fi” as a historical marker—as the aggregating 
term in twenty-first-century media for a variety of texts, usually but not exclu-
sively involving climate change. But cli-fi can and will expand from this initial 
set, I argue, to describe other, even earlier, narratives that resonate for readers 
with the expectations of works formally designated as part of the genre.
My essay proceeds along the lines of what rhetorical narrative theorists 
James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz call “theory-practice,” “inquiries in which 
theory aids the work of interpretation even as that work allows for further 
developments in theory” (Phelan 4). First, I make the case that those debat-
ing the merits of cli-fi would benefit from incorporating rhetorical narrative 
theory’s framework of narrative audience; I lay out that model using Mark 
Twain’s The American Claimant (Mark Twain’s lesser-read2 1892 sequel to the 
1873 novel he coauthored with Charles Dudley Warner: The Gilded Age, A Tale 
of To-Day) as an example of the consequences for interpretation of the novel 
that follow from occupying (or failing to occupy) the model’s positions. From 
there, I trace how actual readers’ connections to climate change, recorded in 
popular and academic criticism, stand to shift norms in reader expectations 
during reading. Thus, while individual works of cli-fi may not reorient actual 
readers’ thinking on climate change, the increased number of these works pro-
mulgates climate change’s existing and emergent impact on reading.
 1. For example, see Bradley and Forthomme.
 2. Larzer Ziff ’s pronouncement of The American Claimant as “the weakest of [Twain’s] 
novels” succinctly captures the prevailing critical devaluing that explains its obscurity (78). 
Most references to the novel in Twain criticism link it dismissively to Twain’s personal struggles 
and monetary needs.
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WHETHER TO READ WEATHER IN A NARRATIVE: 
TWAIN’S READERS’ CHOICES
Discussing cli-fi and its value as a binary between effective or ineffective polit-
icization frames the genre reductively. For example, its existing criticisms do 
not distinguish between evaluating possible misreadings of cli-fi and read-
ings that find a particular work uncompelling, which curtails further thinking 
about how readers reconcile cli-fi’s fictionality with extratextual knowledge 
about climate change. By contrast, the lexicon of rhetorical narrative theory—
specifically, the work of Phelan and Rabinowitz as developed over multiple 
successive publications—helps to convene and compare a wider array of read-
ings. In addition to illustrating ways Rabinowitz’s model of audiences allows 
for these, my reading of Twain’s American Claimant brings out the significance 
of changing relationships of the audience positions across history in ways rhe-
torical narrative theory has not explicitly developed.
Rabinowitz’s model posits three main interpretive stances.3 Readers oscil-
late among participation in these audiences while reading and are often aware 
of more than one simultaneously. The first, participating in the authorial 
audience, involves reading with an eye toward what the implied author wants 
readers to assemble from the narrative. The second, actual audiences, is what 
it sounds like: any readers with whatever particularities or meaning-making 
practices they bring to a text. The third, the narrative audience, reads to go 
with the flow of the narrative—that is, this audience accepts the narrative on 
its terms. If characters in a narrative interact with an abominable snowman, 
the narrative audience goes along with it rather than assuming the characters 
are hallucinating, even though as actual readers they don’t believe in abomina-
ble snowmen and, as authorial audience members, they understand the author 
as also not believing in abominable snowmen. Although many readers focus 
on entering the authorial audience, the model is nonprescriptive; the model’s 
purpose is to allow for the parsing and comparing of responses through these 
positions.
The bemusing paratextual note that opens The American Claimant (a trait 
the novel shares with its prequel, The Gilded Age, and Twain’s Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn) generates similar distinctions as Rabinowitz’s model. Para-
texts often hold extra weight in shaping actual audiences’ deductions about 
the authorial audience, and signs of the authorial voice as distinct from the 
narrator’s also tend to distinguish between authorial and narrative audiences. 
 3. In later work, the rhetorical model incorporated a fourth, the narratee, which desig-
nates the narrator’s direct listener, whether characterized or not, based on the work of Gerald 
Prince. See “Introduction à l’étude du narrataire” and “The Narratee Revisited.”
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More atypically, however, this note also foregrounds the variability of actual 
audiences:
The Weather in This Book
No weather will be found in this book. This is an attempt to pull a book 
through without weather. It being the first attempt of the kind in fictitious 
literature, it may prove a failure, but it seemed worth the while of some dare-
devil person to try it, and the author was in just the mood.
Many a reader who wanted to read a tale through was not able to do it 
because of delays on account of the weather. Nothing breaks up an author’s 
progress like having to stop every few pages to fuss-up the weather. Thus 
it is plain that persistent intrusions of weather are bad for both reader and 
author.
Of course weather is necessary to a narrative of human experience. 
That is conceded. But it ought to be put where it will not be in the way; 
where it will not interrupt the flow of the narrative. And it ought to be the 
ablest weather that can be had, not ignorant, poor-quality, amateur weather. 
Weather is a literary specialty, and no untrained hand can turn out a good 
article of it. The present author can do only a few trifling ordinary kinds of 
weather, and he cannot do those very good. So it has seemed wisest to bor-
row such weather as is necessary for the book from qualified and recognized 
experts—giving credit, of course. This weather will be found over in the back 
part of the book, out of the way. See Appendix. The reader is requested to 
turn over and help himself from time to time as he goes along. (459)
Twain plays on the common gripe of the weather delay to joke about liter-
ary aesthetics and reception, and in so doing disrupts the usual relationship 
between narration and narrated. Use of the mentioned appendix might break 
down along three lines: use within the authorial audience, trying to gauge 
where Twain might prompt such a reference; use within the narrative audi-
ence, wherein someone might stay attuned to the setting and events to recog-
nize when weather would contribute to the narrative instead of “interrupt[ing 
its] flow”; or use by actual audiences, suggested here by the “help himself,” 
where weather description would come into narrative as a matter of idiosyn-
cratic preference. Although this paratext from Twain makes these positions 
more explicit than usual, the plurality of interpretation invoked here is by no 
means unique to his novel, and I argue accounts of cli-fi will be well served 
by attending to it. The American Claimant makes a useful springboard for this 
leap, in part because it presents an unexpected record of the idea of climate 
change as it seemed prior to its scientific consensus, and before that consensus 
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inspired the historical marking of genre, and partly also because of the ways 
that this paratext stages tricky questions germane to cli-fi about the relation-
ship of weather, narrative, and reading.
To ground these theoretical propositions, it is helpful to turn to a sample 
interpretation; as it happens, the New Yorker’s Kathryn Schulz has scooped me 
by discussing Twain’s novel in a trajectory with cli-fi. Apart from this shared 
connection, however, our interpretations diverge. She writes, referring to the 
opening note, “‘No weather will be found in this book’ now reads either as 
denialist—a refusal to face climatic reality—or, very simply, as sad” (Schulz 
n. pag.). That Schulz does not read the note as deadpan corresponds with her 
not mentioning the appendix of Twain’s novel. As an actual reader, Schulz is 
at liberty to feel however she does about Twain’s novel, but I use Rabinowitz’s 
framework here to argue her statement nonetheless offers a misreading inso-
far as it does not reconcile points raised within the authorial and narrative 
audiences.
Schulz also includes Twain in her piece to exemplify historical difference 
of concern: “Meteorological activity, so long yoked to morality, finally has 
genuine ethical stakes.” Times have moved past Twain (as she reads him), and 
cli-fi enters as their standard-bearer. Using Rabinowitz’s model to elucidate 
Twain’s commentary on weather in the narrative, I counter such a timeline 
and suggest Twain’s novel prompts readers to recognize (if in this case through 
absence) the “stakes” of weather and thus complements any emergent account 
of cli-fi’s narrative or thematic innovations. Stemming from these questions of 
Twain’s historical position relative to cli-fi, the second half of this essay takes 
up Schulz’s proposition that The American Claimant “now reads” differently.
While the narrative audience may take Twain’s opening note at face value, 
as perhaps Schulz does, reading the novel within the authorial audience would 
attend to Twain’s characteristic, multilayered humor and the genre of satire 
in which The American Claimant’s prequel participates. After all, the weather 
note is suspicious: the contrast between the dare-devil author and the other 
experts—which sets up a competition even as it gestures toward humble defer-
ral—is probably the main clue that some game is afoot. Also, any reader famil-
iar with Twain as the writer of Life on the Mississippi (1883) and as a steamboat 
pilot, who would have habitually observed weather closely for that reason, 
might also deduce before flipping to the appendix that something tongue-in-
cheek is at play. True to its word, the novel describes no weather aside from 
the first chapter’s characterization of a morning as “breezy fine.” The plot of 
the novel revolves around switched identities and scheming gone awry. Nor 
does the novel prompt readers directly to “See appendix” anywhere outside 
the prefatory note. Twain really leaves his readers to “turn over” as they may.
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If and when readers do flip back to the appendix, “Weather for Use in 
this Book, Selected from the Best Authorities,” they find a handful of snippets 
from works as different as nineteenth-century novels and the Book of Gen-
esis. The descriptions range from the improbable to the ridiculous, and thus 
how weather might intrude in a narrative becomes apparent. One example 
reads:
Merciful heavens! The whole west, from right to left, blazes up with a fierce 
light, and next instant the earth reels and quivers with the awful shock of 
ten thousand batteries of artillery. It is the signal for the Fury to spring—for 
a thousand demons to scream and shriek—for innumerable serpents of fire 
to writhe and light up the blackness.
Now the rain falls—now the wind is let loose with a terrible shriek—
now the lightning is so constant that the eyes burn, and the thunder-claps 
merge into an awful roar, as did the 800 cannon at Gettysburg. Crash! Crash! 
Crash! It is the cottonwood trees falling to earth. Shriek! Shriek! Shriek! It 
is the Demon racing along the plain and uprooting even the blades of grass. 
Shock! Shock! Shock! It is the Fury flinging his fiery bolts into the bosom of 
the earth. —The Demon and the Fury, M. Quad. (Twain 644)
The passage’s frenetic sequence of impressions, its multiple emphatic triple 
repetitions, and over-the-top notes like “the lightning is so constant that the 
eyes burn” are all overwrought. No moment in Twain’s novel calls for readers 
to turn and find such calamity.
The appendix—in “giving credit” via the excerpted weather passages—
completes at least a basic joke from the prefatory note cutting along similar 
lines as The Gilded Age, where Twain and Warner lampoon those who mask 
lack of substance by proliferating decorative cover. This continuity between 
the novels partly stems from their sharing the Sellers character, who repeat-
edly wins influence by spinning bad ideas to persuade the gullible. But the 
joke’s reach extends beyond particular jabs at named writers. Obviously, other 
novels will not put their weather “out of the way” in appendices. And really, 
these passages were chosen because they brought attention to themselves in 
their respective stories of origin. So, the criticism’s thrust, on one hand, is 
that weather is best hidden in plain sight, described sparingly and innocu-
ously. But this leaves one proposition from the prefatory note unaccounted 
for: Is, then, weather “necessary to a narrative of human experience”? Out of 
the way in the appendix or barely noticeable, the implication here reverses the 
initial concession and reinforces the place of weather as background window-
dressing and as slowing a narrative line.
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Perhaps, at this point, the line of questioning deviates anachronistically 
from the purposes of The American Claimant’s implied author, and my own 
ecocritical interest as an actual audience in how texts might mediate under-
standings of weather and climate (and vice versa) takes over a simpler rhetori-
cal gesture. But asking about weather’s necessity to narrative follows the text’s 
grain in two ways. For one, Twain’s joke here does ask about realist aesthetics 
and what realist works are ethically responsible for including: how much of 
what is necessary to human experience is “necessary to a narrative of human 
experience,” and at what point does inclusion or description spill into excess? 
Second, these questions also register formally by staging the content and con-
text relationship as the problem of relating the text of The American Claimant 
to its paratexts, a relationship that turning to the novel’s concluding pages 
elaborates.
The novel ends after the switch-ups of identity and matters of lineage that 
form the central plot are revealed and untangled, yet the literal end of the 
novel is in some ways no end at all. The inveterate good-hearted and delu-
sional con-artist Sellers stands up his protégé Hawkins, leaving only a letter to 
explain his absence—the novel closes with this letter as an interpolated text, 
in which Sellers introduces his next new scheme to win wealth and influence:
In brief, then, I have conceived the stupendous idea of reorganizing the cli-
mates of the earth according to the desire of the populations interested. That 
is to say, I will furnish climates to order, for cash or negotiable paper, taking 
the old climates in part payment, of course, at a fair discount, where they 
are in condition to be repaired at small cost and let out for hire to poor and 
remote communities not able to afford a good climate and not caring for 
an expensive one for mere display. My studies have convinced me that the 
regulation of climates and the breeding of new varieties at will from the old 
stock is a feasible thing. Indeed I am convinced that it has been done before: 
done in prehistoric times by now forgotten and unrecorded civilizations. 
Everywhere I find hoary evidences of artificial manipulation of climates in 
bygone times. Take the glacial period. Was that produced by accident? Not 
at all; it was done for money. I have a thousand proofs of it, and will some 
day reveal them. (641)
He also proceeds to assure Hawkins that he has the “plan all mapped out” on 
a global scale, including his “intention to move one of the tropics up [to the 
north pole] and transfer the frigid zone to the equator. I will have the entire 
Arctic Circle in the market as a summer resort next year.” The absurd logistics 
for making these “billions of money” involve harnessing sunspots.
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Even though Sellers’s letter has a terrifying sort of prescience, down to 
the calculations of first-world power to rationalize worse climates for poorer 
countries and to profit in the process, it seems anachronistic to say he writes 
here about climate change in the twenty-first-century sense.4 Though Sellers’s 
climate-swapping scheme may seem to come as an odd departure from the 
types of social commentaries that preoccupy the plot—such as criticism of 
ideals of class mobility—the ending is less of a non sequitur if considered in 
relation to the novel’s paratextual humor. In fact, it complicates the joke and 
its logic substantially. Swapping climates dissociates a thing from its context 
without consequence. Climate, of course, results from aggregate measure-
ments of air, water, and heat’s interaction with/over a particular geographical 
context. The novel’s comic problems result from each character’s presumption 
or pretension to leave his original context (a British aristocrat trying to live as 
a meritocratic American, another American then posing as the aristocrat, and 
Sellers’s own potential claim to the title through a genealogic stroke of luck), 
playing on the word “place” to link social standing and geographic/national 
origins. As a result, Sellers’s final proposal to swap climates reads as absurd 
or bound to failure by deductive extension. That the appendix immediately 
follows the closing letter reinforces this connection, though readers who fail 
to turn the page thinking the appendix is irrelevant after finishing the novel 
may not catch on.
Weather, then—as a manifestation of climate—is indeed another example 
of context that cannot simply be extracted or moved around at whim; readers 
who took the appendix up on its premise (for however long until they realized 
how little it would gain them) actually demonstrate their willingness to buy 
into Sellers’s idea before its presentation and lose their moral or intellectual 
superiority to other victims of Sellers’s flimflam, since they prove they, too, are 
susceptible to his duping, which would appear so easy to ridicule when more 
hollow characters take the bait within the text. To whatever extent readers are 
in on the paratexts’ joke (and some might never catch on), they enact a com-
plicated combination of ethical judgments in connection to their evaluation 
of the novel’s value and its humor’s workings.
So, returning to Rabinowitz’s terms, the trick Twain masterfully plays 
on readers is that, while they may (within the narrative audience) correctly 
understand Sellers’s schemes and will almost certainly (reading within the 
authorial audience) recognize the criticism of characters misled by those 
hoaxes, they may as actual audience members fail to recognize how the novel’s 
 4. Twain’s library suggests he was familiar with John Tyndall and George Perkins Marsh. 
For more on weather science in the nineteenth century, see Moore and Fleming. For more on 
Twain and science, see Cummings.
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paratexts subject them to the very criticism they identified—another level to 
the authorial audience and the way the narrative’s reach extends beyond its 
fictional storyworld. Whether they succeed or fail to engage with the autho-
rial audience by linking the paratexts and the final letter will determine actual 
readers’ judgments about the ending and the novel’s merit overall.
This interpretation of Twain’s novel delineates how the audience positions 
suggested by Rabinowitz allow for adjudicating among readings. Schulz’s 
consideration of Twain’s book as “denialist” or “sad” stands out as privileg-
ing an actual audience’s concerns over an authorial one, with the particular 
misfortune of obscuring that Twain’s text raises questions precisely concerned 
with weather’s “genuine ethical stakes.” After all, the way Twain’s weather joke 
disrupts assumptions preempts gestures attributed to cli-fi well ahead of the 
genre’s rise. For example, journalist and environmentalist Bill McKibben’s pro-
claims in his introduction to the cli-fi short story volume I’m With the Bears 
that while “on a stable planet, nature provided a background against which the 
human drama took place,” cli-fi spotlights that “on the unstable planet we’re 
creating, the background becomes the highest drama” (4). Twain’s note seems 
to participate strongly in the former line, even developing the spatial quality 
in McKibben’s background metaphor by putting weather “where it will not be 
in the way.” Furthermore, the characterization of weather description as dis-
tinct from narrative motion (here the “author’s progress”) or as mere “fuss-up” 
echoes the familiar dismissal that “nature” typically comes into narratives as 
description or background. Yet my reading of Twain’s novel above shows that 
it substantially complicates McKibben’s division of “background” and “drama” 
well before cli-fi. In doing so, Twain’s novel pulls at the strings of a similar 
division in narrative theory going at least as far back as Gérard Genette, who 
writes of “the absolute slowness of the descriptive pause,” and that persists, as 
Phelan and Rabinowitz recently acknowledged: “Blurring setting with descrip-
tion can turn setting (one element within narrative) into a discursive mode 
that is, from certain philosophical perspectives, in opposition to narrative” 
(Genette 93; Herman et al. 85). Like most satirists, Twain does not propose 
a solution to the problems he exposes. Yet a reading that takes seriously his 
skepticism of weather’s insignificance yields insights that are hardly “denialist.”
Lines of questioning like “Will Fiction Influence How We React to Climate 
Change?” stress participation in the authorial audience; in other words, did 
readers get it? How will they act upon the understanding of climate change 
given unto them? Yet, surely another interesting trait of cli-fi is its stipulation 
that readers participate in its narrative audience. For whatever page-count, 
readers participating in the narrative audience accept climate change as a 
working premise, or the narrative will seriously misfire for them. That is, the 
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situation is not just that climate change is in the novel (and that the ham-
fisted author wants actual audiences to think a certain way about it politi-
cally), it’s that readers have to accept it within the narrative’s confines. By 
refusing to believe in climate change, readers would interpret all the char-
acters of a novel like Barbara Kingsolver’s Flight Behavior as living in a mass 
delusion (or, to return to my earlier example, fail to recognize that their dis-
belief in an abominable snowman does not provide an operative constraint 
within the storyworld). Although this reading may seem validating to the cli-
mate denier whose stance it would match, it can importantly be identified 
as an unproductive misreading of the text and not just a disagreement with 
the author (or critic) regarding the truth value of scientific data because of 
features internal to the narrative with which it will not align. Reading a work 
of cli-fi, insofar as it allows readers to inhabit a world as the narrative audi-
ence where climate change is factual and relevant, presents for readers what 
making compelling choices in the context of climate change might be like, 
which is meaningful intellectual work. Acknowledging the work of reading, 
cli-fi teacher-scholars can turn their attention to what follows—the moment 
where readers must reconcile or reject their actual positions to their intellec-
tual work within the stipulations of the narrative and authorial audiences.5 At 
such a moment, actual readers negotiating among these positions are required 
to exercise their judgment, opening the door to potentially accepting different 
ideas (as environmental humanists have long sought).
THE WAY WE READ NOW: ENVIRONMENTAL 
HISTORY AND NARRATIVE CONFIGURATION
Having used the rhetorical model of audiences to interpret Twain’s novel, I 
now make the turn to the second half of rhetorical narrative theory’s the-
ory-practice: making a case for how works of cli-fi speak back to the model. 
Although my argument above suggests Schulz made a critical mistake in 
authorial reading, I have attended to her reading because her situating Twain’s 
novel within the orbit of cli-fi is nonetheless a move I find compelling and 
one that evinces a larger trend in criticism, especially through her phrasing 
that Twain’s note “now reads” a certain way. My argument in this section is 
that criticism of cli-fi provides a basis for what some narrative theorists have 
already speculated, which is that climate change has begun influencing how 
 5. For additional ideas and practical tools, see Beach’s “Imagining a Future for the Planet 
Through Literature, Writing, Images, and Drama.”
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actual readers read narratives. I locate this within the rhetorical framework by 
demonstrating how various “rules of configuration” stipulated by Rabinowitz 
face shifts amid the developing history of climate change. At stake in these 
shifts might be a way, I conclude, to bridge rhetorical narrative theory with 
other diverse approaches in narrative theory more broadly—for example, fem-
inist and critical race approaches.6
Any attempt to “cross-pollinate” (to credit Markku Lehtimäki’s metaphor) 
the bibliographies of ecocriticism and rhetorical narrative theory risks bump-
ing up against a longstanding and valuable tenet of the rhetorical approach: 
its a posteriori method. As Phelan has explained it most recently, “Rather 
than declaring what narratives invariably do or how they invariably do it,” 
rhetorical narrative theory tries “to reason back from the effects created by 
narratives to the causes of those effects in the authorial shaping of the narra-
tive elements” (6). If this at first seems uncontroversial, it nonetheless operates 
differently from approaches seeking to build a theory from conceptual distinc-
tions and definitions. However, it also runs up against another strand of nar-
rative theory, as Phelan acknowledges: “Rhetorical theory does not preselect 
for analysis certain matters of content, such as gender, race, class, age, sexual 
orientation, or (dis)ability, though it recognizes both that such methods have 
yielded valuable work on narrative and that some narratives do foreground 
such matters” (6). Initially, econarratology would appear just as incommensu-
rate since, as Erin James has described it, it “maintains an interest in studying 
the relationship between literature and the physical environment” (23).
Similar impasses between ecocritical interests and a posteriori method 
might be observed with two articles published in narrative theory’s flagship 
journal, Narrative, by Nicholas Royle and Takayuki Tatsumi, that advocate 
attention to environmental challenges. Royle’s “Even the Title: On the State 
of Narrative Theory” performs its claim about the crossing of environmental 
history and reading to help make it. The passage that joins two of the article’s 
three terms, “nanoment” and “narratoid,”7 presents Royle’s most direct claim 
about reading in the context of climate change. Urging narrative theory to be 
cognizant of environmental issues, Royle writes that the nanoment
 6. Nonetheless, I stop consciously short of suggesting an “ecocritical rhetorical narrative 
theory.” Nothing seems imminently gained by subdividing rhetorical narrative theory as a proj-
ect, and my argument here labors to work within the rhetorical model rather than to splice it.
 7. Royle’s terms are largely incidental to my argument here, but he defines “nanoment” 
as “at once a slowing down and expansion” and narratoid as “a striking word or phrase that 
illuminates the text in which it is observed,” also as “an effect—and perhaps an event—of read-
ing” (7, 8, 8).
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opens on to other perspectives—narrative, environmental, temporal, and so 
on. It accommodates a thinking of deferral and deferred sense, especially 
as regards the experience of “event” (what happened? When did it begin? 
When will it have ended?). It is haunted and spectral, unstable and uncon-
trollable. It affirms its singularity in a thinking of deep time and, today, the 
reality of the anthropocene [sic]. (Parenthetically here you feel compelled 
to add: no one should pretend that climate change is not radically altering 
the world of narrative studies: even within a narrowly meteorological con-
text, “the clouds” for Yeats or Beckett are no longer but “the clouds” for us; 
whether Irish or English, “autumn” is not what it used to be; we can no lon-
ger read Bowen’s description of that season without registering that the very 
narrative assumptions organizing the passing and return of the seasons and 
their representation in fiction are in a process of major transformation.) (7)
Royle’s characterization of climate change as intrusive here is made a priori, 
despite his gestures toward Yeats and Beckett; the argument is predominantly 
conceptual and supported obliquely by suggested examples.
Arguing at a much larger scale than Royle’s attention to the nano-, Taka-
yuki Tatsumi has responded to Wai Chee Dimock’s exploration of Henry 
David Thoreau’s use of frogs in Walden to connote deep time; Tatsumi takes 
this focus on frogs in a different direction, examining Paul Thomas Anderson’s 
film Magnolia and short stories by Haruki Murakami for their representations 
of apocalyptic raining of frogs. Tatsumi argues these and similar events (actual 
and literary) where lifeforms FAll FROm The SKIES (from which he coins 
“fafrotskies”) blur the categories of natural and unnatural. Partly informed by 
the compound disasters of the Fukushima tsunami and the TEPCO Daiichi 
nuclear reactor meltdown, where the dangers of either catastrophe increased 
exponentially as a result of their messy combination, his reflections on the 
blurring of the natural and unnatural lead Tatsumi to claim:
What is at stake now is not exactly the distinction between nature and civi-
lization, I would argue, but rather that between the imaginable and the 
unimaginable. Some of us will want only to try and imagine what should be 
done after the disasters. But perhaps it is just as important to deeply specu-
late upon the nature of the unimaginable already embedded, but unnoticed, 
in the works of the imagination in art and fiction all around us, both present 
and past. (349)
Tatsumi prompts a double-directional relationship between narrative and 
experience, or reading and context. More specifically, his advocated shift from 
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reactive response to speculation poses, at the level of individual actual readers, 
questions about the forward-looking moves readers make while reading. To a 
certain extent, his choice of example’s implicit risk component follows upon 
Ursula Heise’s argument that “narrative genres . . . provide important cultural 
tools for organizing information about risks into intelligible and meaningful 
stories,” which also concerns texts’ blueprints for cultural futures (138). But 
Tatsumi’s claim does not restrict itself to genre, proposing instead a much 
more expansive curiosity about tropes and other narrative components await-
ing detection in literary archives broadly construed—and this curiosity is itself 
occasioned by unfolding events in the present. Though a resourceful and ener-
gizing claim, this, too, presents an a priori approach by preselecting what it 
looks for in the study of narratives.
Neither Royle nor Tatsumi explicitly situates his argument within an eco-
critical framework, raising questions about how econarratology with a foot-
hold in ecocritical bibliographies can contribute to questions about reading 
and narrative. Actually, such questions about relationships between reading 
practices and environmental history have long been present, if not always at 
the surface, within ecocriticism. Cheryll Glotfelty’s definition of ecocriticism 
from her introduction to The Ecocriticism Reader garners frequent citation, 
but few attend to her essay’s opening paragraphs, where she establishes the 
need for ecocriticism partly by comparing scholarly journals to a “scan [of] 
newspaper headlines”: “In view of the discrepancy between current events 
and the preoccupations of the literary profession,” she wrote before the ascen-
dancy of ecocriticism within the discipline, “the claim that literary scholar-
ship has responded to contemporary pressures becomes difficult to defend” 
(xvi). While ecocriticism in the wake of Glotfelty’s landmark volume has been 
diverse in its aims and methods, what Scott Slovic has called ecocritical meth-
ods of “contextualization and synthesis” can be used to contrast Royle and 
Tatsumi in 2013 and 2014 and Rabinowitz in 1987 as actual readers, throwing 
into relief the interplay of environmental conditions and readers’ expectations 
about narrative, whether or not, as Phelan put it, narratives place those condi-
tions in the “foreground” (Slovic 34).
Although Rabinowitz’s audience model is the most cited contribution 
from Before Reading (1987), he proposed four less-discussed rules (notice, 
signification, configuration, and coherence) that are part of rhetorical nar-
rative theory’s ongoing attention to how readers experience or think through 
the act of reading narrative—what Phelan has consolidated within narrative’s 
“progression” as the unfolding of the narrative and readers’ responses to that 
unfolding. Despite their name, Rabinowitz’s “rules” are not hard-and-fast but 
instead describe patterns readers learn and deploy over the course of their 
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experience with narratives. Readers continue to apply the rules that “work” 
for as long as they work, and in this way Rabinowitz’s rules have always been, 
as Phelan describes the rhetorical approach broadly, a “perpetual work-in-
progress” (Phelan xi). What cli-fi contributes to this work-in-progress is two-
fold: first, it marks a context that shows how environmental conditions, so 
apparently stable in 1987 that Rabinowitz could posit a rule about their con-
stancy, have changed, and second, its proliferation offers an emerging mass of 
texts that may habituate readers to alternative rules, which may then collide 
with the old ones as those readers engage earlier texts.
Given that Rabinowitz defines rules of configuration as “govern[ing] the 
activities by which readers determine probability” and “allow[ing them] to 
answer the question, ‘How will this, in all probability, work out?,’” his choice 
to title the chapter “The Black Cloud on the Horizon: Rules of Configuration” 
strikes a surprising chord alongside Royle’s emphasis on clouds as invoking 
climate change and the unpredicted turn in their significance. The title names 
the convention of foreshadowing that uses black clouds or stormy oncoming 
weather to signify dark times ahead by combination of the literal and figura-
tive. As Rabinowitz makes clear, readers often learn such conventions early 
in simpler texts, where their use is straightforward, but also often find them 
applicable in more complicated and nuanced texts.
Another rule of configuration offered by Rabinowitz is even more sug-
gestive when thinking about climate change’s potential impacts on reading: 
“the rule of imminent cataclysm.” The rule of imminent cataclysm suggests, 
“If a story begins at a specified moment right before a general upheaval .  .  . 
we are probably being asked to read with the expectation that that upheaval 
will influence the course” of the narrative (123). Rabinowitz’s example cata-
clysms include the French Revolution, World War II, or the Stock Market 
crash of 1929 preceding the American Great Depression. But the etymology of 
cataclysm, which ties to biblical and other massive floods, fits climate change 
just as well or better, raising the possibility that climate change, too, could 
shape what actual readers expect in texts produced amid awareness of anthro-
pogenic impact on climate. Rabinowitz does delimit that “the rule of immi-
nent cataclysm, of course, applies only to works written after the cataclysm in 
question” (124). Yet Tatsumi’s caution about the imperative not to wait until 
disasters have passed before thinking about available responses (perhaps par-
ticularly since anthropogenic impact on climate isn’t a problem for which 
there is necessarily an “after”), destabilizes Rabinowitz’s “of course.” Though 
part of Rabinowitz’s idea is that imminent cataclysm “works” for the purpose 
of configuration because it adds an element of predictability—authorial audi-
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ences knowledgeable about history recognize likely outcomes of certain events 
(especially when those events arise in a genre that does not signal their revi-
sion)—Tatsumi’s observations about “fafrotskies” recall that present climate 
challenges endanger predictability itself. Climate change as “imminent cata-
clysm” involves predicting unpredictability, or predicting weather events with 
less predictable compound implications.
Regardless of whether cli-fi catches on as a generic term, works that 
have found their way onto cli-fi booklists share the “imminent cataclysm” of 
anthropogenic climate change as a narrative convention (indeed, as a raison-
d’être). As an example, we can consider a passage from Nathaniel Rich’s Odds 
Against Tomorrow. The driving cataclysm of the novel’s plot has arrived, and 
raindrops “detonated in giant asterisks on the sidewalks”; then, “The sky had 
begun to darken. It looked enraged, a livid sky, full of eggplant colors, pur-
ple yielding to cast-iron black. There was something thrillingly exotic about 
the angry blackness of it, tense with intermittent electricity. The clouds were 
scowling” (145). The storm unfolds over several chapters, but this particular 
passage has the advantage of recalling both of Rabinowitz’s tropes of con-
figuration mentioned above, which readers trying to occupy the authorial 
audiences will recognize here as signaling imminent disaster for the charac-
ters—recognition borne out in the narrative audience. Where, in Rabinowitz’s 
“black cloud” rule, the clouds mostly acted as metaphor for other perils, here 
the cloud is the trouble itself. And although readers of Rich’s novel have been 
prepared for a cataclysm since the opening pages, the specific outcomes of 
this storm remain compound and unpredictable—as thematized by the pro-
tagonist Michael Zukor, a disaster scenario predictor and insurance salesman, 
getting blindsided by the hurricane.
But what is notable about commentaries on Rich’s novel is that they pro-
visionally exemplify Royle’s and Tatsumi’s arguments: pace Royle, the novel’s 
hurricane wasn’t just a hurricane for readers and pace Tatsumi, the novel was 
understood as source material for the previously unpredictable. References 
to Rich’s take on environmental science, for example, take a backseat relative 
to the near-ubiquitous references to Hurricane Sandy. That the reception of 
this novel did not take agreement with the author as its center and focused 
instead on the shocking merge between narrative audience and actual audi-
ences’ worlds is notable in American National Public Radio’s coverage of 
Odds Against Tomorrow’s release alongside the rise in usage of cli-fi as a new 
generic term. As its opening hook, the piece recounts an influential reader’s 
moment of paratextual reckoning as he registers how a cataclysmic weather 
event (Hurricane Sandy) influenced his reception of Rich’s novel on his desk:
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When Superstorm Sandy hit New York City last fall, the publisher Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, like most everything else, totally shut down. It was a week 
before power returned to FSG, according to Brian Gittis, a senior publicist. 
When he got back to his office, he began sorting through galleys—advance 
copies of books. And one of them caught him off guard.
Its cover had an illustration of the Manhattan skyline half-submerged 
in water.
“It was definitely sort of a Twilight Zone moment,” Gittis recalls. 
(Evancie)
In microcosm, this incident starts the chain linking one actual reader’s 
changed perspective on a book to a wider diffusion—the publicist shares 
his reading with Angela Evancie, who in turn publicizes the novel under the 
rubric of the new generic term, thus priming at least some of the novel’s read-
ers to understand it in a particular context.
For as long as anthropogenic climate change stayed a ridiculous premise, 
as in Twain’s The American Claimant, it was unlikely to enter into readers’ 
responses and expectations in significant ways, and no single novel (including 
Rich’s) will likely change that. But increased conditioning from critics along-
side the profusion and popularity of works where actual audiences’ extra-
textual awareness of climate change turns out to be useful in guiding their 
experience of progression within the narrative audience might, over time, 
recalibrate expectations and affective responses. For some actual audiences, 
some words already register associations unanticipated in the authorial and 
narrative audience; my and Schulz’s rereading Twain’s The American Claim-
ant alongside cli-fi’s emergence exemplifies this, since its weather apparatus 
resonates differently for us in our context as more than a paratextual joke. 
While such responses will continually bump up against the limits of autho-
rial reading in works where climate change does not, in fact, inform the text, 
those encounters will only reinforce the fact of the intervening changes in 
environmental history.8 Ironically for a novel like Twain’s, such historical dif-
ferences may need to be signaled for future readers by additional paratexts 
like appendices.
 8. My argument here has partial overlap with Vera Nünning’s case for tracing reception 
history as a way of mitigating the ahistorical dimension of narratological work. But whereas 
Nünning does not reference Rabinowitz, my doing so has two purposes. First, it responds 
to the specific charges of ahistoricity leveled at rhetorical narrative theory for its a posteri-
ori approach. Second, the audience model allows for distinguishing between what is a shift 
in normative cultural standards and what is misreading, which Nünning’s argument leaves 
unaddressed.
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My argument about cli-fi differs both from those who are optimistic about 
cli-fi’s political efficacy on one hand9 and the various commentators and crit-
ics lamenting that cli-fi may more-or-less offer a green spin on apocalyptic 
or postapocalyptic sci-fi narrative conventions rather than innovate narra-
tive genres on the other.10 That is, my argument is not necessarily about any 
single work but in the proliferation itself, echoing Adam Trexler’s point that 
“broad reading enables patterns in climate fiction to be gathered” as part of his 
inquiry into how “climate change and all its things have changed the capaci-
ties of recent literature” (Anthropocene Fictions 15, 13). This calls to mind a 
shared irony about many of the pieces that survey the fledgling genre of cli-fi; 
although they often settle on one or a few preferred texts, these essays them-
selves exhibit the opposite impulse—namely, the productive judgments made 
available from the synthesis of reading more than one narrative.
By demonstrating how the accumulation of texts can shift readers’ expec-
tations through the new patterns it introduces, and by showing how dissemi-
nation of those patterns occurs through reception history in popular culture 
and criticism, I have made the case for the process by which reader interests 
and readerly dynamics can shift historically, and thereby come to impact read-
ing of even texts that do not foreground those expectations. Of course, reading 
within the authorial audience—to the extent that readers still have that con-
text available to them—will mollify anachronistic impositions by later actual 
audiences onto earlier literary works. But if one of the effects of narrative that 
rhetorical narrative theory studies, for example, is surprise, then the default 
 9. In one example, Lily Rothman writing for TIME Magazine situates the boom of cli-fi 
films reaching viewers in the summer of 2014 as “arriv[ing] on the crest of a new wave of opti-
mism about the power of fiction” (52). But as Rothman’s wave metaphor implies, this “power 
of fiction” is not new, but newly popular. Cli-fi gets cast here as the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change report with literary stylings and special effects, which uncomfortably con-
notes the desirability of getting past the literary to arrive at more important content; it uncriti-
cally redeploys the “conviction that [a genre’s] capacity to palliate the soul will culminate in an 
environmentally friendly perspective” that Nancy Easterlin incisively unpacks in her ecocriti-
cally focused chapter from A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory and Interpretation (96). 
The Chronicle of Higher Education, meanwhile, uses a terraforming metaphor that cli-fi courses 
are “Changing the Landscape of Literary Studies.” I agree that including cli-fi in syllabi can 
be impactful, but Fernandes’s piece celebrates new course offerings themselves as the impact, 
almost as though literature courses lacked means for engaging environmental issues prior to 
cli-fi’s arrival.
 10. For example, Gaard: “Cli-fi narratives remain confined within the apocalyptic failure 
of techno-science solutions, and uninformed by the global climate justice movement” (274); 
Trexler: “After 30 years spent imagining our possible futures, the limits of the genre are start-
ing to bump up against the limits of our political imaginations” (“The Climate Change Novel”); 
and Forthomme: “In short, a not-so-new form of apocalyptic literature.” However, remaining 
open to pushing back the historical frame of the genre’s inception can qualify some of these 
criticisms.
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assumptions readers bring to various aspects of narrative and the causes in 
shifts to that default in history surely matter to the broader project of rhe-
torical poetics in under-acknowledged ways. Econarratology, recognizing that 
neither the environment nor the reader are historical constants, can enrich 
rhetorical narrative theory’s account then not just of new texts but even of the 
same text over time, across different readers, across different climatic norms.
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C H A P T E R  4
A Comedy of Survival
Narrative Progression and the Rhetoric of 
Climate Change in Ian McEwan’s Solar
MARKKU LEHTIMÄKI
AS URSULA HEISE  argues, perceptions of climate change and other environ-
mental risks are shaped by narrative modes and rhetorical tropes, which serve 
as a means of “organizing information about risks into intelligible and mean-
ingful stories” (138). Consequently, classical figures, tropes, and allegorical 
story models, such as pastoral, apocalypse, irony, tragedy, and comedy, retain 
their vitality when writers try to come to terms with climate change. Based on 
these premises, the rhetorical approach to narrative appears relevant when we 
are studying the ways in which fiction communicates ideas and values related 
to environmental phenomena. In this regard, the rhetorical emphasis in nar-
rative studies can also be seen in the service of ecocritical or other politically 
engaged literary studies.
In this essay, I read Ian McEwan’s climate change novel Solar (2010) as a 
fictional narrative taking part in the heated discussion about the problems 
and possibilities of narrative relative to large-scale environmental problems. 
In Solar, the human race’s struggle for survival takes the form of an envi-
ronmental comedy in which the protagonist, scientist Michael Beard, tries to 
save the planet—and especially his own skin—by developing new technolo-
gies for utilizing solar energy. The character’s progression in the narrative is 
both negative and positive, just as the novel itself can be read either in a comic 
or in a tragic mode; Beard’s body collapses while his ethical vision matures, 
and in the global discussion, climate change develops from an apocalyptic 
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story into an aching reality. Indeed, McEwan’s rhetorical narrative is built on 
complex negotiations, beginning with the challenging questions that the very 
topic of climate change poses: first, how does the novelist’s traditional toolbox 
approach a problem of such global proportions, and second, should we even 
look to fictional narratives for answers to real environmental problems?
More specifically, I argue that despite being cast in a strongly mimetic 
mode in its plotting and characterization, Solar is a metarhetorical narrative 
about climate change, meaning that the novel extensively deals with the many-
sided rhetorical dialogue associated with the climate-conscious talk. Just as 
the novel as a rhetorical and dialogical form complicates this talk, the ecocriti-
cal concern about the heating planet complicates the premises of a human-
centered narrative. The novel also critically asks whether climate change is a 
narrative and whether the solution to this larger-than-human-life question 
is telling better and better stories that we can agree on—a contention that 
is sometimes voiced in literary-theoretical approaches to the Anthropocene. 
Some critics have found McEwan’s comic and allegorical style somewhat dis-
appointing, suggesting that environmental fictions were supposed to deal with 
environmental issues seriously. In my reading, Michael Beard, McEwan’s ethi-
cally deficient protagonist, is a central part of the novel’s rhetorical aim, as this 
mimetic-thematic-synthetic character holds up a mirror to human behavior 
in our age of the Anthropocene. After discussing the novel’s style and some 
responses to it as well as Beard’s character and its progression, I will focus on 
McEwan’s way of using fictional narrative as a rhetorical form that can say 
something worthwhile about climate change. In this regard, my argument is 
related to the recent rhetorical conception of fictionality as a serious mode of 
discourse about the actual world.
When reading Solar in terms of its environmental rhetoric, I pay atten-
tion to the novel’s narrative progression and its way of handling the complex 
issue of climate change through plot and characterization. As the narrative 
progresses, there are changes not only in the world’s climate and global poli-
tics but in the protagonist’s life as well. According to the rhetorical theory 
of narrative, this mimetic aspect of fiction—the life-like characters and their 
actions—is a central means of engaging the reader and addressing ethical 
issues. James Phelan employs the term progression to refer to “a narrative as 
a dynamic event, one that must move, in both its telling and its reception, 
through time,” so that in examining progression “we are concerned with how 
authors generate, sustain, develop, and resolve readers’ interests in narrative” 
(Reading People, Reading Plots 15). From the perspective of the rhetorical the-
ory of narrative, readers’ judgments of the narrative progression also depend 
on their individual ethical investments in characters and ideas.
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While I focus on Solar’s narrative progression in my analysis, my overall 
aim is to merge narrative theory and ecocriticism in order to show how their 
methodological combination might help us read the rhetoric of climate change 
in fiction. In effect, I argue that ecocritics need to study specific rhetorical 
designs in fiction just as narratologists should consider the ways in which 
fiction communicates ideas and values about our living environment. In my 
view, the concepts of the rhetorical theory of narrative helpfully delineate the 
communicative designs and purposes of a fictional narrative such as Solar.
POET AND PHYSICIST: WORLDS OF ART AND
SCIENCE IN IAN MCEWAN’S FICTION
Even before Solar was published, prominent ecocritic Greg Garrard made ref-
erence to Ian McEwan’s forthcoming novel despite not having yet had a chance 
to read it. In these anticipatory remarks, Garrard mentions that McEwan’s 
earlier work—The Child in Time (1987), for instance—provides “an implicit, 
and possibly deliberate, critique of many of the major ethical assumptions 
in ecocriticism” (“Ian McEwan’s Next Novel” 696). In a subsequent essay on 
the published book, Garrard writes that Solar was “eagerly anticipated by 
those who hoped for a dramatic shift in public consciousness of the issue [i.e. 
climate change]” but that the finished product only confirms a widely held 
assumption about the realist novel as a mode ill-suited to this particular topic 
(“Solar: Apocalypse Not” 123). But the critic’s disappointment perhaps stems 
more from execution than the novel as form. Garrard clarifies that the novel 
is “limited . . . by McEwan’s choice of satirical allegory as a genre” (123). The 
rather unenthusiastic critical response to Solar among ecocritics and other 
readers appears to focus on McEwan’s light-hearted approach to a grave issue. 
Another challenge for ecocritical and narratological readings alike involves 
the indeterminacy, even after examining the novel’s narrative structure, rhe-
torical purpose, and aesthetic design, of the implied author’s actual stance 
on climate change issues. In Solar, the implied author’s views are refracted 
through the minds and discourse of characters and therefore remain elusive.
Apparently, McEwan’s use of comedic, satiric, and allegorical story mod-
els is a choice rather unexpected from environmental fiction. Yet, instead of 
as theoretical “top-down” models, we should aim to judge individual works 
according to their specific purposes and achievements (Phelan, Experiencing 
Fiction 142). As Gary Johnson maintains, speaking of a rhetorically oriented 
approach to allegory, “rather than beginning with some ineffable standard of 
aesthetic merit to which a particular work either mysteriously (and sometimes 
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inexplicably) rises or fails to [sic], the rhetorical critic starts by asking what 
an author’s purpose in writing that work might have been” (21). Accordingly, 
I read Solar’s purpose as a kind of parody of environmental literary studies’ 
overly pessimistic view of the human impact on nature as well as its overly 
optimistic notion that literary art can effect change. In this, I echo Astrid 
Bracke, who also notes McEwan’s “satire of .  .  . ecocritical premises” (433). 
The novel is peopled with “merry” artists who are merry because they are 
“worried about global warming” (McEwan 67). Garrard argues, quite rightly 
to my mind, that “environmental literature and ecocriticism have typically 
embodied an unexamined moral idealism” (“Ian McEwan’s Next Novel” 710). 
It has been a crucial part of ecocriticism not only to analyze literary texts but 
also—and even more so—to advocate for environmental awareness and social 
change. But the protagonist of Solar, a hardcore advocate of quantum physics, 
has doubts:
Beard would not have believed it possible that he would be in a room drink-
ing with so many seized by the same particular assumption, that it was art 
in its highest forms, poetry, sculpture, dance, abstract music, conceptual art, 
that would lift climate change as a subject, gild it, palpate it, reveal all the 
horror and lost beauty and awesome threat, and inspire the public to take 
thought, take action, or demand it of others. He sat in silent wonder. Ideal-
ism was so alien to his nature that he could not raise an objection. He was 
in new territory, among a friendly tribe of exotics. (77)
The Nobel Prize-winning scientist Michael Beard, who cares for neither art 
nor climate change and cares “even less for art about climate change,” is hap-
pily ignorant of the fact that he is himself a character in a novel that is a 
modest piece of art about climate change (73). Even before this scene, Beard 
has been baffled by the suggestion that he consider art as one way of think-
ing about climate change: “There were novels Aldous wanted him to read—
novels!—.  .  . and documentaries about climate change” (28–29). The space 
is now open for the politics and rhetoric of climate change, but as Dipesh 
Chakrabarty suggests, it is open “as much to science and technology as to 
rhetoric, art, media, and arguments and conflicts conducted through a variety 
of means” (“Postcolonial Studies” 9). In Beard’s view, however, while fiction 
may have some rhetorical purpose of “lifting,” “gilding,” and “palpating” cli-
mate change, art is not serious enough to concern him.1
 1. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, McEwan maintains that the topic of cli-
mate change is “a subject impacted with hard science: physics, climate science, statistics, graphs, 
measurements—things that are fairly hostile to a novel” (Alter).
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McEwan’s novels often test and challenge clashing worldviews of science 
and poetry.2 David Herman, using McEwan’s novella On Chesil Beach (2007) 
as a test case, draws attention to narratives’ role in wider discursive contexts; 
he writes that “narratives do not merely evoke worlds but also intervene in 
a field of discourses, a range of representational strategies, a constellation of 
ways of seeing—and sometimes a set of competing narratives” (Herman et al. 
17). In McEwan’s subsequent work, it is scientific (especially neuropsychologi-
cal) explanations that have gained prominence; for example, the preference of 
science over poetry is a motif governing Saturday (2005).
In the course of Beard’s lectures on solar energy to his academic audiences 
and his potential sponsors and investors, Solar becomes filled with discourses 
representing natural science, cognitive psychology, capitalism, and humanism. 
The floor is not occupied solely by Beard, for “the point of view of the audi-
ence” is also given voice (138). Obviously, we should be careful not to conflate 
this fictional and characterized audience’s voice with the discourse-level com-
munication between the implied author and the authorial audience—although 
it is possible that the fictional audience’s views on climate change reflect those 
of the actual audience. The narrative, often using free indirect discourse and 
thus merging the narrator’s voice with the character’s viewpoint, explains 
that “Beard had heard rumours that strange ideas were commonplace among 
the liberal-arts departments” and that “humanities students were routinely 
taught that science was just one more belief system, no more or less truthful 
than religion or astrology” (132). Instead, Beard situates himself in another, 
“objectivist” camp that “could not accept that there was no reality without an 
observer” and that “believed the world existed independently of the language 
that described it” (65, 139). Beard remains skeptical of the postmodernist 
ideas espoused by cultural scholars—representing the abovementioned point 
of view of the audience—who dismiss facts of natural science as “socially con-
structed” and treat climate change and other worldwide environmental prob-
lems as only stories and narratives (131). He feels that “people who kept on 
about narrative tended to have a squiffy view of reality, believing all versions 
of it to be of equal value” (147; emphasis added). Whereas McEwan’s previous 
work expresses skepticism about the explanatory power of poetry, in Solar he 
challenges literary scholars to reflect on unexamined celebration of narrative’s 
possibilities. The text invites the actual audience of the novel—including the 
 2. McEwan suggests that science parallels literature as a means by which the world can 
be understood but that there are “insights which science has brought us and which literature 
could never equal,” just as “there are many complex facets of experience for which science has 
no language and literature does” (Cook, Groes, and Sage 128).
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literary theorist—to join debates about the validity of narrative approaches 
to nature.3
Skepticism notwithstanding, however, Solar itself is a thoroughly and 
self-consciously literary text. Even Beard’s scientific work on light, space, and 
power actually goes back to his reading of John Milton. However, Beard does 
not realize Book One of Paradise Lost anticipates his doomed mission to har-
ness sunlight in the verses beginning “A summer’s day; and with the setting 
sun / Dropt from the zenith, like a falling star” despite quoting a fragment 
from them: “from morn / to noon he fell” (200). Ironically, Beard does not 
care for “the arty sort of people” who “intimidated him with literary references 
he did not understand” and who asked that he “synthesized [his] reading into 
some kind of aesthetic overview” (197, 202). Through this comical and rhe-
torical strategy, which makes Beard function as a foil for readers, the novel 
asks its reader to perform interpretive tasks that Beard himself is incapable of 
doing or unwilling to do because of his deep scorn for literary studies—that 
is, to read behind Beard’s back for the implied author’s views. I would argue 
that the implied author of Solar adopts, and encourages readers to adopt, an 
ironic and amused stance toward Beard’s ethics—at least to a point. Beard 
also fails to recognize that his initial interest in “the redeeming power of the 
imagination,” as exemplified by Milton’s poetry, opens up his own mind, for 
a short while, to creative innovation of the kind that is needed to produce 
breakthroughs in the natural sciences (200). These are “daydreams,” “manic 
moments,” “episodes that braided the actual with the unreal” (116). Therefore, 
the celebrated “Beard–Einstein Conflation,” which earns him the Nobel Prize 
in Physics, is the fruit of his youthful mind’s imaginative power, almost Mil-
tonic in its way of seeing.
In the narrative progression, Beard’s scientific worldview repeatedly 
clashes with that of artists, as seen in his outraged response to a novelist called 
Meredith, who suggests that we should bring ethics into the realm of the natu-
ral sciences and vice versa: “Let’s hear you apply [Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle] to ethics. Right plus wrong over the square root of two. What the 
hell does it mean? Nothing!” (77). In Beard’s view, physics is a realm puri-
fied of ethics and emotion, “Free of human taint, it described a world that 
 3. Beard, I think, would find the following theoretical assertion problematic: “[A]n essen-
tial ingredient of the process by which humans make sense of crises in public life—or feel 
inspired to work towards solutions—is stories: narratives we tell ourselves in order to find our 
bearings in a new situation. . . . Our success in developing a globally concerted response to the 
climate crisis, for instance, will depend on the degree to which we can tell stories that we can 
all agree on” (Chakrabarty, “Foreword” xiii–xiv; emphases added).
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would still exist if men and women and all their sorrows did not” (9). Because 
Beard does not see any value in “human taint” and “sorrow,” his mind is cold, 
detached, and reductive—and yet the reader mainly sees the narrative world 
through his limited viewpoint, which has “no language . . . for feelings” (197). 
Beard’s scientific approach therefore intentionally excludes other minds. The 
reader’s confinement to Beard’s point of view may seem problematic, but it is 
absolutely essential to the novel’s rhetoric and ethics. By making readers see 
the world through the protagonist’s self-centered and objectifying vision, Solar 
makes its main move, asking us to reflect on our own ecological preconcep-
tions and “unexamined assumptions” (155).
One easily concludes that Meredith speaks for McEwan, especially since 
this author-character is based on McEwan’s own participation in the climate 
change conference at the North Pole in 2005. The text self-ironically pres-
ents Meredith to the reader through Beard’s vision: a “gangling” and “spin-
dly novelist,” “this crop-haired fellow with rimless glasses,” reading a “harsh, 
impenetrable fragment of a novel punctuated with expletives” (76, 77, 80)—
supposedly the very narrative we are reading. Perhaps McEwan plays with 
self-parody here, even as his authorial persona splits in two: Beard embod-
ies scientific skepticism, and Meredith represents the poetic approach. Even 
though Beard ridicules Meredith’s ethics and art, the reader is nevertheless 
invited to view the fictional novelist’s rhetoric as one among the serious dis-
courses featured in Solar. According to one reading, McEwan defends poetry 
and the humanities in the age of economy and technology; according to 
another, equally valid reading, he exposes the limits of the arts, humanities, 
and especially religion in explaining the human mind and how it works in the 
natural world. It may be the case that Meredith, whom Beard boos, represents 
a novelist’s weak position in the larger arena of climate change rhetoric.
SURVIVAL IN THE AGE OF THE ANTHROPOCENE
As mentioned, McEwan’s use of comedy, satire, and allegory in his fictional 
approach to climate change has received mixed responses. While the rhe-
torical understanding of a work’s specific purposes is one way to deal with 
this criticism, Solar also prompts me to revisit Joseph Meeker’s argument in 
his pioneering work on environmental imagination, The Comedy of Survival: 
Studies in Literary Ecology. Meeker regards literature as an important resource 
of the human species—a means of its survival—since it offers insights “into 
human relationships with other species and with the world around us” (4). 
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For Meeker, comedy as a mode locates human beings in their natural envi-
ronment, while tragedy is about humanity’s doomed attempt to put ourselves 
above the world. Thus, whereas tragedy foregrounds the transcendent moral 
order, human supremacy over nature, and the importance of the human indi-
vidual, the comic mode is fundamentally connected to human survival in the 
natural environment (52). Meeker seeks to determine whether literature con-
tributes to the survival of the human species or to its extinction (25), and his 
emphasis on the comic mode as a model for ecological behavior may help us 
appreciate comedic elements of McEwan’s novel.
However, in the Anthropocene, heroic, tragic, or comical stories of individ-
ual survival in the midst of wild nature may simply not suffice, and idealistic 
notions of narrative’s all-encompassing powers have also become suspect—as 
Chakrabarty concludes, addressing the topic of survival in the climate change 
context, “It is precisely the ‘survival of the species’ on ‘a world-wide scale’ 
that is largely in question” (“Postcolonial Studies” 15). Climate change and its 
various environmental consequences are difficult to make sense of in human 
terms precisely because they radically exceed the human scale. Therefore sto-
ries focusing on human experience—such as Solar—have a necessarily lim-
ited grasp of environmental issues’ global proportions. As I suggested above, 
McEwan employs both narrative comedy and allegorical satire to approach the 
experience of climate change, with a banal and failed scientist as his hero. For 
such a character, readers may question whether his conceptions about climate 
change should be taken seriously either:
Beard was not wholly skeptical about climate change. . . . But he himself had 
other things to think about. And he was unimpressed by some of the wild 
commentary that suggested the world was in “peril,” that humankind was 
drifting towards calamity, when coastal cities would disappear under the 
waves, crops fail, and hundreds of millions of refugees surge from one coun-
try, one continent, to another, driven by drought, floods, famine, tempests, 
unceasing wars for diminishing resources. (15–16)
As the narrative rhetoric discloses these alarming scenarios following from cli-
mate change, we are told that Beard does not believe in these alleged perils. He 
is annoyed by the apocalyptic rhetoric associated with climate-conscious talk 
about the planet, as well as sick of listening to the “familiar litany of shrink-
ing glaciers, encroaching deserts, dissolving coral reefs, disrupted ocean cur-
rents, rising sea levels, disappearing this and that, on and on” (36). And yet, 
behind Beard’s back, these global threats are conveyed to readers in a visually 
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and emotionally evocative way, potentially raising their ecological awareness. 
While Beard believes he is dismissing these views, they in fact emerge as dia-
logical alternatives. McEwan’s strategy here is effective both in terms of narra-
tive rhetoric and in terms of environmental discourse.
What Beard does not recognize is that, in nine years and partly because 
of global warming, he will disappear, too. The narrative progresses from 2000 
through 2005 to 2009, and there are changes in the climate: the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) gives its successive reports, and 
Al Gore challenges George W. Bush in the U. S. presidential election. At the 
beginning of the new millennium, the British government gets engaged with 
climate change “practically rather than merely rhetorically” (16). Yet Beard 
himself only “read about it” and “expected governments to .  .  . take action,” 
and soon “the century had ended and climate change remained a marginal 
concern” (15, 75). The novel consists of three acts, each of which formulates 
a different viewpoint on the topic of climate change: first, Beard’s skepticism 
about it (Part One, 2000), second, his rhetoric outlining the benefits of solar 
energy (Part Two, 2005), and third, his action of saving the planet and his 
own life (Part Three, 2009). Whereas the first part of the novel shows the pro-
tagonist’s profound skepticism about global warming, the last part shows him 
convinced of its reality, much like Al Gore in his documentary film An Incon-
venient Truth (2006). In fact, some pieces of Beard’s rhetoric in front of his 
audience—such as his calculated expression in a staged theater performance 
that “the planet .  .  . is sick” (148)—parody Gore’s populist phrasings. At the 
beginning of Solar, Beard’s egotism strongly reflects humankind’s self-centered 
attitude in the face of a crisis affecting the entire earth, but his subsequent 
conclusions—that in a crisis we understand “that it is not in other people or 
in the system or in the nature of things that the problem lies, but in ourselves, 
our own follies” (155)—signify his growing ethical vision.
Solar progresses from the “frozen shores” of the North Pole to the “sav-
age heat” of the New Mexico deserts, so that human thinking and action are 
enveloped in the harsh and changing realities of the natural environment (79, 
232).4 The text depicts science, Beard’s only and true religion, as practiced 
in sterile, lifeless sites, detached from human concerns. But the problem is 
achingly real; the changing climate—the freezing cold or the burning sun—
affects everyday life. These effects make Beard seem like a comical figure and 
 4. Scott Slovic importantly notes that the popular phrase global warming does not quite 
describe the complexity of climate change, since what is happening globally is both extreme 
warming and extreme freezing. Therefore, for rhetorical reasons it makes sense to talk about 
the implications of “climate change” instead of “global warming” (119).
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an egotist at the same time, for his fears about climate change are not really 
global but instead very local, concerning his own body.5 As the narrative dis-
course and the story-time progress, climate change is written on Beard’s body 
through extreme temperatures’ influence upon his physical well-being:
For when his business was done he discovered that his penis had attached 
itself to the zip of his snowmobile suit, had frozen in hard along its length, 
the way only living flesh can do on sub-zero metal. . . . And he was already 
in pain from the cold. (59)
The instrument panel was showing an external temperature of one 
hundred and twelve degrees Fahrenheit, hotter than either man had ever 
known. . . . Beard was generally adept at avoiding inconvenient or troubling 
thoughts, but now that his spirits were low he was brooding about his health, 
and staring at the reddish-brown blotch, a map of unknown territory, on his 
wrist. (232, 238)
Beard’s bodily experiences have consequences for his ethical thinking. He 
ponders, quite grudgingly, whether “climate change, radical warming above 
the Arctic Circle, was actually taking place and was not a figment of the activ-
ist imagination” (59). The world around him gives constant signs of its exis-
tence, so that Beard is forced to concede that not all were “abstract concerns,” 
for some were “distinctly embodied” (184). Here McEwan utilizes Beard’s 
bodily experiences for rhetorical purposes, foregrounding human experien-
tiality as a way of dealing with issues as big and complex as climate change.
Beard’s comical ventures around the globe are therefore firmly rooted in 
his physical experiences, while his questionable ethics are also emphasized. 
Beard steals his younger colleague Tom Aldous’s pioneering work on artificial 
photosynthesis, the use of carbon dioxide, water, and sunlight as an endless 
resource for the solar energy industry.6 It appears, however, that Beard is in 
it for commercial gain rather than the saving of the planet, so that, indeed, 
 5. Beard’s banal situation is a kind of parody of the well-known environmental slogan 
“think globally, act locally,” since his commercial ideas of saving the planet remain abstract 
compared to his comical actions on the physical and local level. Yet, as Timothy Clark, among 
others, suggests, “the issue of climate change also undermines the very possibility of acting only 
locally” (136).
 6. As often in McEwan’s fiction, the epilogue provides an ironic twist or reversal to the 
main narrative. In the appendix we are given the Nobel Prize Committee’s presentation speech 
with its implication that Aldous’s vision of artificial photosynthesis as a saving solution actually 
derives from Beard’s initial work on “the complicated interactions between light and matter” 
(283).
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climate change is something from which he profits. Compared to Aldous and 
his “deep interest in global warming, ecology, [and] sustainable development,” 
Beard comes across as an opportunistic and selfish villain (270). This makes 
it difficult for readers to view him and his actions with sympathy. One of 
the most revealing conversations occurs in Part Three between the scheming 
Beard and his not-so-bright assistant Toby Hammer, who is worried about the 
possibility, mentioned on television, that the planet is not heating:
“Here’s the good news. The UN estimates that already a third of a million 
people a year are dying from climate change. Bangladesh is going down 
because the oceans are warming and expanding and rising. There’s drought 
in the Amazonian rainforest. Methane is pouring out of the Siberian perma-
frost. There’s a meltdown under the Greenland ice sheet that no one really 
wants to talk about.  .  .  . Two years ago we lost forty per cent of the Arc-
tic summer ice. Now the eastern Antarctic is going. The future has arrived, 
Toby.” . . . Beard laid a hand on his friend’s arm, a sure sign that he was well 
over his limit. “Toby, listen. It’s a catastrophe. Relax!” (216–17)
There is clear irony here, for Beard needs the sun to get scorching hot in order 
to make his solar panels function more effectively. The very contradictoriness 
of Beard’s practice occupies the core of Solar’s narrative rhetoric, for the novel 
dramatizes the potential dead ends to which even well-meaning individual 
or governmental practices may lead. Therefore, his telling Toby to “Relax”—
because it will remain a catastrophe—is not very reassuring. We can view this 
white male physicist as an embodiment of a general refusal to think about 
the future of the planet. Beard’s vices—gluttony, greediness, sexual promiscu-
ity, opportunism, calculation, profit-seeking, and so on—hold up a mirror to 
humankind. His “grotesque body” is the very center of the novel’s “satirical 
allegory” (Garrard, “Solar: Apocalypse Not” 125, 130). Beard consumes, steals, 
and exploits everything around him, whether it is food, women, or other sci-
entists’ research plans. As Beard’s body starts to collapse and his ethics gradu-
ally deteriorates, he becomes a symbol of humankind’s grossly exploitative 
way of treating the planet.
As we have seen, McEwan gives his main character pronouncedly physical 
attributes as well as allegorical dimensions—dimensions that Beard is unable 
to live up to precisely because of his physical shortcomings. Free indirect dis-
course at the narrative’s beginning reveals that the “ethereal Beard of plan-
etary renown” has “given up hopes of being the mortal chosen to find [the] 
grail,” but near the end, Beard believes himself on a “quest to rescue human-
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kind from self-destruction” (11, 66, 223). He thus aspires in vain to the role of 
his namesake, the Archangel Michael, who leads the heavenly forces against 
Satan in Paradise Lost; indeed, like Milton’s god of fire, Hephaestus, he is “a 
falling star” in “the setting sun.” Despite his allegorical dimensions, Beard is 
totally mundane; his “messy” life, filled with junk mail and empty bottles, 
mismatched socks and uncleared attics, never reaches “Eden, purged of clutter 
and distraction” (222, 226).
As a fictional figure, Beard fulfills the three character functions or dimen-
sions outlined in rhetorical narrative theory: the mimetic component involves 
readers’ interest in the narrative world as like our own and characters like 
ourselves; the thematic component involves readers’ interest in the cultural, 
ideological, philosophical, or ethical issues the narrative addresses; and the 
synthetic component involves readers’ close attention to the narrative as an 
artificial construct (Phelan, Experiencing Fiction 5–6). Beard’s figure is, for 
good and ill, recognizably human and thus mimetic; his allegorical quality 
obviously serves thematic functions; and he is a useful narrative device for 
McEwan, enabling metafictional and intertextual commentary, and is there-
fore synthetic. Beard’s developing skin cancer is an indexical sign of global 
warming, which is partially caused by short-sighted human actions, but Beard 
also symbolizes the planet’s looming peril, even becoming an iconic image 
resembling the Earth: “an oily nausea at something monstrous and rotten 
from the sea stranded on the tidal mudflats of a stagnant estuary, decaying 
gaseously in his gut and welling up, contaminating his breath, his words, and 
suddenly his thoughts” (148). Indeed, the descriptions of his bodily features 
sometimes draw on geographic metaphors: “the archipelago of his disrupted 
selfhood” (142); “the northern hemisphere of his eyeball” (244). Beard’s body 
therefore reads as a planetary metaphor for exploitation. The abstract dimen-
sions of Beard’s character are, however, converted into concrete functions of 
his character in the narrative progression (Phelan, Reading People, Reading 
Plots, 9), and the character’s mimetic component comes to the foreground.
This is Solar’s greatest irony and the core of the narrative’s difficult contra-
dictions. Beard’s selfishness is a symptom of humans’ unsustainable treatment 
of their natural environment, yet he is the one who acts by thinking up solu-
tions to save the planet. The ambivalence of Beard marks the novel’s broader 
ethical indeterminacy. It is as if our future depended on Beard’s growing self-
reflexivity, precisely because in his greedy, selfish, and calculating mind he 
is “an average type” representing mankind (170).7 Slovic writes that we are 
 7. As McEwan points out in an interview, “Global warming suddenly wasn’t an abstract 
issue, because humans had to solve it—untrustworthy, venal, sweet, lovely humans” (qtd. in 
Garrard, “Ian McEwan’s Next Novel” 718).
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“an inventive, imaginative species—that is our nature,” but we can “apply our 
minds or physical energy in sustaining or destructive ways” (6). Though, as 
some critics note, Solar reveals a pessimistic attitude about human behavior 
toward our planet (see Murphy 150), the novel also maintains some implicit 
hope about our ethical transformation. In Beard’s case, while his bodily func-
tions gradually collapse, there nevertheless remains some progression in his 
thinking and ethics.
NARRATIVE ART: A RHETORIC AND
POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Although some of the most challenging environmental problems have been 
popular topics in science fiction, fantasy, graphic novels, movies, and docu-
mentaries, Solar, together with Barbara Kingsolver’s Flight Behavior (2012), is 
a rare example of climate change fiction in the mode of the traditional novel 
and psychological realism. In spite of their self-conscious employment of alle-
gory and other rhetorical tropes, these two contemporary novels still fall into 
the category of the realist novel in the sense that they are “set in the here, the 
now, and the local” (Murphy 158). As Adam Trexler maintains, other modes 
and media “lack the novel’s capacity to interrogate the emotional, aesthetic, 
and living experience of the Anthropocene” (6). However, following Trexler, 
we can ask what climate change does to conventional literary forms and what 
distortions and complications may occur in generic structures until they are 
better able to explore the Anthropocene’s complexities and implications.
Solar thus raises a theoretical question about environmental imagination 
and the realist novel’s limits in the age of anthropogenic climate change. Gar-
rard maintains that “none of the traditional forms in literature, film, or televi-
sion documentary is unproblematically suited to capturing the geographical 
and temporal scale, complexity, and uncertainty of climate change in particu-
lar” (“Ian McEwan’s Next Novel” 709). Arguably, formulaic fictions will pro-
vide no sustainable solutions. Yet we may ask (together with Michael Beard) 
whether any kind of art will have the slightest influence on the future of the 
planet. Heise notes that climate change has begun to make its way into the 
cultural imagination and that it “poses a challenge for narrative and lyrical 
forms that have conventionally focused above all on individuals, families, or 
nations, since it requires the articulation of connections between events at 
vastly different scales” (205). Consequently, she argues that in their portrayal 
of climate change, some popular films rely on the conventions of “apocalyp-
tic narrative” (206). These popular notions are also addressed by Beard with 
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increasing cynicism: for him, “the end of the world” was a “fantasy,” and when 
it comes to the special case of climate change, “the apocalyptic tendency had 
conjured yet another beast” (16). Thrillers and science fiction novels, Holly-
wood mega-films, and documentaries routinely utilize conventional, human-
centered narrative strategies when dealing with something that both exceeds 
the human scale and presents a huge challenge to the future existence of the 
species. Also in Solar, McEwan seems to be unable to represent climate change 
except in the form of a conventional masculine narrative about a white male 
scientist trying to navigate his relationship with his several ex-wives and one 
daughter. Obviously, we can also read the novel as a parody of this clichéd 
plotline.
Instead of being a sympathetic and idealistic character with whom the 
readers can become friends, such as Dellarobia in Kingsolver’s Flight Behav-
ior, Michael Beard becomes more and more obnoxious as the narrative goes 
on, “a modern monster in the flesh” (138). He is tragically unable to follow 
the friendly advice of Jesus—a Spanish ice sculptor he meets at the North 
Pole conference—that “it was important never to lose faith in the possibility 
of profound inner change” (66). After all his misdeeds, Beard still wants to 
believe in his own redemption: “He would be redeemed. Let there be light!” 
(144). Finally, the very ending of the novel aims to restore some hope in the 
sense that there might still be love and happiness waiting for the protagonist 
after his five marriages and adulterous escapades. After Beard has lost every-
thing (his solar power project and his reputation in the field of science), he 
still has his loving daughter Catriona, and the last word of the narrative is 
love: “As Beard rose to greet her, he felt in his heart an unfamiliar, swelling 
sensation, but he doubted as he opened his arms to her that anyone would 
ever believe him now if he tried to pass it off as love” (279). But the conclu-
sion of the narrative also offers us another interpretation; the “unfamiliar, 
swelling sensation” in Beard’s heart may actually be a sign of a coming heart 
attack, anticipated by his feelings of chest pain, exhaustion, and his being 
overweight. The ending can be alternatively interpreted as a happy one in the 
comic mode or as an unhappy one in the tragic mode—indeed, this moving 
back and forth between two (or more) possible interpretations is built in the 
novel’s rhetorical design and purpose.
Regarding the rhetoric of climate change and its competing narratives, 
Chakrabarty notes an apparent preference for accounts neither purely sci-
entific nor purely literary; thus, he argues, in order to bring the complex 
dimensions of climate change’s “wicked problem” within the grasp of human 
experience, it is typical to use narrative practices (“Postcolonial Studies” 
10–11, 17–18). While environmental problems are not texts, narratives (both 
scientific and poetic) offer the problem of climate change rhetorically to the 
larger public imagination—as McEwan does in Solar. This is also a view that 
Michael Beard, a staunch opponent of storied versions of the natural world, 
gradually adopts: he employs “narrative art” to make his case about climate 
change and solar power (180). Thus, in a conference on solar power energy 
Beard is trying to survive in front of a demanding audience: “He was warm-
ing to his tale, convinced that it had a useful conclusion that he would dis-
cover in the telling” (155). This may make Beard an unreliable storyteller and 
yet, at the same time, the most reliable there is: he is feeling the actual heat 
in the face of global warming, and this may result in his failure to tell the 
tale. Since he believes that climate change is not a narrative to be told and 
put away, he becomes a “kind of learned satyr” and “innocent fool” who has 
seen the light (137). One way to conceptualize this would be to say that Beard 
gradually moves closer to the ethical stance of the implied author.
In my view, there is both dialogue and discrepancy between the rhetori-
cal theory of narrative and ecocriticism. Whereas, in rhetorical theory, nar-
ratives communicate ideas and values to audiences through textual designs, 
ecocriticism is interested in ways that literature can affect readers to act in 
sustainable ways in the real world. These two approaches and their interests 
can still be combined in order to develop a new, environmentally informed 
and engaged narrative theory. Seymour Chatman suggests that rhetoric 
in fiction should be seen as “end-oriented discourse,” by which he means 
the way in which the novel “suades” its readers toward the investigation 
of some views of “how things are in the real world” (203). According to 
Phelan, the rhetorical approach emphasizes “narrative as a distinctive and 
powerful means for an author to communicate knowledge, feelings, values, 
and beliefs to an audience” (Narrative as Rhetoric 18). In ecocritical liter-
ary studies, there are likewise scholars who see the relationship between 
nature and literature as dialogical and crucially negotiated by rhetoric. Bon-
nie Costello suggests that “the ecocritical preference for referentiality over 
textuality, for real world over rhetorical and aesthetic concerns, seems mis-
guided” (14). Defending the power of poetry, Costello argues that imagina-
tion and abstraction can draw us toward the natural world rather than away 
from it. She adds that “a rhetorically oriented criticism is aware of the text 
.  .  . as a series of motivated strategies and structures, which communicates 
something to an audience” (14). Here, in the idea of rhetorical community 
and transaction, might be the missing link between ecological and narrative 
poetics.
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Recent developments in narrative theory also help us bridge narratology 
and ecocriticism. Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan, and Richard Walsh 
argue that “the use of fictionality is not a turning away from the actual world 
but a specific communicative strategy within some context in that world” and 
that “rhetoric is prevalent wherever and whenever someone wants to move 
someone else to do or think or change something” (62–63). A conception of 
narrative and fiction as rhetoric is the key to making narrative theory relevant 
to environmental literary studies, since in rhetorical theory and ecocriticism, 
as voiced by Costello and others, there are shared ideas about strategies, val-
ues, and communication. From the combined vantage point of the rhetorical 
narrative theory and ecocriticism, fictional narrative is a powerful means for 
making various environmental issues palpable—although we are reminded 
of Solar’s rhetorical and open-ended questions about whether art would lift 
climate change as a subject, gild it, and palpate it.
Indeed it is a central tenet of ecocriticism that writing and reading lit-
erature should not be an end in itself but should lead to engagement, com-
mitment, responsibility, and action in the real world (Slovic 3–5). Slovic also 
wonders how you can use “narrative language for this purpose, to tell the story 
of something as abstract and complicated as climate change?” (123). I would 
argue that McEwan’s choice of comedy and allegory provides one possible 
solution and answer, as does his taking advantage of the distinctive features 
of fictional narrative as rhetoric.
However, Solar seems to speak back to idealistic notions of narrative 
and literary theory and their supposed power to affect the real world. What 
McEwan’s fictional scientist would claim is that both ecocriticism and nar-
rative theory are based on unchecked idealism. It is as if Beard, who feels 
that “greenery .  .  . was not to his taste,” was not reconcilable with any kind 
of politically correct “green” reading (87). We could idealistically think that 
Solar proves Beard wrong, that art can “inspire” us to “take action” in the 
extratextual environment, but this kind of straightforward interpretation falls 
short of recognizing the rhetorical complexity of the implied author’s call 
(77). Through Beard’s slanted thoughts and other fictional voices, Solar asks 
its readers to reflect on the many sides of climate change discussion, including 
the question about the value of literary art and narrative theory in that discus-
sion. As in the confrontation between Beard and Meredith, McEwan presents 
a many-layered approach to the climate change issue, weighing options and 
entertaining contesting versions, especially those provided by natural sciences 
and poetry in their respective visions of the world.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A METARHETORICAL
 NARRATIVE ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE
Fictional narratives can obviously teach us values through their form, includ-
ing complex characters, dialogic voices, many-layered viewpoints, and diffi-
cult human situations. All this makes novels and other narrative fictions a 
valuable means of communicating environmental themes deeply and per-
suasively to their audiences. In Solar, the various conflicting views inside the 
fiction invite the actual audience of the novel to take part in the heated dis-
cussion, to search for the implied author’s design and intentions, and perhaps 
finally to conclude that some ethical problems resist easy solutions. It is this 
metarhetorical emphasis of Solar that, in my view, makes it a specific kind of 
rhetorical narrative. The novel exemplifies the idea that fiction can be a seri-
ous mode of discourse since it provides its readers with the possibility to think 
about narratives’ rhetorical efficacy with regard to problems of the scale of 
climate change. Indeed, the ethical stakes of McEwan’s novel prompt its read-
ers to confront the idea that narrative as a rhetorical form can say something 
worthwhile about environmental issues. The novel’s self-conscious rhetoric 
gives space to various conflicting views about our common world and shared 
realities without providing firm guidelines. The extremely complex issue—
“the burning question” (149)—therefore remains open to further negotiation.
These open questions are reflected in the novel’s narrative style, as Michael 
Beard’s ceremonial confidence in front of a conference audience gradually 
gives way to disturbing inner thoughts: ‘“We pass through a mirror, every-
thing is transformed, the old paradigm makes way for the new.’ But the rhe-
torical flourish of these final phrases had a desperate air, his voice sounded 
thin in his ears, his conclusions were hollow after all. Where now?” (155–56). 
While Beard’s project of providing a sustainable solution to the climate change 
problem is eventually doomed to fail, McEwan is ultimately successful with 
his chosen fictional approach. Apparently, following the rhetorical theory of 
narrative, we should trace a careful path across a complex site of textual mean-
ings. Phelan writes that when reading fiction “we often come across narra-
tives that do not seem to give sufficient signals for us to make clear and firm 
discriminations” (Experiencing Fiction 1–2). Despite his ambivalent role as 
Beard’s antagonist, Meredith, the fictional novelist of Solar, does point the 
reader toward the ethical and rhetorical crux of the narrative, speaking of 
“the loss of a ‘moral compass’” and the “difficulty of absolute judgments” (76). 
This kind of rhetoric inside the fiction—indeed, a kind of interpretative key to 
readers—mirrors the larger discursive and metarhetorical frame of the novel.
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In conclusion, it may be suggested that through his rhetorical moves McE-
wan constructs an argument that real-world problems are not only narrative 
problems and that it is not only a question of different storied versions of cli-
mate change. Literary fictions can still contribute to the discussion about our 
global futures in concert or in clash with other discourses, either scientific, 
economic, technological, or philosophical. Finally, rather than reading Solar 
as a mimetic representation of the reality of climate change, we need to rec-
ognize another kind of design and intention: the novel is about the rhetoric 
associated with climate change.8
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C H A P T E R  5
Ecocriticism as Narrative Ethics
Triangulating Environmental Virtue 
in Richard Powers’s Gain
GREG GARRARD
ECOCRITICAL NARRATIVE ETHICS
Ecocriticism has most often been characterized as a form of political liter-
ary criticism, close kin to feminism and Marxism, albeit with a dramatically 
expanded sense of the relevant polity (Clark; Garrard; Glotfelty and Fromm; 
Feder). While I accept such characterizations in principle, I argue here for a 
shift to narrative ethics on two grounds. First, politicized ecocriticism often 
provides dishearteningly little insight into literature as such. At best, literary 
texts supply apt illustration of theoretical arguments developed prior to, and 
independent of, the reading encounter itself; at worst, the author’s supposed 
exclusions and elisions are the pretext for unilluminating performances of 
scholarly self-righteousness. If literature can’t surprise, enrage, and embarrass 
us—and not just our students—we have no business teaching it.
Second, politics is morality writ large, in any case. While publishing 
research and teaching and grading students are inherently political acts, read-
ing remains a private, subjective, intensely emotive experience, to which the 
rubric of ethics applies more intuitively. As Adam Zachary Newton puts it, 
“Textual interpretation comprises both private responsibilities incurred in 
each singular act of reading and public responsibilities that follow from dis-
cussing and teaching works of fiction” (19). To think of literary criticism only 
as political is to forget the productive tensions—the wrinkles in the first read-
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ing; the jolts of reconceptualization as that reading goes public—between 
these distinct sets of responsibilities.
Jim Phelan has provided a useful schema with which to categorize the 
questions and concerns of narrative ethics:
Investigations into narrative ethics have been diverse and wide-ranging, but 
they can be usefully understood as focused on one or more of four issues: 
(1) the ethics of the told; (2) the ethics of the telling; (3) the ethics of writing/
producing; and (4) the ethics of reading/reception. (n. pag.)
Ecocritics have been interested in all four aspects of narrative ethics, but 
most attention has focused on (1) and (3). Questions of telling seem second-
ary within much ecocritical scholarship to the environmental implications of 
what is told, in terms of plot, setting and characterization. Many allusions have 
been made in ecocritical writings to the ethics of reading (4), although almost 
no systematic evidence has been collected about the actual responses of actual 
readers to environmental texts. Under the ethics of writing (3), Phelan lists 
several questions, one of which has come to predominate in politically activ-
ist ecocriticism: the ethics of exclusion. In practice, this amounts to a measure 
of the difference between what the author chose to write about and what the 
scholar thinks she ought to have written about.
I want to suggest that ecocritical scholars put the ethics of the telling (2) 
at the center of their research and teaching. It is the quality and significance 
of the telling, not the told, that justifies attention to great and singular litera-
ture, if anything does. This does not, though, imply any more than a strictly 
provisional distinction between the form of telling and the content that is told, 
especially if the distinction implies the former is abstract and generalizable 
(as in the more abstruse formulations of narratology) whereas the latter is the 
locus of a particularized meaning. As Derek Attridge argues:
Meaning is . . . not something that appears in defining opposition or comple-
mentary apposition to form, as it is conceived in the aesthetic tradition, but 
as something already taken up within form; forms are made out of meanings 
quite as much as they are made out of sounds and shapes. Form and mean-
ing both happen, and are part of the same happening. (loc.2251)
Newton points out that “Voice” possesses both a form and a content; “point 
of view” involves an “interdependence of percepts and concepts” (53). While 
it is accurate to categorize Richard Powers’s Gain as a double-plotted novel 
narrated in the third person, with shifting though limited focalization, such a 
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description risks the same violence of generalization as thematic categoriza-
tion of, say, an “industrial novel.” A responsible reading should, as Attridge 
suggests, bear witness to the novel’s singularity, whilst striving toward singu-
larity in its own right.
Moreover, I do not suggest that there could be such a thing as ecologi-
cal narrative form, as such. Ecopoetics has long labored under the misap-
prehension that some poetic forms might be inherently more “ecological” 
than others:1 William Rueckert argues in his seminal “Literature and Ecol-
ogy” essay, “Properly understood, poems can be studied as models for energy 
flow, community building, and ecosystems” (qtd. in Glotfelty and Fromm 110), 
while Angus Fletcher claims an astonishing isomorphism of ecology, Ameri-
can democracy, and Walt Whitman’s poems. According to Fletcher, it makes 
no difference whether or not the poems are about matters ecological, any 
more than it makes a difference whether or not the House of Representatives 
enacts pro- or antienvironmental legislation; it is the form that ensures the 
dissolution of the boundary between poem and environment. With specific 
reference to Whitman’s exuberant catalogues, Fletcher celebrates
the systemic character of the world or scene developed in the environment-
poetic. For environments are a special kind of natural ensemble, where 
drama and story are not the issue, where emotion is subordinate to the 
presentation of the aggregate relations of all participants, rather than the 
striking enhancement of singular or single heroes or heroines. . . . Nature’s 
economy calls not for a House of Burgesses, of Lords, of Commons, but 
more radically for “representatives” with whom we interact in a system of 
mutual co-representation. (123–24)
What could it mean to say that, in natural environments, “emotion is subor-
dinate” to anything, even “the aggregate relations of all participants”? Such 
claims distort both ecology and poetics in order to posit a nontrivial relation-
ship between them. As Nancy Easterlin points out, ecocritics have failed to 
learn from the history of literary theory:
The history of Marxist attempts to align ideological commitments with spe-
cific textual practices attests to the inadvisability of pinpointing a correct 
aesthetics, for the simple fact of the matter is that the semantic content of 
 1. It is worth noting, though, that not all ecopoetry scholars subscribe to such mimetic 
theories. Other studies of ecopoetry have focused on the attitudes of prominent ecopoets (see 
Bryson), or the acts of attention to nature that ecopoetry fosters (see Felstiner; Bate).
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an artwork cannot be discerned on the basis of something so general as a 
style or mode. (99)
The earliest ecocriticism was predominantly an ethics of the told: it looked to 
ecopoetry to convey deep ecological ethics by means of theme, imagery, and 
the foregrounding of the other-than-human world. Later theorists of ecopo-
etry looked instead for direct and persuasive articulations of poetic form with 
scientific ecology (albeit in a popularized and basically metaphorical sense). 
If this approach worked poorly with poetry, though, it flounders badly when 
applied to prose narratives, novels being even less like ecosystems than poems. 
Instead, I want to extend the attention to “form” by linking it differently to 
ecocriticism’s ethical concerns.
The ecocritical version of narrative ethics I propose has more defi-
nite ambitions than those proposed by Attridge and Newton, both authors 
strongly influenced by Emmanuel Levinas. Neohumanist, Levinasian, and 
ecocritical narrative ethics concur in exempting literature from the burden 
of delivering specific moral lessons, but Newton’s formulation is too remotely 
metaethical:
“The ethics of reading”/“the ethics of fiction”/“the ethics of criticism”: all 
such formulations sit precariously on an ambiguous genitive. By purposeful 
contrast, my proposal of a narrative ethics implies simply narrative as eth-
ics: the ethical consequences of narrating story and fictionalizing person, 
and the reciprocal claims binding teller, listener, witness, and reader in that 
process. (10–11)
If the narrative relation always constitutes an encounter of/with the Other—
a moment Newton considers inherently “ethical,” following Levinas—it is 
hard to see how any normative distinctions can be made within or between 
narratives.
Even accepting Newton and Attridge’s characterization of narration as 
always already ethical, environmental narrative ethics might still seek to elab-
orate more specific moral aspects of storytelling. It would abjure consequen-
tialism, the ethics of the hospital administrator, and deontology, the ethics of 
constitutions and courtrooms, in favor of an ethical orientation more appro-
priate to the singularity of literature: environmental virtue ethics. As Ron-
ald Sandler and Philip Cafaro propose, “An adequate environmental ethic . . . 
requires not only an ethic of action—one that provides guidance regarding 
what we ought and ought not to do to the environment—but also an ethic 
of character—one that provides guidance on what attitudes and dispositions 
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we ought and ought not to have regarding the environment” (84). Virtue has 
acquired some horrible connotations: ankle-length dresses, lace doilies, nosy 
neighbors, and furiously repressed sexuality. Environmental virtue isn’t much 
better: proudly driving a “clean diesel” (damn you, Volkswagen) past the F150s 
parked outside Tim Hortons, V8s idling, to buy some conspicuously grubby 
carrots from the farmers market. Yet in philosophy, virtue ethics represents 
the plausible view that morality is best seen as a matter of character, rather 
than the application of invariant objective rules or the outcome of a calcula-
tion of the pleasurable and painful consequences of our actions for innumer-
able moral patients.
Moreover, the serendipity that binds the notion of character from virtue 
ethics to the narratological concept of a fictional person reminds us that lit-
erature preeminently stages for us Sandler and Cafaro’s question: “What sort 
of person would do that?” Literary fictions enmesh characters in plots that 
test them—this is the heart of a narrative ethics of the told—but they also 
narrate their fates in ways that imply judgment, or a range of possible judg-
ments, upon them. As William Flesch shows in his brilliant Comeuppance, 
narrators are witnesses who employ focalizers as witnesses to the multifarious 
conclusions of characters who witness each others’ words and actions, and 
who invite us, too, into the helplessly ethical relationship of bearing fascinated 
witness to the cooperation, defection, reward, and (especially) punishment of 
fictional people. Although Flesch does not use the term, his book outlines a 
kind of evolutionary narrative ethics that is closely aligned with my intentions 
here, by contrast with more familiar narrative theories that are primarily cog-
nitive, such as Lisa Zunshine’s “other minds” orientation, or affective, such as 
Suzanne Keen’s study of narrative empathy.
In Flesch’s sophisticated Darwinian account of literature, fictional narra-
tives have a crucial role in monitoring and enforcing strong reciprocity:
Fiction recruits [the] central capacity in human social cognition for taking 
pleasure in responding to the nonactual. It gratifies the proximal or psy-
chological aim of our interest in what some have done and how others have 
responded. That aim is the pleasure we take in strong reciprocation, par-
ticularly punishment, a pleasure useful in nonliterary contexts as an incen-
tive to altruistic punishment and presumably evolved for that reason. That 
pleasure is one of anticipation, and we take pleasure in anticipating altruistic 
punishment—enough so that we demand of others that they be altruistic 
punishers, and that we anticipate what will happen in ways that underlie 
our interest in seeing how things will turn out, our desire to follow events 
to their conclusion. (51)
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The narrative ethics I propose, then, will take place at the point that a work of 
literature stages environmental virtue and vice, albeit not in relation to a preex-
isting set of precepts such as environmental justice or deep ecology, nor in rela-
tion to a predetermined set of abstracted narrative techniques designated as 
more or less ecological. In this ethical moment, the reader, allied with the nar-
rator and focalizer in the desire to “see how things turn out” and form judg-
ments about them, enjoys both the privileges and vulnerabilities of his place 
in the hierarchical organization of narrative and, at the same time, encoun-
ters the alterity that confounds too simple an alignment of his verdict with 
theirs. In the analysis that follows, I will seem to test this model of ecocritical 
narrative ethics on Richard Powers’s novel Gain, although in truth it was the 
novel (teaching it, especially) that prompted me to account for its singular-
ity in these terms. While the present essay does not attempt to narrate this 
reciprocal relationship as such, acknowledging it should challenge the reader 
to consider whether the model I propose can be generalized beyond the text 
that, in some measure, provoked it.
GAIN’S CHIASMIC PLOTS
The singularity of Richard Powers’s novel Gain has two main sources in its nar-
rative organization: a dual plot that juxtaposes the story of Laura Bodey, who 
ultimately dies of ovarian cancer, with the history of how J. Clare’s Sons, a soap 
and candle manufacturer, became Clare, Inc., a multinational conglomerate; 
and a liberal sprinkling of what I will call intratexts (mostly advertisements 
and real or invented maxims about cleanliness) presented without comment 
in the gaps between the dual narratives. These narrative techniques inform 
environmental virtue in three ways: they portray, for our moral consideration, 
a growing corporation as a richly characterized protagonist; they make pos-
sible a reflective, critical relationship to the stereotypes about environmental 
risk dubbed “toxic discourse” by Lawrence Buell (35–45); and they foster a 
sense of ecological change as complex, contingent, and historical, rather than 
teleological and reductively deterministic. Clearly, virtue in this context pre-
cludes an authorial performance of self-righteousness for the reader’s confi-
dent endorsement; it is a metacognitive, as much as a moral, ideal. Moreover, 
both Laura’s and Clare’s moral ambiguity can be used, reciprocally, to inform 
environmental virtue ethics, which otherwise tends to focus on individual 
heroism rather than struggle and compromise.
The dual narrative, Powers’s most striking technique, has attracted the 
majority of the novel’s commentary. A simplistic reading might be that Laura’s 
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story undermines the progressivism of the Clare story, turning Gain into a 
diatribe against industrial capitalism in the tradition of Dickens’s Hard Times 
or Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. However, such readings generally minimize 
the narrator’s enthusiasm as he conveys the rise of Clare International. The 
replacement of homemade liquid soap by industrially produced cakes was 
clearly a crucial factor in the most radical improvement in the conditions of 
life in human history. The narrator’s own idiom is infected by the language 
of the humane optimism of early nineteenth-century America: “Dirt’s duck-
ling transformed to salve’s swan, its rancid nosegay rearranged into aromatic 
garland. This waxy mass, arising from putrescence, became its hated par-
ent’s most potent anodyne” (37). First, alliteration reemphasizes the fairy-tale 
quality of the transformation of rendered animal fat into stearine soap; next, 
nineteenth-century diction such as “putrescence” and “anodyne” announces 
the corroboration of the Clare founders’ hopes by narrative authority. Walter 
Kirn aptly summarizes the narrator’s ethical orientation as “slightly skeptical 
but fundamentally awed” (Kirn). Deftly avoiding the usual novelistic clichés 
that portray the corporation as octopus or behemoth, Powers’s sympathies 
are highly unusual for literary fiction, as Kirn acknowledges: “His wide-angle 
fatalism about commerce even glints at times with Bill Gates optimism. Pow-
ers plays down but doesn’t rule out the chance that the wheel of invention, 
toil, and speculation just may land us all in heaven someday, virtual immortals 
with pensions fat enough to last through all eternity.” If such connivance of a 
novel’s narrator with the fate of a multinational corporation seems unethical, 
it is probably because environmentally oriented readers are the legatees of the 
1960s anticorporate romanticism and skepticism that created new challenges 
for the company in a later period:
The Clare brass failed to fight this collapse in reputation, because it couldn’t 
comprehend it. The public had turned not just against Clare but against 
all industry and enterprise. Now that business had delivered people from 
far worse fates, people turned against the fate of business. Like the careless 
grantees in fairy tales, they forgot the force that freed them to complain in 
the first place. (383)
As elsewhere in the novel, free indirect discourse equivocates between the 
company’s managers’ perspective and the narrator’s. Specifically, Powers 
ensures it remains unclear whether the simile that compares 1960s environ-
mentalists to “careless grantees in fairy tales” is one the “Clare brass” actually 
used, or is the narrator’s way of epitomizing their bafflement at the sudden 
switch in public attitudes. Assuming the balance is tilted toward the latter, we 
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can say that the narrator’s gratitude for the “force that freed” unprecedented 
millions of people from filth and want is a moral orientation evident at both 
levels of telling and told. As such, it challenges readers to consider whether a 
corporation can exhibit environmental virtue.
The Clare plot is, though, only half the story. Laura Bodey is an ordi-
nary mother, divorcee, and realtor living in Lacewood, a Midwestern city 
dominated by a Clare agricultural products factory. With appalling rapidity, 
her narrative switches from the pleasures of gardening and the challenges of 
teenage children to the consequences of diagnosis with ovarian cancer: she 
seeks the most advanced medical treatment; the treatment devastates her body 
along with the disease; the treatment fails, and she dies. Despite Laura’s lack of 
character development, though, the moral center of the novel gradually shifts 
toward her from the resistible rise of the Clare empire. As Jeffrey Williams 
writes, “In dramatic terms, the two plots take opposite trajectories, the Clare 
plot one of a bustling and entertaining ascent, Laura’s a tragic and moving 
descent” (Williams).
While the fictive and legal personality of Clare gradually becomes more 
diffuse and less emotionally compelling, thanks first to incorporation and 
later to diversification, acquisition, and a stock market launch, Laura’s is 
clarified for us by close, painful, near-exclusive focalization throughout her 
ordeal. Just as importantly, the temporality of the two narratives contrasts via 
an extended chiasmus: the compressed, elliptical telling required by Clare’s 
century and a half of growth with the horribly distended temporality of Lau-
ra’s suffering. Where the Clare narrative scurries through the decades like a 
visitor at the Chicago World’s Fair, emphasizing diegesis, Laura’s narrative 
evokes the intolerable, inescapable hours of chemotherapy treatment with 
mimetic immediacy and slowness. The narrator repeatedly draws attention 
to Laura’s excruciating experience of time, as in this telling instance halfway 
through twenty-four hours of chemotherapy: “A day dripped out in micro-
seconds outlasts the idea of time” (127). Elsewhere, the narrative parcels out 
her treatments in milligrams of poisonous cures and lists of medical brand 
names.
The juxtaposition of differentiated characterization, diction, and tempo-
rality generates a growing sense of irony, mostly at Clare’s expense, although 
readers’ own susceptibilities as historically conditioned consumers also garner 
some gentle mockery. For example, Clare early on learns to market “Nature” 
and its antithesis, cleanliness, in a single image: “Native Balm [the Clare 
soap brand] embodied all the natural wisdom lost to the onslaught of mod-
ern industrial chemistry, while each package remained immaculate, milled, 
dependable” (197). In case we were liable to miss the irony, the narrator has 
already primed us, channeling Laura with free indirect discourse, to suspect 
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the slipperiness of “the natural.” One of the chemotherapy agents transfused 
into her is taxol from yew tree bark: “How can tree bark hurt you? Tree bark 
is 100 percent natural. The Native Americans used to make all kinds of things 
out of tree bark. Canoes and houses. Mighty medicines. The completely natu-
ral toxin is set to drip into her for the next twenty-four hours” (126). Just as 
Clare once used the iconography of the Red Indian to sell industrially pro-
duced soap, so Laura sells herself chemotherapy with some reassurance from 
the “ecological Indian,” that tenacious Western myth (Krech). More subtly, 
Powers challenges the dichotomy of nature and culture that underlies toxic 
discourse, according to which “artificial” toxins, carcinogens, and oestrogenic 
compounds are assumed to be more hazardous than those that occur “natu-
rally” (Ames, Profet, and Gold).
Powers’s refusal to collapse the chiasmic narrative into a satisfying conclu-
sion likewise challenges toxic discourse. As Thomas Byers points out:
In Gain, the expectation or assumption, conditioned by such popular corpo-
rate conspiracy thrillers as Erin Brockovich and Michael Clayton, is that the 
two plots are causally related—that the history of the corporation provides 
an explanation for the cancer, and that in the end the plots will converge 
in the exposure of the corporation’s venal villainy, perhaps leading to its 
demise. (Byers)
The contrast between the plots draws its power in part through consistent, yet 
differentiated, use of free indirect discourse: in the Clare story, the technique 
simultaneously prompts and frustrates judgment (probably subconscious in 
most readers) of the unknowable complicity between the narrator and the 
company’s corporate persona, while in the Laura story, free indirect discourse 
forces us into an emotionally draining proximity to the dying protagonist. Yet 
the relationship between the narratives is never quite resolved, and Powers 
rejects satisfying, moralistic closure in favor of their more ethically sophisti-
cated and complex raveling.
TRIANGULATING INTRATEXTS
While Powers’s chiasmic plots dominate both the novel and the critical 
responses to it, a narrative analysis must also account for the fragments of 
extraneous text that appear throughout, which I am calling intratexts2 to sig-
 2. ‘Intratexts’ refers to textual devices, including such embedded written artifacts as epi-
taphs or advertising slogans, that mark off internal subdivisions. The term is most frequently 
found in Classics scholarship (e.g., Alison Sharrock and Helen Morales, Intratextuality).
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nify that they are distinct from the main dual narrative, while standing in 
a constructive internal relationship to it. They stick out in the text, partly 
because some employ unusual typography, but also because their variable nar-
ration and frequent extratextual reference contrasts with the erudite intimacy 
of the authorial persona. If free indirect discourse brings us uncomfortably 
close to Gain’s characters, human and corporate, provoking and complicating 
our moral response, the role of the intratexts is different but complementary.
There are, by my count, forty-one intratexts, ranging from the road sign 
welcoming visitors to Lacewood through an advert for Chicago’s 1893 World’s 
Fair to the epitaph to the words of Samuel Clare’s daughter Elizabeth, inscribed 
to imitate a stonemason’s hand:
When we devote our Youth to God
’Tis Pleasing in his eyes
A flour Offered in the bud
Is no vain saCrafiCe (86; [sic])
In this instance, the intratext conveys an event unrecorded in the main Clare 
narrative itself, as if in recognition of a boundary between worldly success and 
private loss.
Students tell me they skip over the intratexts and critics often ignore them, 
but they are vital to Gain’s narrative construction. I suggest above, drawing on 
Flesch’s work, that focalization, narration, and reading can be seen as modes 
of witnessing, or gazing with attitude. For Flesch, the mystery of humans’ 
distinctive altruism and cruelty is founded in the exigencies of ultra-sociality, 
which requires “altruistic punishment” (a perfectly apt paradox) in order to 
enforce “strong reciprocity.” Its primitive form is revenge; its modern avatar 
is justice; spanning the two, historically, is the readerly interest in poetic jus-
tice. As we will see in more detail in the next section, though, Gain arouses 
an expectation of a just resolution, only to frustrate it. The intratexts not only 
inhabit the textual space between alternating passages of the two main plots; 
they also exist in an interstitial narrative and ethical location between the 
acts of witnessing that each of those plots invites. Yet the intratexts are not 
focalized in such a way as to offer unequivocal commentary on either of the 
chiasmic plots, even though a few are micronarratives with focalizers in their 
own right. Readers presumably read them from the perspective of whichever 
chiasmic plot attracts their moral sympathy, but cannot find unambiguous 
vindication there. Each intratext can also be read from the competing vantage 
point of the other plot, a narrative trick I should like to dub triangulation.
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Some of the intratexts are intertextual quotations of real sources such as 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (“The greatest meliorator of the world is selfish, huck-
stering Trade” [7]) or Grace Hallock’s 1928 publication A Tale of Soap and 
Water: The Historical Progress of Cleanliness (35, 100, 348). One intratext, a 
recipe for “Healthy Chinese Vegetables and Noodles” printed on the other side 
of an advertisement for Laura Bodey’s realty business, reminds the reader that 
she, too, is a “selfish, huckstering” trader in her own right (61). At a later stage, 
when Laura starts looking for environmental causes for her cancer, there is 
a list of titles of scientific journal articles that clearly belongs to her narra-
tive (233). Most intratexts, though, are advertisements for Clare products that 
form a potted history of American marketing, from bald nineteenth-century 
appeals to religiosity (48) to sepia-toned 1980s productions that repackage 
corporate history as environmental virtue (198).
Readers are likely to interpret Clare’s marketing with varying degrees of 
individual cynicism, more or less according to taste and political orientation. 
Yet the positioning of many of the intratexts in between sections of the chi-
asmic plots means we are encouraged to read them from one or other of the 
points of view they provide. While Gain’s narrating persona is consistent and 
continuous,3 the fictional or real intertextuality of the intratexts, together with 
their diverse narrative voices, constructs them as extrinsic. At the same time, 
though, they seem to allude internally to one or both main plots at a thematic 
level. For example, a micronarrative-style advertisement for Clare’s Clarity 
blusher follows a woman in rapid sequence from mirror makeup retouch 
to risqué assignation in a fancy restaurant, then home, makeup redone and 
clothing miraculously transformed from “courtesan-spy white to hunter-green 
flannel” (107) during the drive home to her loving family. The ekphrastic nar-
ration of the TV advert concludes:
The whole story unfolds in just under thirty seconds. In their roughhouse clinch 
[with her husband], the flannel woman’s purse falls open at her feet. With one 
hand . . . she reaches down and closes the clasp on a cake of blush hiding there.
The voice-over returns, arch now, everything understood. “Some things you 
need never say at all.
“Face by Clarity. For as many looks as you have lives.” (108)
We recognize this miracle of narrative compression, in outline, from innumer-
able similar thirty-second stories. We also, after a moment’s reflection, under-
 3. In the absence of overt personalizing features, and with the circumtextual knowledge 
of Powers’s “egghead” reputation, we are likely to assume the narrator is an authorial persona.
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stand it as selling the elusive fantasy that women can combine erotic allure 
with wholesome family life, with only a little smoothing over the boundary—
which the advert reinforces rather than elides—in between.
Less obvious, though, is the intratext’s position in between the narration 
of Julia Clare, the company’s most effective booster in the nineteenth century, 
and Laura Bodey’s dispiriting visit to a cancer specialist in Indianapolis. In 
the course of the former, Resolve Clare is led, with the help of his unstop-
pable wife, to the “gradual realization that what was good for soap was good 
for America. And better still, the other way round” (106). From the vantage 
point of the previous section of narrative, the Clarity advertisement embod-
ies, at worst, the venal sin of igniting unachievable hopes in watching women; 
at best, it can be seen as an extension of Julia’s own ambitious promotion of 
American industry, with female aspiration at its heart. Yet the section follow-
ing the intratext returns to Laura’s story as she seeks clarification of her prog-
nosis without success: the specialist, who hasn’t read her file, spouts jargon 
and figures that assert his expertise without enlightening his patient. Ques-
tioned as to the cause of her ovarian cancer, he replies obliquely, “There’s . . . 
some evidence that provoking agents, either combined with or inducing an 
alteration in the immune system .  .  .” (111). If we infer—though Laura does 
not, at this stage—that Clare may be the source of such “provoking agents,” 
the corporation’s efforts to sell beauty products to women whom it is, simul-
taneously, condemning to death becomes a sick joke. By situating the advert 
in between the chiasmic plots, though, Powers forces the reader to decide, 
however unreflectively, whether to read it in the light of the one or the other, 
using a process of triangulation.
The triangulation effect need not imply that the Clare narrative suggests a 
sympathetic reading of the intratexts, whereas the Laura narrative necessarily 
requires a cynical reading. In this instance, an advertisement for asthma medi-
cine, the contextual triangulation arguably involves a reversed effect:
BREATHING EASY
This year, Melissa blew out all her candles. In one breath. By herself. Last 
year, just humming along while the other kinds sang Happy Birthday left her 
gasping for air. Until Respulin appeared among the rest of her life’s presents, 
each new candle taxed her lungs to the breaking point. She could not run, 
sing, shout, or even jump a rope. She lived in constant fear. A spring day felt 
like being buried alive.
Melissa turned nine today. Maybe she still can’t spell oral leukotriene D4 
receptor antagonist. But she does know how to spell Happiness.
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The Biological Materials Group
CLARE MATERIALS SOLUTIONS (130–31)
The genre is, again, recognizable: medicine marketing that tropes expensive 
pharmacological agents as “gifts” of modern science. It is another micronar-
rative of fear, hope, and gratitude, focalized through an imaginary beneficiary 
of Clare’s products, and written in a confiding idiom that aligns her child-
ish innocence and vulnerability with the company’s protective, paternalistic 
expertise.
The intratext occurs just after one of the most painfully sustained nar-
rations of Laura’s chemotherapy, and is immediately followed by Benjamin 
Clare’s development of a marketing strategy for Native Balm around the idea 
that “The Red Man never worried about his skin” (131). Laura is positioned, at 
this stage, as an adult equivalent of Melissa: an ailing recipient of miraculous 
medicines she cannot understand. Filled with nausea at the thought of food, 
she stashes her hospital lunch “As if she’s a little child again, only now blessed 
with a handbag” (129). From this perspective, we might read the advert “inno-
cently,” as an emotionally heightened promotion of the real benefits of medical 
science. Triangulating from the Clare narrative, by contrast, suggests a cynical 
reading of the advert in which the corporation simply manipulates our paren-
tal emotions for commercial gain.
As the chiasmic plots seem set to converge in the latter part of the novel, 
the challenge of triangulation becomes more acute as the divergent interpreta-
tions available become more pointed. While Laura is the exclusive focalizer for 
most of her narrative, there is an odd passage where her ex-husband Don tries 
to glean information about Clare’s toxic emissions from a friend in Clare’s PR 
department. They are flirting and chatting when she suddenly realizes his real 
intentions: “And, in a syllable, everything changes. She misses no beat. Just 
as funny, just as warm, just as welcoming. But it’s like a little layer of friendly 
gauze has come down between them” (296). Behind the welcoming demeanor 
we perceive ruthless corporate self-interest, just as we might expect. Indeed, 
the marketing image of Clare as your friendly neighborhood multinational is 
beginning to seem pretty threadbare by now, which primes us to read the next 
intratext—a press release reassuring the public in the wake of the publication 
of EPA Toxic Release figures—still more skeptically.
The statement seems perfectly rational: it acknowledges that “public con-
cern over health is never unreasonable” and reminds readers that the EPA 
Toxic Release Inventory “makes no statement about any risks posed to health” 
by the substances it includes (297). It observes, correctly, that concentrations 
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of trace substances matter far more than their mere existence and claims that 
“the levels of hazardous material coming from Clare’s plants are negligible 
and pose no significant risk to anyone living in the vicinity” (297). Even given 
expectations shaped by classic toxic texts such as Erin Brockovich, we might 
have given Clare the benefit of the doubt, only now the chiasmic plots seem to 
be narrowing toward convergence. As readers naturally alert to proleptic hints 
of narrative resolution, we are likely to expect a lie’s uncovering.
It never happens, as we have observed, and so the challenge—at once cog-
nitive and ethical—of triangulation rests upon us until the end. The very last 
intratext occurs just after the Clare narrative tells us that the company “went 
green, inside and out,” because “green, too, was a need, the same as any that 
has faced the species. And nothing met human need better than concerted 
human industry” (386). It occurs just before Laura’s son Tim comes home to 
find her gasping: “In that shortness of breath, a waking dream of live burial” 
(388). In between the company’s zenith and its human antagonist’s nadir is 
the text engraved on a brass plaque in the hospital, which thanks “the Benja-
min Clare Charitable Fund” for its generosity in renovating the hospital. Yet 
the narrative structure tends rather to undermine than underscore cynicism, 
most notably in the way the twin plot resolves into three tightly interwoven, 
persistently ambiguous, endings.
CAMERA, CORPSE, AND CORPORATION: 
GAIN’S THREE ENDINGS
Clare, at first sight, seems to emerge triumphant: the class action for allegedly 
producing carcinogens is resolved with a payoff, without admission of liability, 
to the plaintiffs, but Laura dies without seeing it. The troublesome agrichemi-
cals division is sold off, and soon after, the Lacewood plant is closed down and 
moved to Mexico. There is never any proof of Clare’s responsibility for Laura’s 
illness, only attribution of guilt by (narrative) association.
Nor does Laura emerge as an environmentalist heroine. Her vague, wry 
skepticism toward consumerism is provoked repeatedly but quickly assuaged: 
“Peanut sheets. Laura is not sure what problem the sheeting of peanuts actu-
ally solves. What was wrong with yesterday’s peanut concept? .  .  . Anyway, 
they make Ellen happy. No mean feat, these days” (29). She fends off her ex-
husband Don’s insistent demand that she seek the truth behind her illness, 
partly because she resists his annoying blend of paranoia and Mr. Fixit but 
also because she thinks affixing blame on Clare International is just too neat 
and simple: “The whole planet, a superfund site. Life causes cancer” (323). 
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Even when she summons up the will to oppose it, she is defeated by the ubiq-
uity of Clare’s products:
She vows a consumer boycott, a full spring cleaning. But the house is full of 
them. It’s as if the floor she walks on suddenly liquefies into a sheet of ter-
mites. They paper her cabinets. They perch on her microwave, camp out on 
her stove, hang from her shower head. Clare hiding under the sink, swarm-
ing her medicine chest, lining the shelves in the basement, parked out in the 
garage, piled up in the shed. (345)
The entemomorphic imagery conveys in a sinister key the very proliferation of 
household products that the Clare narrative had previously celebrated, but it 
also justifies Laura’s ultimate fatalism. If it weren’t this particular suite of prod-
ucts, it would be a slightly different one; if she threw out all the Clare stuff, it 
would only be replaced by Unilever or Johnson and Johnson.
In any case, as Ursula Heise’s perceptive analysis demonstrates, Gain 
demonizes neither the company’s products nor its by-products; rather, the 
Clare narrative questions the forms of legal personality the company assumes, 
which publicize risk and privatize profit. Heise observes:
Part of the point in juxtaposing the two narrative strands, then, is to show 
how the corporate body and the individual body depend on each other, and 
how the corporate organism can become a lethal threat to the individual 
one. More than any single substance and more even that the whole array 
of products it delivers, it is the corporation as a social form that kills Laura 
Bodey. (loc.3745)
However, while Heise admires Powers’s gestures toward a global perspective in 
the novel, she has reservations about its neorealist narrative voice:
In Gain, . . . the self-assurance of the narrator’s command of the global and 
his transparent (though complex) language remain in tension with the sce-
nario of individual powerlessness vis-à-vis the global that the novel portrays. 
In this respect, the novel’s formal accomplishment lags behind its conceptual 
sophistication. (loc.3860)
I dispute the powerlessness of the individual in the novel, although I admit 
Laura is deprived of options for unambiguously virtuous action. More debat-
able is Heise’s assumption in Sense of Place and Sense of Planet that only the 
fractured and alienating language of the modernist narrative tradition, equated 
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here with “formal accomplishment,” will ruffle the reader’s complacency and 
produce a critical, reflective response. This is the narrative ethics implied by 
the Russian Formalists’ ostranenie and Brecht’s entfremdungseffekt, and despite 
its still-widespread acceptance I’m not sure it has ever found empirical sup-
port. Moreover, as the Formalists knew, estrangement and automatization are 
moving targets; one can acclimatize to Beckett in time.
In fact, Gain ends with three fairly violent shifts in focalization. Immedi-
ately after Laura dies, the narration traces with astonishing detail the produc-
tion of a disposable camera using parts from around the world but otherwise 
eliding the agency of its makers. Even though this camera is, far more than 
any other character in the novel, a global citizen, it turns out to be a “dispos-
able miracle,” inviting devastating comparisons to Laura’s transient existence, 
extraordinariness, but also ultimate inconsequentiality—not least because the 
camera is used to photograph Laura on her deathbed, then thrown in the 
trash, undeveloped (397).
If the camera presents a dehumanized vision of Clare’s global industry, the 
next section refocalizes through Franklin Kennibar, the first Clare CEO to be 
characterized to any depth since the firm went public in 1891. His reflections, 
looking down from his executive suite, are startlingly nihilistic:
We speak of bitter, he thinks. We speak of sweet. We speak of bounce, we 
speak of body. Of hold and shine and non-stick and pine scent and quick-
acting. In reality, there is no bitter, no sweet, no bounce or body. There is 
nothing but a series of chemicals, each distinctly shaped, stretching on for-
ever into the void. (397)
His qualms go far beyond the delusive jargon of Clare’s marketing to a fun-
damental questioning of the phenomena of subjective experience, what phi-
losophers call “qualia.” From this perspective, the corporation, itself a fictive 
personality, conjures the fiction of financial value from the fiction of subjec-
tive qualia. The Clare CEO appears to be experiencing existential angst, col-
ored by industrial chemistry. At the same time, the shift from italicized direct 
discourse to free indirect discourse forces the reader to make subconscious 
judgments about the complicity of the authorial persona with Kennibar that 
are at once necessitated by the narration and rendered ethically undecidable 
by it. Whose nihilism is it, exactly?
Challenged by a journalist to explain the “purpose of business,” Kenni-
bar writes out a list of dozens of possible answers, from implausibly altruistic 
(“To improve the general welfare.”) to wholly cynical (“To make things that 
people desire. To make people desire things.”) (398). In any case, he is about 
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to propose the breakup of the Clare behemoth as protection against a hostile 
takeover, yet another revolutionary transformation for the two-centuries-old 
company. Departing from that intimation of corporate mortality, the narra-
tion circles out, by means of erratically shifting focalization spanning Ken-
nibar’s network of employees. In a certain sense, all these people depend on 
the CEO—the focalization shifts out from him at the center—but then, as 
Kennibar reflects mordantly, his decision has itself been precipitated by the 
depression in the company’s stock price thanks to a class action that included 
one recently deceased Laura Bodey. Thus, although the chiasmic plots are 
never definitively resolved—there is no smoking gun leading directly from 
the Clare Agrochemical Division to Laura’s ovarian tumor—the reverberations 
from Laura’s death nevertheless resonate globally.
The third ending shifts focalization once more, to Laura’s son Tim, who 
has spent most of the novel shooting Nazis on his computer. He uses some of 
his mother’s settlement to buy a more powerful machine, which he eventu-
ally puts to use as part of a research group at MIT working on “a computing 
solution to the protein folding problem” (404). After years protesting against 
Clare, “curiosity slowly got the better of bitterness.” When his research group 
cracks the problem, he offers his mother’s settlement money to help the com-
pany start up. Powers conjures a neat symmetry in the last paragraphs, imag-
ining the software that functions as a “universal chemical assembly plant at 
the level of the human cell” in terms that specifically recall the chemical struc-
ture of soap: just as soap molecules are “ambidextrous,” being water-soluble at 
one end and fat-soluble at the other, the protein-folding program “relied upon 
a chunk of code whose ambidextrous data structures looked out Janus-faced 
to mesh with both raw source and finished product” (405). More faintly, we 
might say that the intratexts, too, are Janus-faced, since they are always sus-
ceptible to reading alongside one or the other of the main narratives. The last 
line of the novel has Tim suggesting that “it might be time for the little group 
of them to incorporate.” Thus the cycle of commerce begins all over again, 
only this time it proposes to intervene at a still-more intimate physical level 
than Clare’s products.
GAIN: ETHICS AND NARRATIVE STRUCTURE
Given that Tim has challenged the company that may have killed his mother, 
his decision to imitate it has peculiar moral significance. Perhaps, as Joseph 
Dewey suggests, it should be seen as a failure on his part: “Though Powers 
surely cheers such medical research, its end logic is disquietingly familiar; 
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surely genetic engineering . . . represents a new century’s unsettling version of 
Clare International, the nostalgic urge to flee the responsibility to die, to fix 
nature’s ‘flaws”’ (127). Heise, too, argues that the ending is “curiously optimis-
tic and pessimistic at the same time,” because Tim’s venture looks as much like 
repetition as progress (172).
To a large extent, any reading of the ending must follow from one’s per-
sonal resolution of the chiasmic plot structure: any reader who has followed 
Clare’s progress with dismay will view the emergence of the next generation as 
a new disaster-in-the-making. That said, Powers does not invite a moralistic 
response, having deftly avoided both the classic resolution of a tale of toxic-
ity—the miasma is traced back to the source and the malefactor punished 
accordingly—and the more subtle temptation to depict the rise of a corpo-
ration as unequivocal moral decline. Thanks in large part to Romanticism, 
declensionist historiography is a pervasive structure of feeling in environmen-
talist thought that inverts narratives of progress with little or no attention 
to the astonishing gains in human welfare they celebrate. Gain, by contrast, 
commends to our moral attention the biography of a corporate character, as 
Bruce Bawer explains: “Clare’s management acquires a concept of the cor-
porate image and then consciously strives to establish the corporation as ‘a 
person’ not only ‘in the eyes of the law’ but ‘in the minds of its customers.’” 
The legal “‘person’” brought to life by incorporation is anthropomorphically 
elaborated by narration into a still-more complex fictive being. Having nar-
rated Clare’s life story over a century and a half, Powers asks us to consider, as 
do Sandler and Cafaro, “what sort of person would do that?”
Clare is unique in literary fiction, to my knowledge, as a corporate char-
acter whose environmental virtue is at least as complex a question as that of 
any merely human being. In this sense, it has the potential to extend our ethi-
cal sensibilities, rather than just being subjected to them. Even the company’s 
ultimate dissolution, anticipated at the level of narration by the disorientating 
shifts of focalization away from Kennibar and back to him, can be read either 
as poetic justice for the company that killed Laura Bodey or as a further trans-
mutation of an entity that has always had to adapt to survive. Declensionist 
historiography and reflexive hostility to corporate capitalism are morally and 
pragmatically debilitating because seven billion humans cannot live tolera-
ble, sustainable existences without industrial production on a commensurate 
scale. When Powers’s narrator compares environmentalists of the 1960s to “the 
careless grantees in fairy tales” who “forgot the force that freed them to com-
plain in the first place,” he is implicitly prodding us toward a more nuanced 
appreciation of Clare’s moral character (383).
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Our reliance on the products of industry for comforts we seldom fully 
appreciate need not enervate our judgment, just as climate activists’ decision 
to drive to a protest site does not invalidate their argument. As environmen-
talists, we all abide in hypocrisy, and so we cannot accept it as a knockdown 
objection. Nonetheless, the narrative configuration of reader, narrator, and 
corporate character in Gain models an ethical relation that acknowledges that, 
by comparison with their ancestors, almost all the novel’s readers are unimag-
inably privileged, even if, like Laura, they are also vulnerable to unprecedented 
risks. Key features of the novel’s telling, notably the narrator’s unknowable 
complicity with Clare and painful intimacy with Laura—both relayed by 
means of free indirect discourse—and the curious ambidextrous externality 
of the intratexts, demand ethical response even as they frustrate moralism. 
Gain challenges us—requires us, actually, by way of narrative—to weigh hon-
est gratitude in the scales with the desire for justice and fear of personal and 
ecological harm, a moral quandary that is perhaps the central challenge for 
environmental ethics today.
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C H A P T E R  6
Feeling Nature
Narrative Environments and Character Empathy
ALEXA WEIK VON MOSSNER
N OT FA R into Sanora Babb’s Dust Bowl novel Whose Names Are Unknown 
(2004), the Oklahoma homesteader Julia Dunne gets caught in a thunder-
storm with her two young daughters. After spending a pleasant afternoon 
at a neighboring farm, the pregnant woman and her two girls are sent away 
before dinner, regardless of the fact that “it’s looking stormy out” (34). Hop-
ing that the sky might be “just threatening” (34), they embark on their long 
walk across open land. They do not get far before they realize that it was not 
a mere threat:
They were almost a mile away, walking in the hollow, when the rain began 
in large slow drops, and the far horizon quivered with sheet lightening. Fork 
lightening snapped suddenly, splitting the moving clouds, flashing close to 
the wires. The whole flat world under an angry churning sky was miracu-
lously lightened for a moment. A strange liquid clarity extended to the ends 
of the earth. Julia saw the trees along the creek and the animals grazing far 
away. The bleak farmyards with their stern buildings, scattered sparsely on 
the plains, stood out in naked lonely desolation. A sly delicate wind was ris-
ing. Their dresses moved ever so little. Thunder clapped and boomed. (35)
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Written in realist style, this passage invites readers to imagine the sight of 
open land, heavy clouds, and sudden flashes of lightning. Much of the passage 
uses Julia as a focalizer, cueing readers to simulate her subjective experience 
of the situation as she imbues various features of the landscape with affective 
value to the point of personifying them: the buildings are stern, lonely, and 
desolate, and they are utterly exposed to the force of an “angry churning” sky 
that now proceeds to make its “threat” a reality. The sensory imagery in the 
passage is not solely visual but also includes the sensation of the “sly delicate 
wind” catching the women’s dresses and the sound of thunder clapping and 
booming, foreboding the onslaught of rain that will soon follow.
What each of us imagines when reading this passage from Babb’s novel 
will be quite different in terms of detail and appearance, depending on our 
personal experiences and cultural background. And yet—unless we for some 
reason exhibit an aberrant response—it will involve a swiftly approaching 
thunderstorm across an open, barren landscape and the movements, sensa-
tions, and feelings of the three desolate women as the “lightning crack[s] near 
them” and they run for shelter, “their breath cutting like knives in their lungs” 
(35). Narratologists have likened literary narratives to “instruction manuals” 
that contain “a set of instructions for mental composition” and invite read-
ers to follow those instructions (Caracciolo 83; Scarry 244). The metaphor 
of the instruction manual is an interesting one because it stresses the active 
role of the reader as someone who performs the narrative in their minds, as 
psychologist Richard Gerrig has put it (Experiencing 17). Just like actors on a 
stage, Gerrig suggests, readers engage in acts of simulation during which “they 
must use their own experiences of the world to bridge the gaps in texts” and 
must invest their own emotions in order to “give substance to the psychologi-
cal lives of characters” (17). But it is not only characters who are enlivened in 
that way. It is also the narrative environments that surround characters, the 
storyworlds that frame and enable their actions. “In trying to make sense of 
a narrative,” explains narratologist David Herman, “interpreters attempt to 
reconstruct not just what happened but also the surrounding context or envi-
ronment embedding storyworld existents, their attributes, and the actions and 
events in which they are involved. . . . Interpreters do not merely reconstruct a 
sequence of events and a set of existents, but imaginatively (emotionally, vis-
cerally) inhabit a world in which things matter, agitate, exalt, repulse, provide 
grounds for laughter and grief, and so on—both for narrative participants and 
for interpreters of the story (570). Herman’s narratological argument agrees 
with the theoretical assumptions of much of ecocriticism: that narrative envi-
ronments are not only important to our understanding of a given narrative 
but they in fact play a central role in both character and plot development.
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In this essay, I argue that the reverse is also true. Using a cognitive eco-
narratological approach, I suggest that not only are narrative environments 
crucial for our understanding of characters, but characters are also central to 
our understanding of narrative environments.1 The first section of the essay 
explores the role of embodied simulation and character empathy in this recip-
rocal relationship. Using examples from Sanora Babb’s memoir An Owl on 
Every Post (1994), it argues that while the evocative description of a narrative 
environment is what allows readers to imagine it, it is the narrative align-
ment with experiencing agents that imbues that environment with vivacity and 
affective meaning. The second part of the essay returns to Babb’s novel Whose 
Names Are Unknown to demonstrate that the same basic principles also apply 
to fiction and that the affectively charged experience of a narrative environ-
ment can be an important feature of politically engaged novels such as Babb’s.
EXPERIENCING NARRATIVE ENVIRONMENTS:
EMPATHY, EMOTION, AND EMBODIED SIMULATION
Econarratology, as Erin James defines and develops it in The Storyworld Accord 
(2015), is situated at the intersection of postclassical narratology and ecocriti-
cism, thereby “pairing ecocriticism’s interest in the relationship between lit-
erature and the physical environment with narratology’s focus on the literary 
structures and devices by which writers compose narratives” (3). More spe-
cifically, James suggests that the combination of contextual approaches with 
cognitive narratology—which draws on the insights of cognitive science—is 
particularly well suited for an ecocritical exploration of the rich storyworlds 
within which literary characters function. All narrative texts, she observes, 
“even those that do not seem to be interested in the environment in and of 
itself, offer up virtual environments for their readers to model mentally and 
inhabit emotionally” (54). They are virtual environments because they only 
exist in the writer’s mind and in those of individual readers, their only mate-
rial form being that of black dots on a white page or that of pixels on some 
kind of electronic reading device. And yet they can be so vivid and engaging 
that readers feel strongly moved by them and even unwilling to (mentally) 
leave them by refocusing their attention on their actual environment.
How exactly the mental modeling and emotional inhabitation of literary 
environments comes to pass has been explained in a variety of ways. Gerrig 
suggests that it is, in part, an unconscious mental performance that involves 
 1. The notion of a “cognitive ecocriticism” was first introduced by Nancy Easterlin (257).
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what he calls readers’ “memory traces” (“Conscious,” 42), but he does not 
spell out how exactly such a performative act plays out in readers’ minds. 
Caracciolo offers an enactivist take on the subject, arguing that readers experi-
ence narrative space by “enacting a character’s bodily-perceptual experience” 
of that space through what he calls a “fictionalization” of their own “virtual 
body” (160). I want to draw on another, neuroscientific account here, on one 
that does not require the theoretical construct of the reader’s “virtual body” 
because it considers our imaginary experience of literary environments a 
case of neuronal reuse.2 Like the enactivist approach, this approach draws on 
research in the interdisciplinary field of embodied cognition, but it relies on 
simulation theories, in particular on the notion of embodied simulation as it 
has been propagated by the Italian neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese.3
Embodied simulation theory is built on mirror neuron research and—
at the most basic level—it must be understood as a “non-conscious, pre-
reflective functional mechanism of the brain–body system, whose function is 
to model objects, agents and events” (Gallese, “Bodily Selves” 3–4). Neuroim-
aging research has shown that when we see another person act, we map those 
actions onto our premotor cortex, the part of the brain that is also active when 
we engage in actual movement. Remarkably, something related also happens 
when our brains process literary texts. As Gallese sums up the empirical 
results of several functional neuroimaging (fMRI) studies:
Silent reading of words referring to face, arm, or leg actions, or listening to 
sentences expressing actions performed with the mouth, the hand, and the 
foot, both produce activation of different sectors of the premotor cortex. . . . 
These activated premotor sectors coarsely correspond to those active during 
the execution/observation of hand, mouth, and foot actions. Thus, it appears 
that the MNS [mirror neuron system] is involved not only in understanding 
visually presented actions, but also in mapping acoustically or visually pre-
sented action-related linguistic expressions. (457, “Mirror Neurons”)
 2. Neuronal reuse, also called neuronal recycling, postulates that “structures in the brain 
eventually adapt so well to their environment that culturally determined processes such as 
reading end up operating through them, even though they had not evolved for this purpose” 
(Jacobs and Schrott 130).
 3. Embodied cognition is a vast and highly interdisciplinary and heterogeneous field that 
includes researchers in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelli-
gence. They are united by the belief that many features of cognition are shaped by aspects of the 
body beyond the brain, but there are substantial differences between subfields and individual 
researchers as to the exact role of the body and the surrounding environment in the emergence 
of mind and consciousness.
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Whereas in the case of direct perception the premotor cortex “mirrors” the 
movements we see in other agents, in reading (or listening), the perception 
of movement thus plays out on the imaginary level with our brains reacting 
much in the same way they would respond to personally performed move-
ment. This is what cognitive scientists call neuronal reuse since the same neu-
rons that are active in performed movement also fire in response to perceived 
movement and imagined movement.
Importantly, the mirror neuron system not only helps us recognize the 
actions of others, real and imagined, but also in the attribution of sensations, 
attitudes, and emotions. “The perception of pain or grief, or of disgust expe-
rienced by others,” explain neuroscientists Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado 
Sinigaglia, “activates the same areas of the cerebral cortex that are involved 
when we experience these emotions ourselves” (xii). Such “feeling with” is 
what we call empathy, and it can be triggered not only by our perception of 
actual people around us, but also by our imagined perception of a literary 
character. As I have argued elsewhere, we might feel along with a character 
even more fervently than with an actual person because a literary text can give 
us a degree of access to the emotions and sensations of another being that is 
rarely possible in real life (25). For econarratological readings, it is important 
to note that processes of embodied simulation are crucial not only for our 
empathetic engagement with characters but also for our experience of the nar-
rative environments that surround these characters and that stand in complex 
relationships to them. Studies have shown that textual imagery relating to 
vision activates the visual cortex whereas textual imagery relating to sound, 
smell, taste, or touch activates other relevant brain regions through neuronal 
reuse (Keysers and Gazzola). That means that feeling along with a character 
is crucial in how readers experience and relate to a narrative environment.
Take the example of Sanora Babb’s An Owl on Every Post, which chronicles 
her impoverished childhood in a dugout on the Colorado prairie during the 
second decade of the twentieth century. Babb’s literary life was bounded by 
the Great Plains, where she was born in the Oklahoma Territory in 1907, and 
the coastal hills of California, where she died almost one hundred years later, 
in 2005. Although it has so far received little attention from ecocritics, her 
work shares in the inexhaustible delight in the natural world that marks the 
life and work of many American nature writers, a passion that she attributed 
to the five years she spent as a girl on the endless plains of Colorado. An Owl 
on Every Post, Babb makes clear in her afterword to the memoir, is her attempt 
to share the experience of those formative years in a way that helps readers 
understand what it meant to her, personally, to live “on a grand earth under 
a big sky, not just within walls” (251). In order to allow for such understand-
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ing, she not only offers descriptions of that open environment but also strives 
to convey a sense of what it is like to experience it by providing access to her 
younger self ’s qualia.
Qualia are most commonly used by psychologists and philosophers “to 
characterize the qualitative, experiential or felt properties of mental states” 
(Levin 693). First-person narrators tend to give readers a good deal of insight 
into the qualitative, experiential, or felt properties of their own mental states—
what they think and how they feel about the people, things, and events they 
encounter in the storyworld. In the case of a memoir, it is suggested that this 
narrator is identical with the author, although critics and scholars of autobiog-
raphy have long insisted that it would be a mistake to naively conflate the two, 
or to assume that the qualia of an autobiographical narrator are necessarily 
an accurate representation of the author’s actual subjective experience of an 
event in the past. Rather, it must be seen as the author’s attempt to bring to life 
for the reader their past subjective experience as they remember it at the time 
of writing. In Babb’s case, it is the attempt to convey her changing emotional 
relationship to the harsh landscape of the Great Plains.
Babb was only seven years old when, in 1913, her mother sat her and her 
sisters down in a “slow mixed train of a handful of passengers and cars full 
of coal, flour, lard, canned food supplies, and other necessities” (Owl 7), leav-
ing behind the city of Red Rock, Oklahoma, for an isolated broomcorn farm 
on the flat plains of Colorado, east of the Rocky Mountains. “The lackluster 
autumn landscape,” as Babb remembers the sight from the train, “was like 
an old gray carpet spread to the far, far circling horizon. There was nothing 
more to see. This was an empty land” (7). Clearly, the writing of such sen-
tences involves the embodied simulation of a remembered visual impression 
on the part of the author as well as an emotional engagement with that visual 
impression. Readers, in turn, must rely on the “instruction manual” of Babb’s 
written account in order to recreate in their minds a version of the land-
scape that she remembered and then tried to transform into language during 
the writing process. Here and elsewhere, Babb relies on simile and metaphor 
in order to aid readers in that process of embodied simulation.4 Calling the 
landscape “lackluster” and “empty,” and comparing it to an “old gray carpet” 
may not provide readers with a lot of visual detail of the actual Colorado 
landscape, but it imbues the experience of that landscape with affective value. 
As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have shown, newly created metaphors 
highlight a specific aspect of experience by mapping the unfamiliar—such as 
 4. On the activation of brain regions by metaphorical language, see Aziz-Zadeh and 
Damasio.
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the subjective environmental perception of another person—onto the more 
familiar—such as one’s own memory of the visional impression of an old gray 
carpet—on the grounds of structural similarity (152). Readers may or may 
not be personally familiar with the environment of the Great Plains, and that 
degree of familiarity will doubtlessly influence how they imagine it during the 
reading process. Regardless of their own experiences, however, the evocation 
of an old gray carpet gives them an immediate sense of how it looked and 
felt to that seven-year-old girl beholding it through the glass panes of a train. 
As Anežka Kuzmičová has pointed out, “There is no straightforward relation 
between the degree of detail in spatial description on the one hand, and the 
vividness of spatial imagery and presence on the other” (23). Instead, it is 
a process of sensorimotor resonance—and thus embodied simulation—that 
helps create in readers’ minds an emotionally salient impression of a narra-
tive environment that presents itself to the young girl as an endless expanse 
of “gray waste” (Babb, Owl 8) and that has a “primordial loneliness to it” (7).
The affectively laden perceptions of Babb’s experiencing agent, then, are of 
central importance to readers’ imagination of and emotional relationship to 
the environment she describes. As Elaine Scarry has pointed out, there are at 
least two features of narratives that enable readers to have what she calls “non-
actual, mimetic perception” (9): one is the evocation of material conditions, 
the other is the evocation of characters’ responses to those conditions that 
cue readers to empathetically share those responses. In first-person narration, 
both of these features depend on the narrator’s qualia, but other characters 
can nevertheless be of importance in making the environment emotionally 
salient for readers. Babb remembers that her mother, who had “never [been] 
in a place without trees . . . was utterly unprepared for the desolation viewed 
from the train window. Even the companionship of her piano could not keep 
back the tears” (Owl 7). Readers do not have access to the mother’s subjective 
experience, but the narrator attributes her tears to an emotional state of sad-
ness that is triggered by the “desolation viewed from the train window.” The 
mental image of the weeping woman therefore reinforces, for the reader, the 
impression of an environment that is harsh and hostile to human survival 
because it is lacking almost everything that is conducive to human survival: 
water, plant life, animal life, shelter.5
The interesting twist in Babb’s memoir—one that resembles the expression 
of xerophilia that we find in the nature writing of Edward Abby, Mary Austin, 
Terry Tempest Williams, and others—is that she actually grows to love that 
 5. Humans are evolutionarily wired to perceive an “empty” environment as threaten-
ing because it offers little on which to live. On the perception of uncertain environments, see 
Kaplan and Easterlin.
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inhospitable and harsh environment and that she wants to enable her readers 
to share that love.6 The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan claims that familiarity with a 
certain place “breeds attachment when it doesn’t breed contempt,” and Babb 
remembers how despite the hardships she quickly developed a strong topo-
philic attachment to her new environment (99). This process begins to set in 
on the morning after her arrival. The first time the family gets up at dawn in 
their new home, they see
the big sky turn pink and orange, then blue. The air was of such purity that 
we stood breathing deeply for the simple pleasure of breathing. Its fragrance 
was unlike the softer, leafy air we had known. Strong plants that lived in a 
land of little rain gave into the winds their pungent smells, sagebrush more 
powerful than all others. We turned around and around to see the full circle 
of horizon, the perfect meeting of earth and sky. (15)
Packed with vivid sensory imagery, this passage makes it easy for readers to 
imagine the material conditions of the prairie landscape as well as the fam-
ily’s sensory experience of it. Nothing is left here of the previously evoked 
“old gray carpet.” Instead, readers are cued to imagine vivid colors such as 
pink, orange, and blue, accompanied by the strong scent of sage and other 
fragrant herbs. The narrative’s primary experiencing agent—Babb’s younger 
self—has completely changed her affective relationship to the prairie, expe-
riencing “pleasure” when breathing in that strong herbal scent of the prairie. 
And since readers’ imaginary experience of that ecological space is inevitably 
bound to the qualia of the first-person narrator, they are cued to imagine it in 
an entirely different way than they did before, invited to feel much more posi-
tive feelings in response to a large sky, vibrant colors, and invigorating scents. 
After all—it bears mentioning again—they have no direct access to an “objec-
tive” account of the environment or even to the qualia of another experiencer. 
Readers never get to know what it was truly like for Babb’s mother to live far 
away from the city in this excessively simple and often extremely strenuous 
way. Nor do they get any direct insight into the qualia of Babb’s father, who 
has been toiling on the land with her grandfather long before the women’s 
arrival. Instead, readers are invited to simulate the qualia of a seven-year-old 
to whom this world is fascinating, not least because she finds out that it is not 
at all empty but filled with life.
 6. Xerophilia is the ability of some “desert-loving” plants to survive in extreme condi-
tions. Tom Lynch has extended the term to include the works of writers who love desert places.
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Babb’s memoir chronicles the challenges of growing up in a place where 
the crops are mostly doomed to failure, where beloved work animals die 
due to the harsh conditions and their human owners barely make it through 
another winter. And yet her narrative is brimming with evocative descriptions 
of “a world of liquid light, magnetic, overpowering” (33). Not only does the 
girl become enamored with the peculiar light that suffuses that world but she 
also feels “close to its animals and birds and sparse growing things, its silence, 
even its loneliness” (18). It is particularly the omnipresent owls that fascinate 
her, with their “great immobile star[ing], their heads swivel[ing]. They were 
watching for prey, the little field mice, no doubt, but to me they were curious, 
even ominous, an owl on every slender post like a night-blooming flower” 
(33–34). The girl’s young and impressionable mind is awed by the rawness and 
sensual intensity of this world, “kept silent by a wondering stir of beauty, a 
longing of spirit asking a first and eternal question of the universe” (33). Read-
ers are invited to share in this sense of awe, delight, and fascination which, in 
Babb’s memory, outshines the hardships of the homesteader life.
Such imaginative sharing of an emotional experience prepares readers for 
Babb’s afterword, and her affirmation that it was precisely this profound emo-
tional experience that allowed her to know intuitively “that everything in the 
universe is connected, that all life is One,” long before understanding the fact 
on an analytical level (251). The cognitive narratologist Patrick Colm Hogan 
has suggested that in narrative discourse “the implied author establishes a 
norm and in effect asks the reader to take up that norm to reflect” upon the 
elements of the discourse that have been made emotionally salient (Narra-
tive Discourse 257). Through vivid sensory imagery, Babb’s memoir invites 
readers to reflect on the interconnectedness of life and on the power of the 
prairie landscape to shape minds. As she explains in the afterword, she still 
“treasure[d] the deep influence of those years” (252) when, two decades later, 
she sat down to write a novel set in the same bioregion but at a time when 
everything she had cherished as a child had quite literally turned to dust.
EMPATHY, EMOTION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE IN WHOSE NAMES ARE UNKNOWN
Following the destiny of a poor homesteader family from the airless expanse 
of the Dust Bowl to the flooded refugee camps of California, Babb’s novel 
Whose Names Are Unknown could hardly have been titled more appropriately, 
not only because its fictional protagonists stand in for thousands of nameless 
“Okies” who fled the fatal Midwestern drought of the 1930s but also because 
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the book itself was quite literally eclipsed by another one.7 The novel was 
already under contract with Random House when its market was swept away 
by the publication of John Steinbeck’s bestselling and Pulitzer Prize-winning 
The Grapes of Wrath (1939) whose devastatingly similar plot was in part based 
on Babb’s very own notes about the California working camps (Rodgers x). 
After several unsuccessful queries at other presses, Babb was forced to shelve 
her manuscript and then lived just long enough to see its eventual publication 
by the University of Oklahoma Press in 2004. Now available to readers, Whose 
Names Are Unknown holds its ground regardless of its remarkable structural 
similarities to Steinbeck’s masterpiece.
Robert DeMott has called The Grapes of Wrath “one of the most significant 
environmental novels of the century” because, from the dust storms that sweep 
the Oklahoma landscape at the beginning of the book to the floods that inun-
date California farm workers at the end of it, it foregrounds human-nature 
relationships (xix). The same could be said of Whose Names Are Unknown, 
only that a much larger proportion of its narrative is set in Oklahoma, fol-
lowing the daily lives of dryland farmers in the slow rhythm of the seasons, 
and that it shows much greater interest in these farmers’ complex affective 
relationships to their environment.
Contemporary readers of Babb’s manuscript were deeply touched by it. 
One of the editors who read it deemed the novel “more honest, moving, 
and human” than Steinbeck’s book (53). Literary luminary Ralph Ellison was 
deeply impressed by Babb’s evocation of place. “In re-reading your novel,” he 
wrote in a letter to her, “I had the same feeling of an emotionally dense atmo-
sphere I experienced during our first conversation (coming up Park Avenue in 
the dark) that was more of Kansas and the plains than of a taxi and New York” 
(qtd. in Battat 53). What Ellison describes here is the illusion of narrative 
transportation. Transportation, explain social psychologists Melanie Green et 
al., is the “psychological immersion into a story,” a process that “entails imag-
ery, emotionality, and attentional focus” (37). Regardless of whether we listen 
to a story (as seems to have been the case during the cab ride Ellison shared 
with Babb) or read it, we shift our attention away from our actual environ-
ment and, as Wojciehowski and Gallese put it, “suspend our grip on the world 
of our daily occupations” while engaging in processes of embodied simulation 
that allow us to vividly imagine the alternative world of the story and to react 
emotionally to it (n. pag.). As a result, we feel transported into that alternative 
 7. As Babb explains in her Author’s Note to the novel, the title of the novel “is taken from 
a legal eviction note: To John Doe and Mary Doe Whose True Names Are Unknown” (xiii).
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world. It is telling that Ellison singles out his feeling “of an emotionally dark 
dense atmosphere” rather than any particular detail of the landscape Babb 
described to him both personally and in her novel. We remember things best 
(though not necessarily most accurately) when they are charged with emotion 
(Hogan, Affective 164) and so it is no wonder that what Ellison associates with 
Babb’s evocation of “Kansas and the plains” is how he felt about its “emotion-
ally dark atmosphere” (Kensinger 241).
As in An Owl on Every Post, that affective charge results in part from 
Babb’s tendency to channel literary environments through the subjective expe-
rience of characters. Unlike the memoir, however, the novel uses an omni-
scient third-person narrator and, on the surface at least, its characters are 
fictional. The novel tells the story of the Dunne family’s harsh life in an under-
ground dugout on their grandfather’s barely subsistent broomcorn farm on 
the arid high plains of the Oklahoma panhandle, miles from the nearest town. 
Although it draws directly on Babb’s childhood experiences, the fictional set-
ting of the novel is transferred from Colorado to the state that, during the 
1930s, would become the epicenter of the Dust Bowl, in the words of envi-
ronmental historian Donald Worster, “the darkest moment in the twentieth-
century history of the southern plains” (4). Babb was living far away from 
the disaster zone in Los Angeles when she wrote her novel, but she received 
letters from her mother who was witnessing the developments first-hand in 
Kansas. In addition, Babb’s volunteer work for the Farm Security Administra-
tion in the San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys brought her in close contact with 
the dispossessed farmers who had already left the Midwest behind and now 
sought refuge in the quickly established camps in the hope that they would 
find work in California’s orchards. Written during the nights that followed 
her long days in the camps, Whose Names Are Unknown is thus a fictional 
compound of Babb’s remembered first-hand experiences and various second-
hand accounts she received, a story that is at once fiction and nonfiction to the 
point of using the words of her mother’s letters verbatim in one of the most 
dramatic moments of the narrative.
And yet, the pleasure, fascination, and delight that pervade Babb’s memoir 
are still present in the early pages of the novel. The following passage is taken 
from a moment in the narrative after Julia Dunne has miscarried her baby 
as a result of her strenuous walk in the middle of the severe thunderstorm 
described at the beginning of this essay. Julia’s husband Milt is deeply affected 
by the loss of what would have been his first son and close to despair over 
his inability to wrest a decent harvest from the land’s meager soil. Despite his 
desperation, however, he feels a deep connection to that land:
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A deepening coolness and dusty smell of buffalo grass mingled with the 
freshness of the field, and now and then the disturbing smell of sagebrush 
blowing strongly made him turn from his thoughts to a pleasant awareness 
of the fragrant wind. This was a western wind, heavy with the pungent, lively 
smell of desert weeds and the dry earth filled with the sun. He felt the night 
around him, the great endless dark, and the intimate friendly feeling sprang 
up in him for the road that his feet followed by touch and familiarity. (60)
Once again, Babb foregrounds a character’s qualia in her evocation of a natu-
ral environment. Instead of describing the physical features of the landscape, 
she focuses on Milt’s subjective experience of it. As Erin Battat has pointed 
out, “Babb is at her best as a writer in her ability to find language that evokes a 
landscape characterized by the absence of physical features” (54). In the “deep-
ening coolness” of the night, Milt is alert to the “dusty smell of the buffalo 
grass” and the freshness of the field,” the “disturbing smell of sagebrush” and 
the “pungent, lively smell of desert weeds.” It is too dark to see the physical 
features of the landscape and so Milt predominantly experiences it on the 
olfactory level. Readers are invited to emphatically share Milt’s qualia through 
embodied simulation both in this nocturnal moment of pleasure and topo-
philic appreciation.
Only instants later, however, these positive emotions are overshadowed 
by “a mounting hulk of fear and doubt, ponderous with the question of the 
future uncertain” (60). This, too, is an emotional response to the environment, 
but one that is colored by Milt’s understanding that the environmental condi-
tions of the prairie determine the life of his family. As a farmer, he is given to 
searching the sky for signs of coming weather:
He looked at the edges of the sky, hoping for clouds or the steely haze that 
might mean early snow. Off to the northwest a bank of clouds lay just darker 
than the sky, still like a great animal waiting to spring, showing the sleepy 
fire of its eyes when the faint autumn lightning winked. It was far away and 
would spend its strength on other land. His wheat and that of every prairie 
farm was waiting on the ground for rain. (60–61)
Whereas the previous passage limited readers’ access to the narrative envi-
ronment to his sense of smell, readers are here cued to simulate Milt’s chang-
ing visual perception. Instead of a “great endless dark,” he now can make out 
cloud formations, visual information that is not neutral but affectively charged 
by his hope for rain and his fear that it will not come. Like his wife Julia, Milt 
tends to personify nature, attributing not only material agency but also aware-
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ness to it. He believes that his land is “waiting” for rain, while the animal-like 
clouds seem to have eyes and the power to decide where they will pour their 
water. Babb’s use of simile and metaphor suggests to readers on the cognitive 
level that the Dunne family is at nature’s mercy. At the same time, the evoca-
tion of “a great animal waiting to spring”—an evolutionarily salient image that 
suggests immediate danger—allows them to empathize with Milt’s feelings of 
fear through processes of embodied simulation.
The second passage that I want to consider is located near the middle of 
the novel, when the dust storms have reached the Oklahoma panhandle, bury-
ing everything in their way under heaps of dirt. Here, Babb once again takes 
pains to evoke the environmental conditions in a way that allows readers to 
experience not only how they look, taste, and feel, but also what emotions 
they evoke in those who are subjected to them. The dust is so all-pervasive 
that Julia can feel it “in her clothes and on her skin, in her mouth and nose, 
on everything she touched” (86). It is an unpleasant, suffocating physical sen-
sation that amplifies the family’s fear that the storm will take their crops. Milt 
picks up handfuls of dust and senses its “alien texture . . . fine and silky, with an 
oily feel” (87). His mind is spinning as it draws up multiple possible scenarios 
of how he might be able to save his crop or plant another one before the end 
of the season. Julia, for her part, begins to “keep a record of the strange phe-
nomenon of the dust” (90). This is the part of the book that Babb took almost 
verbatim from her mother’s letters, now transformed into Julia’s first-person 
account as she tries to capture her subjective experience of the situation:
April 25. Blew all night and still blowing almost black. It’s a terrible feeling to 
be in this blackness. You don’t know what is going on outside and imagine all 
kinds of things. It is so still, just blows and blows but as if there is no wind, 
just rolling clouds of dust. We haven’t seen light for two days. I am worried 
about my chickens, some of them acting droopy. Dad is sleeping in the barn 
again, worrying about the horses. (94)
The sudden change in narrative voice and perspective allows for an even 
greater degree of immediacy and immersion as Julia shares her plight seem-
ingly unfiltered by another narrating agency. Her voice is colored by anger, 
fear, exhaustion, and naked despair as the farm and everything that lives on it 
is submerged in dust for weeks and weeks on end. As a first-person narrator, 
she invites readers to empathetically feel along with her deeply negative emo-
tions as they simulate in their minds what it is like for her to “hear the cattle 
bawling for water,” sounding “so pitiful and helpless” and to lose her beloved 
neighbors to the horrible, suffocating dust (94).
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Narratologist Howard Sklar has argued that readers’ sympathy results 
from at least two basic components: “the heightened awareness of the suf-
fering of another” and “a judgment of the explicit or implicit unfairness of 
that suffering” (28). Babb’s novel aims to create such awareness by painting a 
vivid picture of the horrific environmental conditions of the Dust Bowl and by 
foregrounding how it affects her sympathetic, hard-working characters who 
do not deserve to suffer because they are not guilty of any deliberate wrong-
doing. The Dunne’s misery comes in many guises; it is emotional, physical, 
and deeply existential, and not all of it is weather-related. As Battat has noted, 
“The Dunnes and their neighbors bristle within a system of modern finance in 
which they are at the mercy of nameless, faceless institutional creditors” (52). 
Such institutions have no mercy, and neither does the environment care about 
the farmers’ desperate struggle. “No use to keep on writing dust, dust, dust,” 
decides Julia in her last journal entry, “Seems it will outlast us” (Babb, Whose 
Names 95). The narrative will prove her right, but instead of making it seem 
like an inevitable decision, it invites readers to share in the heartache involved 
in abandoning the place one is materially and emotionally attached to, the 
deeply felt sense that you simply “can’t leave” and that circumstances never-
theless force you to do exactly that (120). It is this painful emotional struggle 
between place attachment and the need to survive that is at the heart of Babb’s 
novel. As readers, we come to understand the desperation that comes with 
leaving behind what you love, whether it is a person or a place. The history 
of the United States has seen many forms of dispossession and displacement, 
and from the early days of the republic, the Sooner State has played a promi-
nent role in some of the most notorious of them. As someone who grew up in 
“the Indian country of Oklahoma” and who, as a child, considered “the Oto 
Indians near Red Rock” her “other family,” her “other home” (Owl 7), Babb 
was acutely aware of the economic, spiritual, and emotional consequences 
of Indian removal policies. And while her novel focuses on the plight of the 
poor white “Okie” farmers who we tend to associate with the Dirty Thirties, 
it also sheds a critical light on communities of color whose suffering is just as 
undeserved and unfair.
Like the Joads in The Grapes of Wrath, the Dunnes eventually give up their 
struggle and migrate west to work in the orchards of California, where they 
are subjected to different but equally unjust conditions of agricultural produc-
tion. Unlike Steinbeck, however, Babb allows her characters to acknowledge 
the African American, Filipino, and Mexican migrant workers who toil next 
to them in the orchards “for the same reason we do” (Whose Names 180). 
Fueled by the understanding of a shared destiny and the recognition that “I’m 
no better’n he is; he’s no worse,” Milt solidarizes with nonwhite workers in 
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order to fight for higher wages and better living conditions (180). By the end 
of the novel, they all have been jailed for organizing strikes, but this has not 
changed their understanding that “all the men [who] had been standing alone 
in the wide valleys, dwarfed beneath the western sky” must be united by the 
“desperate need to stand together as one man” (222). Battat reminds us that 
Babb drew on her own first-hand experiences as Farm Security Administra-
tion employee in the migrant camps in her imagining of “interracial alliances 
among white, Filipino, and African American workers” against the exploit-
ative practices of California farmers (12). It may very well have been these 
experiences that led her to develop “cross-racial empathy” (Battat 61), which 
she in turn tries to evoke in her readers as she expands the cast of charac-
ters on the final pages of her novel. Suzanne Keen has argued that charac-
ter empathy can be used strategically by politically committed writers, since 
simulating the subjective experience of people whom we know to be ficti-
tious may “disarm [us] of some of the protective layers of cautious reasoning 
that may inhibit empathy in the real world” (69). Whose Names Are Unknown 
was Babb’s attempt to do such disarming by evoking sympathy and moral 
allegiance for a family of white dryland farmers and then inviting readers to 
extend those feelings to other, nonwhite families who work the land under 
similarly intolerable conditions. Perhaps it would have succeeded in engaging 
contemporary readers in such a critique of social and environmental injustice 
had it been published in its time.
CONCLUSION
Particularly important from the perspective of econarratology is that—in both 
of her books—Babb decided to give so much room to her protagonists’ per-
ception of the prairie environment and their complex emotional relationship 
to it. By giving access to these characters’ qualia, Babb invites readers not only 
to see that environment through their eyes but to also smell it through their 
noses, listen to it through their ears, and feel it through their nerves. Arguably 
all narration involves some kind of experiencing consciousness that provides 
readers with information about the storyworld, but sensing and feeling along 
with the protagonist placed within that storyworld adds a different dimension. 
Detailed descriptions by an omniscient narrative voice may provide readers 
with a clear understanding of the physical properties of a storyworld, but the 
physical presence of an experiencing agent allows for the embodied simula-
tion of personal exposure that adds an affective charge to that understanding. 
More important still, the feelings readers develop for characters in the course 
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of a narrative will likely influence their imagined experience of environments 
that seem beneficial or threatening to those characters and therefore their 
emotional response to them.
Empirical studies have shown that “labeling a narrative as fact versus fic-
tion does not affect the intensity of emotional response” (Green et al. 37) and 
yet we have to consider Keen’s argument that labeling a story as fiction may 
have a liberating effect on readers that might lead to greater character empa-
thy and thus to a somewhat different experience of the narrative environ-
ment. Whose Names Are Unknown invites readers to see the prairie through 
the eyes of a fictional family of farmers in order to understand the full emo-
tional extent of what it means when everything you care for turns to dust, 
when you are uprooted, displaced, and disowned. Like An Owl on Every Post, 
the novel is a mental “instruction manual” that makes it easy for readers to 
simulate in their minds the sensory and sensual dimensions of the prairie 
environment as they present themselves to an experiencing agent. Unlike the 
memoir, however, the novel links the sensual evocation of the landscape to the 
tragic fate of the people who have become attached to such a difficult place 
and who are forced to leave it behind. “We ain’t farmers anymore’n a man who 
works in a shoe factory is a custom boot-maker,” declares Milt bitterly at the 
end of the novel to a racially and ethnically mixed group of migrant workers. 
“We’re a lot of parts that can’t stand alone because we haven’t got an acre of 
our own to keep our feet on” (216). Whose Names Are Unknown is the story 
of this material and spiritual deprivation, a story that tries to give readers a 
sense of what it is like to experience it in order to allow for a fuller—and fully 
embodied—understanding of the migrant worker’s situation.
What we may take away from these readings of Babb’s little-known work 
is not only that cognitive econarratology can help us get a better sense of 
how exactly literary texts evoke virtual environments in emotionally salient 
ways but also, as I have shown, that such readings must not ignore the larger 
social, political, and ecological context of a given literary text. As James has 
suggested, an econarratological approach will also take “the extratextual world 
as a central concern,” thereby considering “the relationship between the text, 
the reader, and the physical world that lies beyond the text” (14, 29). Given 
the current interest in the body and in the role of affect and emotion in our 
interaction both with the natural world itself and with cultural texts that rep-
resent that world, I believe that the insights of cognitive science and related 
narratological approaches can be highly productive for ecocritical analysis. As 
an emergent subfield of ecocriticsm, cognitive econarratology has the poten-
tial to open a new dimension in the analysis of environmental narratives of 
all kinds.
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C H A P T E R  7
Finding a Practical Narratology in 
the Work of Restoration Ecology
MAT THEW M. LOW
I N T H E opening essay of American Places (1981), Wallace Stegner discerns 
that “when literally nothing is known, anything is possible,” an observation 
he applies specifically to the fantastical visions and delusions of grandeur that 
characterized early explorations of the so-called New World, from passage-
ways opening access to the riches of the East, to the cities of gold and foun-
tains of youth that lay hidden within (“Inheritance” 4). “Inheritance” goes on 
to document the centuries-long process of acceptance—even resignation—
that Europeans and, eventually, Euro-Americans had to undertake before 
“whatever authentic wonders of great rivers, mountains, plains, minerals, oil 
and coal, deep soil, fertile valleys . . . could be seen straight and inventoried in 
realistic terms” (14). Over half a millennium after those initial forays into and 
through North America, my work turns to Stegner’s observation with a sense 
of irony, in part because a vast majority of us living on this very same ground, 
especially the midcontinent, find ourselves once again at a time when virtually 
nothing is known about the land that those earliest explorers passed over. Spe-
cifically, with less than one-tenth of one percent of the native tallgrass prairie 
ecosystem remaining and only fractionally higher percentages remaining of 
the related mixed- and shortgrass prairie ecosystems, “knowledge,” to borrow 
another observation from Stegner, has been “postponed” (7). The greed that 
preoccupied the earliest explorers from directly experiencing the bountiful 
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resources of the prairie has been replaced by greed that strips the land of those 
same resources, thereby prohibiting direct experience of them in the present.
Writing from a strictly environmental perspective, the current status of the 
North American prairie as a largely unloved and unmissed landscape (but not 
“lost” or “vanished,” as much recent coverage of this region has phrased it) is 
one of the great injustices of the “destructive infancy” of America’s nationhood 
that Stegner describes in the latter paragraphs of “Inheritance.” However, cou-
pling an environmental—or ecocritical—response to the prairie’s precarious 
position with some of the key components of narrative theory opens space for 
a more hopeful outcome. In fact, Stegner’s quotation at the outset works so 
well because the second half of his antithesis, “anything is possible,” is itself a 
foundational postulation of many subsets of narrative theory, including post-
classical and cognitive narratologies, as well as studies of “unnatural” narrative. 
Take, for instance, Marie-Laure Ryan’s explication of “possible worlds” in the 
Living Handbook of Narratology: “The foundation of [Possible Worlds] theory 
is the idea that reality—conceived as the sum of the imaginable rather than 
as the sum of what exists physically—is a universe composed of a plurality of 
distinct worlds” (“Possible Worlds”). In other words, when looking for a tool 
to make present what has been rendered absent—such as the North American 
prairie—one ought not overlook the capacity of narrative to imagine a world 
other than “the sum of what exists physically.” This is not to say that narrative 
alone can bring the prairie back to its former prominence, but when “literally 
nothing is known” by those with the most to lose from its absence, what David 
Herman terms the “world-creating potential of stories” must be prioritized 
alongside land acquisition, reseeding, reintroduction of keystone animal spe-
cies, and prescribed fire as necessary elements in the effort to rehabilitate the 
midcontinent’s native grassland ecosystems (Storytelling 103).
The title of this essay uses the term “practical narratology” not so much 
out of the desire for a coinage but as an effort to interject an immensely useful 
and compelling theoretical field into the world-at-large. Those familiar with 
ecocritical discourse will no doubt recognize a reference, if not necessarily 
an homage, to Glen A. Love’s influential work Practical Ecocriticism (2003), 
which he poses as a step forward for ecocriticism that looks to “test [ecocriti-
cal] ideas against the workings of physical reality,” while also utilizing what 
he calls “the empirical spirit of the sciences” (7). Love’s work has an important 
place in the evolution of ecocriticism as a critical field, but my goal here is not 
simply to mimic his work within the realm of narrative theory. Instead, my 
use of the term “practical” originates from the desire to address a single ques-
tion. It has been my experience that the critical study of narrative is the most 
effective means for gleaning insights into various modes of media and com-
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munication, from canonical literature to mainstream political discourse. Thus, 
I cannot help but wonder: might this field also be applied to a more functional 
outreach or extension? If it can, which is the case I will make here, then given 
the dire consequences of our myriad looming environmental crises, perhaps 
such functionality could be used to reconstruct vibrant, thriving, healthy sto-
ryworlds and actual worlds simultaneously. In other words, a practical narra-
tology with an environmental focus would look to combine the cognitive turn 
in narrative theory—for instance, immersion in the reconstructed storyworld 
of an ecocentric narrative—with direct, embodied experience of landscapes 
in the process of ecological restoration or reconstruction. Though having a 
more narrowly focused interest in how narratology intersects with environ-
mental discourse, my term is deeply influenced by Herman’s belief that “nar-
ratives can be used to make sense of what goes on in the world via accounts of 
the experiences of persons—experiences that crucially involve, without being 
wholly reducible to, sets of beliefs, motivations, and goals” (Storytelling 74). 
Being more firmly grounded in “the experience of persons,” the concept of 
practical narratology can be put to use both on the prairie and throughout 
the world, overcoming a number of obstacles that are faced by any meaning-
ful response to our ongoing environmental crises—a list that includes misun-
derstanding, ignorance (willful and otherwise), mistrust, and especially as it 
pertains to the prairie, insufficient opportunity for immersion in an ecosystem 
through either a fully developed prairie storyworld or an intact prairie in the 
actual world.
In recent years, scholarship has emerged looking to place narrative theory 
in dialogue with other fields and discourses once thought beyond the purview 
of work done traditionally in the humanities. Much of this work has been 
done to show that the scope and reach of narrative analysis is not limited to 
what can be found on a page or screen. For instance, Nancy Easterlin closes 
her chapter on “Minding Ecocriticism” from A Biocultural Approach to Liter-
ary Theory and Interpretation (2012) by posing a challenge to ecocritics who 
have the opportunity to “illuminate values, relationships, social networks, and 
traumatic events [that] affect our positive constructions and terrible devalu-
ations of natural and built locales. [For them,] literature will be a profound 
resource, showing that the capacity to trust and love other humans makes it 
possible to love the world” (151). Though not stated outright, an essential com-
ponent of Easterlin’s vision is taking the lessons learned through ecocritical 
analysis of literary texts and putting them in practice in actual world scenar-
ios of ecological restoration and reconstruction. Positioning her work more 
squarely in the domain of cognitive narratology, Erin James’s The Storyworld 
Accord: Econarratology and Postcolonial Narratives (2015) uses the title phrase 
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to advocate “for an environmental treaty sensitive to the cultural differences 
of environmental imaginations and experiences gleaned from the reading of 
narratives” (253). As with Easterlin, James desires to see the work of ecocriti-
cism more actively engage “narratological taxonomies, neologisms, and tra-
ditions,” especially those of cognitive narratology, in order to take advantage 
of advances made in understanding “the human intellectual and emotional 
processing of narratives to query how narratives and readers interact” (4, 16). 
Given the shifting landscape of all modes of academic discourse and the grow-
ing need for a wider range of inputs into every facet of environmental dis-
course, the intersections that Easterlin and James model in their work, be 
they “biocultural” or “econarratological,” enable the type of analysis that I am 
pursuing here. Indeed, the work undertaken in this study owes a great deal 
to James’s theorization of econarratology, in particular her observation that 
“narratives . . . allow readers to simulate and live in environments they would 
otherwise be denied and experience those environments from an alternative 
perspective” (24). There are even notable resonances between James’s focus on 
postcolonial narratives and my own emphasis on prairie storyworlds, despite 
some obvious cultural and geographical distances. In particular, postcolo-
nial narratives push back against hegemonic narratives perpetuated within 
dominant discourse by opening up “culturally diverse understandings and 
experiences of global environments” that might otherwise be missed without 
engaging narratives outside the traditional canon (24). Similarly, my effort to 
establish a practical narratology focuses on a North American ecosystem that 
has been subjected to close to two hundred years of steady and intensifying 
marginalization, beginning with some of the earliest and most enduring writ-
ten depictions of the prairie as the “Great American Desert,” and continuing 
with modern-day dismissals of the entire region as “flyover” country.1
Looking back briefly to my days as a graduate student, I recall that my 
specialization began with ecocriticism, which then led (as a lifelong Midwest-
erner completely ignorant of the region’s native ecology) to an interest in the 
prairie and the associated concerns of restoration ecology, including participa-
tion in some hands-on fieldwork like seed harvesting and prescribed burning. 
 1. A glaring omission from the present study is the injustice brought upon the indig-
enous human communities that made their homes in this region for millennia prior to Euro-
American settlement. Though this aspect of the topic is beyond the scope of this essay, it is a 
topic that I have written about extensively elsewhere, in particular in those places where I have 
advocated for “prairie survivance” based on the work of Anishinaabe writer and scholar Ger-
ald Vizenor. My work on this topic has been heavily influenced by three texts he has written 
or edited: Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance (1994), Fugitive Poses: Native 
American Indian Scenes of Absence and Presence (1998), and Survivance: Narratives of Native 
Presence (2008).
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Only later did the field of narrative theory present itself as an immensely use-
ful way of conceptualizing the perpetuation of the prairie’s image as barren, 
empty, and worthless—space, as Doreen Massey phrases it, “to be crossed 
and maybe conquered”—through travel narratives written by early visitors like 
Washington Irving and reinforced by the likes of Buffalo Bill Cody and oth-
ers in the latter half of the nineteenth century (4). With few exceptions, this 
image of the prairie has predominated continuously among those residing in 
this region from the opening, and so-called “closing,” of the frontier through 
today. It was only upon reading Adam Zachary Newton’s Narrative Ethics 
(1995/2009) that an understanding of narrative’s role in perpetuating this 
image of the prairie began to take shape, illuminated largely by the principal 
focus of Newton’s inquiry: “narrative as claim, as risk, as responsibility, as gift, 
as price. Above all, as an ethics, narrative is performance or act—purgative . . . 
malignant . . . historically recuperative . . . erotic and redemptive . . . obsessive 
and coercive” (7). In other words, telling stories about the prairie certainly 
had a price, that price being the eventual removal of all but small remnants 
of the indigenous plant, animal, and human communities that thrived on the 
midcontinent prior to Euro-American settlement. Viewed more optimistically, 
however, Newton’s identification of some ethical imperative within the telling 
of stories gives hope that narratives of the prairie might also be a “gift,” or at 
the very least “recuperative,” in the spirit of Thomas King’s challenge in The 
Truth about Stories (2003): “Want a different ethic? Tell a different story” (164). 
The last couple of decades have indeed seen a small uptick in these “different” 
sorts of stories about the prairie, including in the fiction of Annie Proulx and 
Marilynne Robinson, nonfictional texts by John Price and Paul Johnsgard, 
the poetry of Ted Kooser, and the photography and film of Michael Forsberg, 
among others. Their work, taken together, represents a formidable advocacy 
for the ecology of the midcontinent, though still not formidable enough to 
overcome the prevailing, fatalistic narrative of the prairie as a place long gone 
and never much worth saving in the first place.
In searching for common ground among ecocriticism, restoration ecology, 
and narrative theory, the concept of “worlds” has emerged as central to utiliz-
ing narrative as a means for responding to the crises facing the prairie. Theo-
rization of “possible worlds,” “actual worlds,” and especially “storyworlds”—a 
concept that has become increasingly prominent in studies working from 
within the cognitive turn of narrative studies—turns out to be particularly 
apt in looking into an ecosystem that has been subject to routine removal 
from both narratives and landscapes of the North American midcontinent 
over the last two centuries. Herman’s definition of “storyworld” in the Rout-
ledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory (2010), for one, offers a clear delinea-
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tion of the ways in which this term moves the study of narrative away from 
mere close reading or even exegesis, and into the lives and experiences of 
readers themselves:
Storyworld better captures what might be called the ecology of narrative 
interpretation. In trying to make sense of a narrative, interpreters attempt 
to reconstruct not just what happened but also the surrounding context 
or environment embedding storyworld existents, their attributes, and the 
actions and events in which they are involved. Indeed, the grounding of 
stories in storyworlds goes a long way toward explaining narratives’ immer-
siveness, their ability to “transport” interpreters into places and times that 
they must occupy for the purposes of narrative comprehension. Interpret-
ers do not merely reconstruct a sequence of events and a set of existents, 
but imaginatively (emotionally, viscerally) inhabit a world in which things 
matter, agitate, exalt, repulse, provide grounds for laughter and grief, and so 
on—both for narrative participants and for interpreters of the story. More 
than reconstructed timelines and inventories of existents, then, storyworlds 
are mentally and emotionally projected environments in which interpret-
ers are called upon to live out complex blends of cognitive and imaginative 
response. (570)
Herman’s use of “ecology” at the opening of this quotation is not an effort to 
align his cognitive narratology with environmental or ecocritical discourse, 
but it is suggestive that he recognizes crossover of some terminology between 
these fields. Indeed, this whole quotation is filled with such concurrent ter-
minology, including “reconstruct,” “embedding,” “environment,” “immersive-
ness,” and “inhabit.” Such concurrence is found in Herman’s other writing on 
this topic and particularly in Story Logic (2004), where he goes so far as to 
claim that “narrative comprehension” itself ought to be considered “a process 
of (re)constructing storyworlds on the basis of textual cues and the inferences 
that they make possible” (6). Ultimately, it is the word “reconstruction” that is 
repeatedly invoked in Herman’s writing about storyworlds that brings narra-
tive theory and restoration ecology in most direct dialogue with one another, 
as in both fields it expresses a means of bringing “worlds” into existence.
Looking at a brief literary example will help elucidate these points of con-
nection that have been identified in the long quotation from Herman above, 
as well as show how practical narratology can be extended from a storyworld 
to an actual world. As noted above, some of the most complete and compel-
ling descriptions of the prairie come from travel narratives written about the 
grasslands of the midcontinent by its earliest Euro-American visitors, a good 
number of whom would go on to miscast the region as barren and desolate, 
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despite the vivid storyworlds created within their own accounts. This was not 
always the case, thankfully, and the journals produced by most members of 
the Corps of Discovery expedition—Lewis and Clark themselves, but also oth-
ers who wrote extensively about their experiences along the Missouri River 
watershed—lack the same apathy or outright hostility toward the prairie that 
characterizes the accounts that came after. For instance, a short selection from 
Sergeant Patrick Gass’s journal illustrates the prairie’s unceasing involvement 
in all matters of life and death for the men who would spend the better part of 
two years immersed in the midcontinent’s native ecology. This example con-
cerns the only death of a member of the Corps of Discovery, Sergeant Charles 
Floyd, an event that is striking today not only for its singularity in the two-
year expedition but also for its clear impact on his comrades as it happened:
Here Sergeant Floyd died, notwithstanding every possible effort was made 
by the commanding officers, and other persons, to save his life. We went on 
about a mile to high prairie hills on the north side of the river, and there 
interred his remains in the most decent manner our circumstances would 
admit; we then proceeded a mile further to a small river on the same side 
and encamped. Our commanding officers gave it the name of Floyd’s river; 
to perpetuate the memory of the first man who had fallen in this important 
expedition.
Gass’s brief narration of Sergeant Floyd’s death is worth thinking about in 
connection to Herman’s definition of storyworld. On the one hand, this is an 
exemplary moment from the journals in which most readers will “imagina-
tively .  .  . inhabit a world in which things matter”: the expedition is not just 
navigating an unfamiliar environment, but dealing with human tragedy in 
the face of so many unknowns. That they traveled with Floyd’s body an addi-
tional mile from where he succumbed to his illness, to a place of “high prairie 
hills” in order to bury him “in the most decent manner our circumstances 
would admit,” shows that the physical surroundings played a role in their con-
ception of the solemnity of this event and are thereby an important compo-
nent of the storyworld that later readers of the journals would “mentally and 
emotionally project.”2 On the other hand, the importance of the storyworld 
invoked by Gass’s account is all the more striking to anyone who has visited, 
 2. George Catlin’s 1832 painting View from Floyd’s Grave, 1300 Miles Above St. Louis, cur-
rently held by the Smithsonian American Art Museum, provides a vivid depiction of this spot 
along the Missouri River as the Corps of Discovery would have encountered it prior to the 
settlement and development of what would become Sioux City, Iowa. An earlier sketch of the 
place can also be found in Plate 118 of Caitlin’s Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and 
Condition of the North American Indian, vol. 2.
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or even driven past, the obelisk marking Floyd’s actual world gravesite on the 
southern edge of Sioux City, Iowa. Twice moved because of fears of erosion 
and grave robbers, the current location of the Sergeant Floyd Monument no 
longer overlooks native tallgrass prairie or even the small tributary bearing 
his name; instead, its slightly elevated view encompasses a busy interstate, an 
industrial site, apartment complexes, a strip mall, and a narrow stretch of the 
Missouri River “tamed” by the Army Corps of Engineers nearly a century and 
a half after the Corps of Discovery’s initial passage through it. This most cer-
tainly is not the only instance of a storyworld superseding the current physi-
cal status of an ugly locale or degraded ecosystem, examples of which abound 
in the journals from the Corps of Discovery themselves. Yet this example is 
notable, perhaps paradigmatic, for documenting the way in which every facet 
of the prairie has been subjected to removal, neglect, or abuse, even parts of 
it demarcated as sacred space by those considered among the most impor-
tant Euro-Americans to transverse this region. The prairie’s presence in Gass’s 
account, and its revitalization in his storyworld, is made all the more urgent 
by its continued absence from the ground where it once thrived.
Returning to Herman’s various efforts to define “storyworld” over the last 
two decades, of most importance to the present study is the recurrence of 
the verb “reconstruct”—sometimes also written as “(re)construct” or, as a 
nominalization, “reconstruction”—to describe the process undertaken by the 
reader/interpreter of a given narrative to piece together the “textual blueprint” 
that ultimately enables the existence of a storyworld. This verb is not used 
exclusively (“creation,” “modification,” “modeling,” or “(re)modeling” all come 
up as well), but the consistency with which it is used by Herman, and thereby 
other theorists responding to or building upon his work, warrants further 
inquiry. Perhaps not incidentally, “reconstruct” shares a root with two promi-
nent fields within literary studies that have influenced narrative theory at vir-
tually all levels: first, the structuralisms that built upon Saussure’s linguistic 
theory and served as a model for those at the forefront of the “narrative turn,” 
like Genette, Greimas, and others; and second, the poststructuralism and 
deconstruction that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century with 
the goal of destabilizing, if not upending entirely, more traditional approaches 
to interpreting a text or narrative. If structuralism deprived readers of mean-
ingful contribution to the interpretive process by pinpointing inflexible uni-
versalities in any given narrative, it could also be said that no small number 
of adherents to the fields of poststructuralism and/or deconstruction undercut 
those universalities to such a degree as to render the interpretive process all 
but meaningless. Thus, giving readers an opportunity to “reconstruct” crucial 
elements of a narrative is an empowering gesture that revives the presence of 
human agency in the transmission of narratives: in other words, “storytelling 
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practices are inextricably interlinked with ascriptions of intentions to persons” 
(Herman, Storytelling 23). In order for a practical narratology to be effective 
in any way, recognizing the role of human minds, and human bodies, in the 
creation, transmission, and interpretation of narrative is an essential first step.
Human agency, or “ascriptions of intentions to persons,” also lies at the 
heart of how “reconstruction” is understood and practiced in the field of res-
toration ecology, though it should be noted that there is some fluidity in how 
this term and related terms are used. The Society for Ecological Restoration, 
for its part, sees the broader work undertaken by professionals in this field as 
“ecocentric restoration, which is restoration focused on the literal re-creation 
of a previously existing ecosystem, including not just some but all its parts and 
processes” (Jordan and Lubick 2). Based on this fairly straightforward defi-
nition, when applied generally to the process of rehabilitating compromised 
or damaged ecosystems worldwide—such as forest, coast, mountain, desert, 
and so on—“restoration” is an adaptable term that describes the sort of work 
undertaken to “restore” something that has been lost or removed. However, 
as one narrows in on the prairie, some distinction is made between the work 
of “restoration” and the work of “reconstruction,” both of which are further 
contrasted with the work of “preservation.”3 Another recent publication in 
the field of restoration ecology, for example, names “reconstruction” as one 
of the activities that might be undertaken in the larger process of restoration, 
specifically as it concerns the prairie: “Landscape reconstruction involves its 
practitioners in actively shaping (or reshaping) the natural world, creating 
(or re-creating) communities of species that can live together in an ongo-
ing, self-sustaining way .  .  . Prairie restoration is the best known example” 
(Baldwin et al. 9). Instead of clearly delineating that “restoration” is this and 
“reconstruction” is that, this definition places an emphasis on the hands-on, 
physical labor of reconstruction, which again points back to human agency. 
Carl Kurtz’s A Practical Guide to Prairie Reconstruction (2001/2013) offers the 
most straightforward usage of this term, and is therefore most helpful in link-
ing actual world ecology back to the use of “reconstruction” in the context of 
 3. “Preservation” generally refers to protecting remnant species (both plants and animals) 
and/or ecosystems from further development or degradation. For some, such as Chad Graeve 
at Hitchcock Nature Center in Pottawattamie County, Iowa, priority ought to be placed on pre-
serving the remnant prairies and oak savannas still mostly intact in small patches throughout 
the midcontinent. For others, such as the contributors to the essay collection Beyond Preserva-
tion (see below), the idea of “preservation” is misguided because it assumes that certain parts 
of nature haven’t been compromised by human activity, which they don’t believe to be true. 
Instead, they advocate for restoration, or reconstruction, projects that come as close to historic 
ecosystems as possible. My own work is not picking a side in this debate, though I would gen-
erally refer to the work being done at a place like Rochester Cemetery, which is a pioneer cem-
etery in Cedar County, Iowa, that contains one of the most ecological diverse remnant prairies 
and oak savannas left intact in the State of Iowa, as “preservation.”
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narrative storyworlds: “The term ‘reconstruction’ means starting prairie from 
scratch in a bare crop field,” a process that involves “restoring a diversity of 
native grasses, sedges, and forbs (a collective name for prairie flowers) and 
implementing a management plan” (2). Looking at these various definitions, 
a point of agreement is the fact that “reconstruction” involves hands-on labor, 
or is something that ecologists do. Moreover, in personal conversations that I 
have had with restoration ecologists and land managers, who use a fluidity of 
terms to describe rehabilitating prairie ecosystems, there is at least agreement 
that the work undertaken in reconstruction entails starting with less (if any) 
intact prairie and involves more time and resources to achieve the desired out-
come of “not just some but all its parts and processes” (Jordan and Lubick 2).
Agreement is also found among these definitions in the fact that the 
reconstructions of prairie ecosystems undertaken by restoration ecologists 
and land managers are “intentional systems,” in much the same way that Her-
man observes intentionality in narratives and the storyworlds they contain. A 
prairie reconstruction is not going to come about by accident, even in those 
areas with the most resilient seed banks.4 Likewise, a storyworld in a given 
narrative, fiction or nonfiction, is not going to reconstruct itself in the read-
er’s/interpreter’s mind. In both instances, specific actions must be undertaken 
to bring the desired “world” into existence, whether it is a multiacre prairie 
exhibiting profuse species diversity, or a location in a narrative in which key 
elements of the plot take place. For the former, choices are made about the 
type and distribution of grasses, legumes, and forbs, preventative measures 
for invasive species (such as prescribed fire), and the reintroduction of animal 
species like bison and elk; for the latter, Herman has written in several places 
of the ways in which “particular textual cues prompt readers to spatialize sto-
ryworlds, that is, to build up mental representations of narrated domains as 
evolving configurations of participants, objects, and places” (Basic 183). A cer-
tain subjectivity must be acknowledged in both cases, as no two restoration 
ecologists will interpret the reconstruction process on a given patch of prairie 
 4. The Iowa Natural Heritage Foundation refers to a “seed bank” as “the community of 
viable seeds present in the soil.” In essence, even with the introduction of intensive agriculture 
throughout the midcontinent, once fields are no longer plowed or tilled, crops are not planted, 
and chemical applications are curtailed, there is always a possibility that a small percentage of 
prairie plants that once resided in the soil will return, thanks to the presence of the seed bank. 
Again, it is somewhat beyond the scope of this study, but the seed bank affords a relevant con-
nection to indigenous cultures from this region. Melissa K. Nelson, writing of Anishinaabeg 
responses to contemporary environmental crises, asserts that “stories can go dormant. They 
can lie fallow for decades or even centuries, buried in the land like winter seeds waiting for an 
ideal spring. When the conditions are right, the story seed can emerge with the signature of its 
origins, but with new shapes and colors given the latest conditions it finds life in” (214).
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the same way, just as no two readers will reconstruct the storyworld “prompts” 
of a given narrative uniformly. Herman addresses this issue later by pointing 
to the “strategic, always only partial mapping of textual cues onto storyworld 
dimensions” that are unique to the “particular uses to which the narrative is 
being put” (Storytelling 48). Likewise, nearly all restoration ecologists and land 
managers with whom I have discussed this topic emphasize the fact that no 
reconstruction will ever be a complete replica or re-creation of what existed 
prior to Euro-American settlement, nor will most reconstructions become 
what Chris Helzer of the Nature Conservancy refers to as “calendar prairies,” 
or an idealized image of what a prairie “should” be. Instead, as Helzer points 
out, a much more realistic goal is “reconstructing functional landscapes” that 
might, to borrow Herman’s term, be best determined by the ecological “affor-
dances” of the size and location of a given prairie reconstruction.
In making the move to more concrete examples of reconstruction at work, 
a final term of concurrence between narrative theory and restoration ecology 
is that of “immersion.” In fact, the dearth of opportunities for modern-day 
residents of the North American midcontinent to immerse themselves fully 
in either actual world prairie ecosystems or prairie storyworlds (failures that 
go hand-in-hand) drives this call for a practical narratology of the prairie. 
Marie-Laure Ryan makes as strong a case as any why more emphasis needs 
to be placed on the immersive experience provided by narrative, stating, “At 
its best, immersion can be an adventurous and invigorating experience com-
parable to taking a swim in a cool ocean with powerful surf. The environ-
ment appears at first hostile, you enter it reluctantly, but once you get wet and 
entrust your body to the waves, you never want to leave. And when you finally 
do, you feel refreshed and full of energy” (Narrative 11). Nineteenth-century 
metaphors comparing the prairie to an ocean aside, the hesitancy of readers 
and residents of the North American midcontinent to become immersed in 
what has become an unfamiliar native ecosystem is precisely the concern that 
Ryan articulates in the first half of this quotation, and the hope is that more 
accessible opportunities for such immersion would result in the reinvigoration 
she describes in the latter half. For instance, in her examination of sixteenth-
century English Romance, F. Elizabeth Hart offers a clear articulation of why 
immersion in narrative storyworlds is a phenomenon that has changed the 
way humans think about themselves and their relationship to all manners 
of “worlds,” in part by “considering the likelihood that increased numbers 
of readers also meant that narrative immersion simply became a more wide-
spread, commonly shared, and familiar experience whose effect, overall, was 
to focus cultural attention on the mind and the specialized worlds that minds 
create” (105). Whereas Hart theorizes that this increase in narrative immersion 
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ultimately led early readers to deeper understandings of “human interiority,” 
the insight she provides also opens up speculation about the positive results 
derived from richer and more frequent immersion in prairie storyworlds and 
actual worlds today.
To reinforce the importance of immersion to implementing a practical 
narratology of the prairie, I offer here two literary examples and one per-
sonal experience as a sort of case study of what such functional application 
of narrative theory might produce. Whereas Wallace Stegner’s nonfiction 
enabled an entry point into this topic in the opening paragraphs, his fiction 
provides an excellent example of how these concepts can be put into prac-
tice—in particular, his fiction set in rural Saskatchewan, the western extent 
of the North American prairie, such as the semiautobiographical novel Big 
Rock Candy Mountain and some of his early short fiction that he incorporated 
into that novel. There is frequent reference to the prairie in these stories, both 
the real and the imagined. In the short story “Buglesong” (1938), for instance, 
the young protagonist Bruce Mason drifts in and out of sleep as he listens 
to a strong prairie wind blowing outside: “In his mind he had seen the prai-
rie outside with its woolly grass and cactus white under the moon, and the 
wind, whining across the endless oceanic land, sang in the screens, and sang 
him back to sleep” (13; emphasis added). This description offers two notable 
insights into the concept of immersion. First, Stegner’s wording in this passage 
obviously ties in well with propositions of cognitive narratology put forth by 
Herman and like-minded theorists, as Bruce is quite clearly “reconstructing” 
a “mentally projected [world],” one that he knows intimately from the time 
he spends exploring the prairies (and hunting weasels) in the area around his 
family’s homestead (Story Logic 49). In other words, it is his physical immer-
sion in the prairie that enables this cognitive emergence of the prairie back 
inside his home. Second, this is a small example of a narrative about the prai-
rie in which important textual cues about this ecosystem—the “woolly grass,” 
“cactus,” and “wind” in particular—are provided to the reader to “reconstruct” 
a prairie storyworld of his or her own. Even for those readers without extensive 
experience of direct immersion in actual world prairie ecosystems, the details 
that Stegner provides enable “imaginatively . . . inhabit[ing] a world in which 
things matter,” thereby potentially mattering to the reader as well.
A fruitful counterexample is Annie Proulx’s novel That Old Ace in the Hole 
(2002), likewise set in the region of shortgrass prairie, though much farther 
south in the Texas panhandle. While somewhat older than Stegner’s Bruce, 
Proulx’s protagonist Bob Dollar is also a transplant to this region, by way of 
Denver. Unlike Bruce, however, Bob does not encounter an intact prairie eco-
system at the time of his arrival, in large part because his own entry into this 
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region is separated from the experiences of Bruce in frontier Saskatchewan by 
nearly three-quarters of a century. Thus, even though the characters inhabit 
roughly the same type of grassland ecosystem—which would have been con-
tiguous for millennia prior to Euro-American settlement—these differences in 
chronology and geography create a vastly different encounter with the native 
ecology of this region. At the opening of the novel, an interesting acknowl-
edgement is made that Bob “knew he was on prairie” as he first drives into 
the panhandle, and at least some sense of the history of the region is provided 
as well. In the very next paragraph, a major shift takes place, as Bob is still 
shown to be among those for whom “nothing is known” about the implica-
tions of being part of the prairie ecosystem: “Bob Dollar had no idea that 
he was driving into a region of immeasurable natural complexity that some 
believe abused beyond saving. He saw only what others had seen—the bigness, 
pump jacks nodding pterodactyl heads, road alligators cast off from the big 
semi tires. . . . It seemed he was not so much in a place as confronting the raw 
material of human use” (3). So, just as Bruce in “Buglesong” is capable of being 
immersed in prairie “in his mind” because of direct experiences of immer-
sion in the ecosystem itself, Bob, at least at the opening of That Old Ace in the 
Hole, is incapable of the same sort of immersion, both physical and mental: 
the former because the shortgrass prairie as he enters it no longer resembles 
a viable ecosystem of “immeasurable natural complexity,” the latter because 
the absence of a physical prairie negates any ability to become immersed “in 
his mind.”
Over the course of the novel, this changes to a certain degree as Bob 
encounters characters invested in reconstructing some semblance of the his-
toric shortgrass prairie ecosystem in the Texas panhandle, and so his igno-
rance is at least transformed into a sort of ambivalence. Near the close of the 
novel, we are told, “In his [Bob’s] mind’s eye he saw the panhandle earth imme-
morially used and tumbled”; this is followed by a vision that moves from the 
“probing grass roots” and “hooves of bison” of the native prairie through to 
the “scrape of bulldozers, inundations of chemicals” that he has more directly 
experienced in his time there (358; emphasis added). Though the wording is 
quite similar, what is depicted at the close of Proulx’s novel is a very different 
sort of immersion than Stegner describes in “Buglesong.” Bruce’s experiences 
of immersion in the prairie allow him to visualize its presence, confident that 
it will be there when he wakes in the morning; Bob’s experiences leave no such 
confidence, only a belief that “ruined places could not be restored,” and there 
was only a visualization of a “ghost ground, ephemeral yet enduring” where 
the prairie once had been (358–59). The main difference between the two is 
that Bob Dollar, like most people currently residing in the midcontinent, by 
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the end of the novel still has not been fully immersed in a thriving prairie eco-
system, and so is incapable “in his mind’s eye” of reconstructing the prairie in 
the way that Bruce does so effortlessly.
If, as Marco Caracciolo contends, “experience is an activity; it is an embod-
ied exploration of the world,” and it therefore follows that “readers enact the 
storyworld by relying on the virtuality of their movements,” the contradictory 
experiences of Bruce Mason and Bob Dollar on the shortgrass prairie come 
into sharper focus (“Blind Reading” 90, 91). Extrapolating from these two 
fictional characters, and positioning them as readers or interpreters of narra-
tive—a move warranted by the respective descriptions of their mental activity 
in attempting to visualize the prairie—Bruce’s immersion in the prairie makes 
him a sort of “ideal reader” in the enactivist model, because he is able to fol-
low the “blueprint” and build the world of the prairie in his imagination. Bob, 
who lacks the same level of “active and embodied exploration of an environ-
ment,” is therefore incapable of reconstructing a similar sort of storyworld in 
his own mind (“Blind Reading” 99). Extending these literary examples to the 
prairie as it exists today, it is no stretch to say that hopes for reconstructing 
meaningful amounts of ecosystem ultimately rely on more people—children 
in particular—like Bruce, who grow up immersed in the prairie, both story-
worlds and actual worlds, who can lie in bed and conjure images of the prairie 
as they drift to sleep, confident in the knowledge that it will be there for them 
to tramp and explore when they wake. Writing elsewhere, Caracciolo con-
tends that “it is on the plane of our emotional engagement that the impact of 
stories becomes clearly evident. . . . Stories can trigger emotional reactions by 
bringing into play values and evaluations that are part of recipients’ emotional 
background” (“Those Insane Dream Sequences” 235–36). It is no stretch to 
posit that there are currently more Bob Dollars than Bruce Masons inhabiting 
the American midcontinent, but a practical narratology, and narrative more 
broadly, can help invert that reality by facilitating more consistent and com-
pelling “emotional reactions” to this ecosystem through routine experiences 
with both prairie storyworlds and actual worlds.5
An area of Herman’s extensive explorations of storyworlds that has thus far 
received too little attention is what he labels “exophoric strategies for world-
building,” a term introduced in some of his more recent writing on cogni-
tive narratology (Storytelling 109). What follows will only begin to scratch the 
 5. My analysis of Bruce Mason and Bob Dollar as diverting types of “readers” of the 
prairie ecosystems they inhabit is but a small sampling of Caracciolo’s writing on the topics of 
experientiality, embodiment, enactment, and immersion. The way in which fictional characters 
and actual readers intersect is of particular interest, especially as considered in Caracciolo’s 
essay “The Reader’s Virtual Body: Narrative Space and It’s Reconstruction.”
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surface of the importance of this term to a practical narratology, as it draws 
a clear link between the literary analysis of prairie storyworlds and the sort 
of “world building” that can occur in situ while immersed in prairie actual 
worlds. Specifically, in the personal account that follows, I hope to demon-
strate the importance of the sorts of narrative situations that feature “a story-
teller combining utterances and gestures while telling a narrative on-site .  .  . 
both semiotic channels—the visual one supporting gestural communication 
and the auditory one supporting verbal communication—enable the story-
teller to evoke more than one reference world” (112). As will be exhibited in 
this example, it matters that the narrative is shared “on-site,” and it is sig-
nificant that multiple reference worlds—in this case, before and after prairie 
reconstruction has taken place—are included in the narration in order to call 
attention to the degraded status of the land prior to reconstruction, and the 
thriving prairie ecosystem that has taken its place.
Suzan Erem is the founder and codirector of the newly formed Sustain-
able Iowa Land Trust, an organization that seeks to keep, or place, farmland 
throughout the state in permanent sustainable agriculture. On her own prop-
erty in eastern Iowa, more than eighty acres of hilly land overlooking and 
abutting the Cedar River, she is in the process of converting what was for-
merly terraced farmland planted to grow crops like corn and soybeans into 
native tallgrass prairie and woodland. During a recent tour of Erem’s prop-
erty, she made an unprompted reference to the work she and her husband are 
doing on the land as “reconstruction.”6 Throughout our long walk through 
her property, not only was I physically immersed in a reconstructed prairie, I 
was also audience to an oral history of this land as Erem told the narrative of 
its transformation from degraded farmland to thriving prairie and woodland. 
Because the prairie has so vigorously taken to the slopes and bottomland of 
this property, I first had to reconstruct the storyworld of the degraded farm-
land, aided by the “utterances and gestures” of Erem describing and point-
ing to sites where terraced rows of corn or soybeans gave way to eroding 
hills and washouts dumping into the adjoining river; most strikingly, I had to 
reconstruct a monocultural landscape of a single crop (or barren land from 
late fall to early summer) in place of the diverse array of native grasses and 
wildflowers—bluestem, indiangrass, switchgrass, goldenrod, wild bergamot, 
mountain mint, to name a few—that I was now walking through. As Erem 
continued describing the reconstruction process, the storyworld became one 
of transition, from neglected farmland to nascent prairie and woodland, with 
 6. In order to give credit where it is due, it was during our subsequent conversation about 
the concept of “reconstruction” that she pointed me to the revised edition of Kurtz’s Practical 
Guide to Prairie Reconstruction, which offers the more elaborate definition quoted in this essay.
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young native plants competing with stubborn invasive species (there remains 
an abundance of Queen Anne’s Lace) and oak saplings routinely eaten to stubs 
by deer. The fluidity of the storyworld at this point in Erem’s narration brings 
to life Ryan’s observation that “if we conceive of storyworlds as mental repre-
sentations built during the reading (viewing, playing, among others) of a nar-
rative text, they are not static containers for the objects mentioned in a story 
but rather dynamic models of evolving situations. We could say that they are 
simulations of the development of the story” (“Transmedial” 364). Indeed, the 
presence of stubby oak saplings and Queen Anne’s Lace shows that the story 
of this place is truly dynamic and still developing. Eventually, through patient 
land management and the hard work of thinning invaders so that native plants 
can thrive, the storyworld of Erem’s narration became equivalent with the 
second reference world, namely the reconstructed prairie ecosystem that I 
was currently immersed in “on-site.” In Ryan’s words, I truly left this place 
“refreshed and full of energy.”
Of course, I must recognize that most of what I have written here is meant 
to address the general lack of opportunities for the sort of dual immersion 
in reconstructed prairie ecosystem and prairie storyworld that I experienced 
over the course of a couple of hours on a cool late-summer day. Not only has 
most of the prairie been removed, as has been well covered, but there is also 
the problem of a relative absence of “story creators” capable of reconstructing 
the storyworld of a given prairie as it transitions from degraded, damaged, 
or neglected land to something approximating its former diversity and vital-
ity. As part of my own research into this topic, I have sought out such “story 
creators” in eastern and western Iowa, and eastern and central Nebraska, in 
order to immerse myself in prairie and to hear these narratives of recon-
struction firsthand. This fieldwork, coupled with extensive reading of fictional 
and nonfictional narratives of the prairie, has led me to concur wholeheart-
edly with James’s observation, echoing psychologists Melanie C. Green and 
Timothy C. Brock, that “direct experience is a powerful means of forming 
attitudes—a process that narratives foster because of their ability to enable 
the mimicry, or simulation, of experience” (20). The residents of the North 
American midcontinent cannot be forced to visit a reconstructed prairie, or 
spend a couple of hours on site with an ecologist, or even read a narrative in 
which the prairie is prominently, and positively, featured. But as advocacy for 
the prairie becomes more pronounced and organized, these are the sorts of 
strategies that must be employed, preferably concomitant with one another. 
We have already reached a point where “literally nothing is known,” and if 
narrative theory can contribute anything to this crisis, it is by showing that 
any “world” is possible.
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Worldmaking Environmental Crisis
Climate Fiction, Econarratology, and Genre
ASTRID BRACKE
IN BARBAR A KINGSOLVER’S  2012 novel Flight Behavior, a scientist suggests 
that the media will only report on environmental crisis if it is “sexed up” suf-
ficiently: “Every environmental impact story has to be made into something 
else” (318). His critique of the media points to the important—and often dif-
ficult—matter of communicating climate change. How stories are told is cen-
tral to our understanding of them and their effectiveness. Nonetheless, while 
ecocritics and environmental humanities scholars acknowledge the key role 
of narratives in this respect,1 the mechanics of this process—for example, 
the function of genre in representing environmental crisis—have yet to be 
explored in depth. An econarratological2 approach to genre provides a useful 
starting point for exploring which forms, registers, structures, and tropes tend 
to feature in narratives of environmental crisis. This chapter positions genre 
as a key site of econarratology and provides an understanding of the workings 
of genre as a significant element in narrating environmental crisis. As such, it 
 1. See for instance Heise and Carruth; Rose et al.
 2. Throughout, I use the term “econarratology” as defined by Erin James. Econarratol-
ogy, she proposes, “embraces the key concerns of each of its parent discourses—it maintains an 
interest in studying the relationship between literature and the physical environment, but does 
so with sensitivity to the literary structures and devices that we use to communicate representa-
tions of the physical environment to each other via narratives” (23).
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continues emerging work on the intersection of narratology and the imagina-
tion of climate crisis. In particular I’ll draw on the concept of worldmaking 
and Marie-Laure Ryan’s typology of genres to define the genre of climate fic-
tion. The principle of minimal departure, I’ll show, is one of the key elements 
through which climate fiction creates an uncomfortable sense of proximity, 
confronting readers with a crisis that is present and imminent rather than at 
a comfortable distance.
In what follows, my focus is threefold: first, I briefly explore genre in rela-
tion to narratology and ecocriticism; second, I (further) define the genre of 
climate fiction, or cli-fi; and third, I provide a reading of cli-fi novels to dem-
onstrate that worldmaking is a key generic and narratological characteristic 
of climate fiction. Given these three aims, I deliberately limit myself to a dis-
cussion of just two works of climate fiction, in order to leave enough space to 
both set out a framework and provide a further fleshing out of cli-fi’s generic 
characteristics—characteristics which, I’ll show, require an expansion of the 
existing narratological repertoire.3 My reading has three implications for our 
understanding of climate fiction, in particular, and genre, in general. The first 
is that I make explicit the physical dimension of genres, an element generally 
neglected by genre scholars in favor of social contexts. As I show, the con-
struction of physical worlds, or worldmaking, is central to not only making 
sense of social worlds outside of the text, but especially to coming to terms 
with changing physical contexts. The second implication of my reading is that 
I extend Ryan’s typology of texts in several ways: by adding cli-fi to it, and, 
importantly, by further developing her definition of chronological compat-
ibility between the fictional world and the real world. My application goes 
beyond mere chronological setting and shows how climate fiction uses chro-
nology—and especially the blurring between the fictional world and the actual 
world—to depict the epistemological uncertainty that characterizes climate 
crisis. Finally, the third implication of my approach is that I foreground the 
role played by the principle of minimal departure in climate fiction. Cli-fi 
novels, I argue, do not just depict climate crisis, but play with the principle 
of minimal departure to recreate the experience of living through risk and 
uncertainty on the scale of individual novels.
 3. A more extensive analysis of works that can be called climate fiction, though not in 
terms of econarratology, is provided by Adam Trexler in Anthropocene Fictions (2015). Other 
possible novels that could be explored in this context are Ian McEwan’s Solar (2010), James 
Howard Kunstler’s World Made by Hand (2008), and possibly Cormac McCarthy’s The Road 
(2006).
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GENRES AS “DISCURSIVE MAPS OF THE WORLD”4
Genres are generally understood to do two things: to guide readers in their 
understanding of a text, and to help them make sense of the world by fram-
ing their perceptions and experiences.5 In the first sense, genres function as 
what Peter Seitel calls “frameworks of expectation,” “established ways of creat-
ing and understanding that facilitate human interaction and the communica-
tion of meaning” (277). When someone says “I’ll kill you!” it’s good to know 
whether this is a comedic situation, or when someone is serious—like in a 
thriller or crime novel—and it’s time to run. In addition to genre’s ability to 
provide insight into individual works, Seitel also suggests that genres “bring 
into focus the social contexts that shape and are shaped by generic perfor-
mances” (275). In this chapter, I’ll focus on this second function of genres: the 
way in which genres enable us to capture, understand, and represent the world 
around us, social as well as physical.
Genres have come to be seen as reflections of the environments in which 
they originate: as Tzvetan Todorov argues, “[They] bring to light the constitu-
tive features of the society to which they belong” (19). This leads to an under-
standing of genres as what Ralph Cohen calls “historical and social formations 
that undergo transformations that shape a society” (xv). The question asked 
by genre theory consequently is “What kind of world is brought into being 
here?” (Frow 1633). As a narratological category, genre provides an especially 
fruitful entry point into ecocritical and environmental humanities discussions 
about narratives suitable to a time of climate crisis. Indeed, an understand-
ing of genres may enable us to get closer to understanding our position and 
challenges in such a time—as Seitel notes, “Genres are also tools for living in 
society, chunks of communication that do work, and are designed to do that 
work, be it to educate, to test, to open a channel of communication, to punish, 
or merely to amuse” (277, original emphasis).6 Genres not only provide us with 
the parameters to understand communication and texts, they also provide the 
frameworks to help people make sense of the world around them, especially 
in a time of crisis and change. While in genre studies the emphasis is gener-
 4. See Frow (1633).
 5. As John Frow suggests, “Genres give schematic guidance .  .  . to the users of texts” 
(1633). A third function of genre is that it can be prescriptive, in that it can influence and deter-
mine the work of artists. As Heta Pyrhönen notes, “Generic conventions are normative, telling 
authors what they should and should not do” (109).
 6. Similarly, Bakhtin argues that genres are, as Pyrhönen summarizes, “ways of seeing 
and interpreting particular aspects of the world, strategies for conceptualizing reality” because 
they function as what Bakhtin calls “transmission belts” between social history and linguistic 
history (121).
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ally on the social contexts from which genres originate and which they might 
help navigate, my exploration of cli-fi in this chapter shows how genres also 
originate from and help readers navigate physical contexts, especially those 
changing due to climate crisis.
Considerable terrain is to be won for both narratology and ecocriticism—
and econarratology—in respect to the effect of genre in the understanding of 
(fictional) worlds. While genre is arguably at the heart of the study of narra-
tives and could be seen as a narrative macrodesign, it is also often, as Susan 
Keen notes, “left out of theoretical discussions of narrative form” (141). In fact, 
genre scholars themselves have noted that although genre has a central posi-
tion in classroom discussions and on the shelves of bookstores, contemporary 
literary critics discuss it less and less. Genre studies, as Michael B. Prince puts 
it, seem to be “the B-movie of literary studies, a big frame-up where all the 
really relevant questions of political and economic praxis are held at bay in a 
merely ‘literary’ preoccupation with form” (453).7 Most current narratological 
approaches to genre build on classical work, especially generic classification 
(Todorov), leaving considerable room for in-depth explorations of the effect 
of genre on narrative environments and worldmaking.8 This dimension is 
explored particularly by Marie-Laure Ryan, whose work on genre and world-
making is central to my discussion of climate fiction below.
Ecocritics tend to leave genre unexplored, which is remarkable given the 
central role of genre in ecocriticism’s early stages. In her introduction to The 
Ecocriticism Reader, Cheryll Glotfelty notes that one of the primary aims of 
ecocriticism is to recuperate “the hitherto neglected genre of nature writing” 
(xxiii). Even today, a marked preference for environmental nonfiction char-
acterizes ecocritical publications.9 In those cases in which genre is explored, 
ecocritics are generally concerned not so much with the internal workings of a 
genre but—in line with ecocriticism’s aims of affecting change—the effect that 
 7. See also Frow, who has suggested that genre studies is “just not one of the topics 
about which interesting discussions are happening these days” (1627) and Marie-Laure Ryan 
who notes, “The attitude toward the concept of genre which one finds most pervasive in con-
temporary literary studies is a skepticism that conceals uneasiness and even discouragement” 
(“Introduction” 109).
 8. For narratological discussions of genre see the brief lemma on genre in Porter Abbott’s 
Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, the entries on genre theory (Michael Kearns) and econar-
ratives (Ursula Heise) in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory (Herman and Ryan), 
and Heta Pyrhönen’s discussion of genre in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative (Herman), 
and Susan Keen’s Narrative Form.
 9. “Environmental non-fiction in the tradition of Thoreau remains a major if hardly 
exclusive concern of twenty-first-century ecocriticism” (Clark 35).
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genres have on readers and, consequently, whether some genres are ecocriti-
cally or environmentally more sound than others. Such ecocritical approaches 
depict a more evaluative approach to literature, exemplified by Richard Ker-
ridge’s typology of genre in which he lists those genres best suited to repre-
senting climate crisis, including, for instance, Modernist cut-up and collage.10 
Yet such readings may be problematic: as Nancy Easterlin suggests, ecocritics 
might ask themselves “whether it is advisable to theorize aesthetics on the 
basis of ethics” (97). Another line of ecocritical engagement with genre and 
narrative also holds that literature can affect human perceptions but, as Pieter 
Vermeulen puts it, “draws on the resources of literary narrative not to shape 
ethical and political action, but rather to begin to come to terms with the 
finitude of human life” (870). Trexler’s work on climate fiction fits this cate-
gory, as does my own. My reading of climate fiction shows how genre-specific 
elements of worldmaking become a means of making sense of the changing 
social and physical worlds outside of the text. As I demonstrate in the remain-
der of this chapter, such an approach results in an extension of narratological 
understandings of genre. Most importantly, it demonstrates how the narra-
tive’s use of generic characteristics makes the epistemological uncertainty typi-
cal of climate crisis part of the reader’s experience of the novel.
DEFINING CLIMATE FICTION
Climate fiction has come to the fore since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century and, through its explicit concern with human-nature relations, can be 
seen to reflect, and engage in, the cultural discourse of environmental crisis 
over the past two decades. At the same time, it taps into an older tradition of 
ecodystopian and apocalyptic literature.11 The term “cli-fi” as shorthand for 
climate fiction gained widespread popularity in the spring of 2013, following 
a report on NPR that defined it as “novels and short stories in worlds, not 
unlike our own, where the Earth’s systems are noticeably off-kilter” (Evancie 
 10. See Kerridge, “Ecocritical Approaches to Literary Form and Genre.” An early example 
of evaluative ecocritical engagement with genre is Joseph Meeker, The Comedy of Survival. 
Meeker’s argument for comedy rather than tragedy as an environmentally better genre influ-
enced Kerridge’s reading of Ian McEwan’s Solar (“The Single Source”), as well as Ursula Heise’s 
reading of Douglas Adams and Mark Carwardine’s Last Chance to See (“Lost Dogs”) and Nicole 
Seymour’s “Towards an Irreverent Ecocriticism.”
 11. See Adam Trexler’s introduction in Anthropocene Fictions. Frederick Buell provides a 
discussion of twentieth-century dystopian and apocalyptic fiction in From Apocalypse to Way 
of Life.
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par. 6). The articles that followed the NPR report echo this definition: Husna 
Haq distinguishes cli-fi from science fiction by arguing that it “describes a 
dystopian present, as opposed to a dystopian future, and it isn’t non-fiction 
or even science fiction: cli-fi is about literary fiction” (par. 9), and Carolyn 
Kormann suggests in the New Yorker that “novels that would once have been 
called science fiction can be read as social realism” (par. 6). While most of 
these articles—which, to date, make up the brunt of early criticism on climate 
fiction—celebrate the potentials of the genre, some critics fear that the name 
“cli-fi” makes the genre sound “marginal when, in fact, climate change is mov-
ing to the center of human experience” (Kormann par. 4), or that “cli-fi” has 
been coined “for squeamish writers and critics who dislike the box labelled 
‘science fiction’” (Glass par. 4).
Despite this flurry of attention to the genre in 2013, it took until 2015 and 
Adam Trexler’s Anthropocene Fictions for the first in-depth critical analysis of 
climate fiction. He argues that “climate change necessarily transforms generic 
conventions” and that climate novels change “the parameters of storytelling” 
(14). Trexler’s argument fits in with ecocritical and environmental humanities 
scholarship arguing that, as Greg Garrard puts it, “climate fiction ought to 
test the boundaries of narrative and genre, perhaps to breaking point” (300). 
A clear delineation of the terms “Anthropocene fiction” and “climate fiction,” 
used interchangeably by Trexler, is lacking in his work. To prevent similar 
confusion, I, like Garrard, use only the terms “climate fiction” and “cli-fi” to 
refer to novels that depict climate change and crisis. The definition of climate 
fiction that I propose in this chapter is moreover narrower than that suggested 
by Trexler’s “Anthropocene fictions,” and one that places cli-fi apart from 
genres such as science fiction and postapocalyptic literature.12 Science fiction 
tends to be set in the more distant future while the potential and strength of 
cli-fi is that the works are set more or less right now. Furthermore, unlike 
postapocalyptic novels such as Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, cli-fi is not set 
after a big rupture, a seemingly sudden event that changed all.13 Instead, cli-fi 
describes a risk society, a constant state of living in potential man-made dan-
 12. While Trexler remains relatively vague about his definition, his emphasis on the 
Anthropocene as a shaping force on literature suggests that all fictions composed in the 
Anthropocene are Anthropocene fictions.
 13. In relation to The Road, Trexler suggests that these kind of apocalyptic novels “fail to 
place climate change or create a meaningful connection between it and the reader” (79). While, 
as Kerridge remarks, George Monbiot has called the novel “the most important environmen-
tal book ever written,” Kerridge doubts its suitability as an environmental novel because of its 
“strategy of insufferability” that says to the reader, “here is something that gives you no option 
of reacting just a little. You must either face the scenario, or turn away from it unable to pretend 
you are doing anything else” (“Ecocritical Approaches” 374).
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ger, rather than sudden and cataclysmic apocalypse.14 Climate fiction reflects 
that, as Frederick Buell notes, environmental crisis “has become more and 
more a place in which people dwell, a context in reference to which they rep-
resent themselves” (250). Consequently, literature and popular culture at large 
reflect environmental crisis as “part of people’s daily, domestic experience . . . 
problems that people now cope with daily, not just nightmares the future will 
bring more fully out” (280). Other distinctions can be made between cli-fi 
and both what Kerridge calls “narratives of resignation” on the one hand, and 
Amy Patrick’s “precautionary narratives” on the other. Narratives of resigna-
tion are fatalistic and offer hope “only in the form of sardonic poetic justice 
and apocalyptic survivalist fantasy” (Kerridge, “Narratives of Resignation” 87). 
Precautionary narratives, on the other hand, rely on the sense that all is not 
lost. Rather than emphasizing irreversible degradation, they imagine environ-
mental crisis in terms of “potential yet avoidable consequences” (Patrick 142, 
145). Such hopefulness is also deeply problematic: “hopefulness,” Clive Ham-
ilton suggests, “becomes a way of forestalling the truth” (211). In its attempt 
to address both the immediacy and importance of environmental crisis, cli-
fi takes the middle ground between skepticism and defeatism, and a (mis-
guided?) belief that crisis can yet be averted.
A number of generic elements of climate fiction can be distilled. Taking 
the somewhat rough definition that genre = content + form, these elements 
both capture the thematics explored by the genre, as well as their formal, nar-
ratological features. In terms of themes and topics, climate fiction is concerned 
with climate change and science, and it tends to depict characters living in a 
risk society. The tension between familiarity (cli-fi is set in the present or very 
near future) and defamiliarization (the effects of climate crisis) is a key theme. 
Another is the tension that Trexler identifies between widespread awareness 
of catastrophic global warming and the failed obligation to act. Yet all of these 
elements would not succeed in truly capturing climate crisis or successfully 
bringing across the immediacy of climate crisis without a number of formal 
and narratological elements, such as contrasting lay characters and scientist 
characters and an emphasis on storytelling and narrativity as (metafictional) 
components of the novel. The most significant of these is the technique of 
worldmaking. The rest of this chapter will consequently focus on narrative 
worlds and especially the use of the principle of minimal departure as cen-
tral to depictions of life in a time of climate crisis. After exploring in some 
more depth the strategies of worldmaking in cli-fi, I provide brief readings of 
 14. For foundational work on the concept of risk society, see Ulrich Beck; Anthony 
Giddens.
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two works of climate fiction: Barbara Kingsolver’s Flight Behavior (2012) and 
Nathaniel Rich’s Odds Against Tomorrow (2013).
CLIMATE FICTION WORLDS
Worldmaking refers to both the ways in which the textual world is created 
and, in turn, how readers are able to make sense of it. In David Herman’s 
words, the term encapsulates both “how narrative designs prompt the con-
struction—enable the exploration—of different sorts of storyworlds” and 
“how the process of building storyworlds in turn scaffolds a variety of sense-
making activities” (Storytelling x). The worldmaking possibilities of narratives 
tie in with the concept of storyworlds, projected environments that enable 
readers to travel from the actual world to the textual world, to gain access to 
it, understand it, and even experience it to some extent. My analysis of cli-fi 
emphasizes the important role that genre plays in this process of worldmaking 
and in the creation of the storyworld. Moreover, the process of worldmaking 
reflects the social as well as the physical dimension of genres: as the reader 
follows along to construct a fictional physical environment, they also engage 
in an act of making sense of their own changing social and physical world.
Interpreting a text within the framework of genre is far less a matter of 
knowing in advance exactly what the narrative’s world will look like and pri-
marily a matter of picking up on and interpreting cues that, often subtly, tell 
readers what the world they are entering looks like. Ryan argues that readers 
use their own world and environment as a starting point for their understand-
ing of the narrative’s world. She terms this process the principle of minimal 
departure: “We construe the central world of a textual universe .  .  . as con-
forming as far as possible to our representation of AW [the actual or real 
world]. We will project upon these worlds everything we know about reality, 
and we will make only the adjustments dictated by the text” (Possible Worlds, 
Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory 51). Getting from the actual world 
to that of the storyworld can happen quickly (for instance, if the narrator 
mentions locations such as Mars or aliens in the first lines) or slowly, as when 
a storyworld corresponds closely to readers’ actual world or they are led to 
believe so. The relationship between the actual world and the textual—often 
fictional—world is a defining element of genre, as Ryan notes: “To know that a 
text is a fairy tale or a legend, a science fiction story or a historical romance, is 
to know, at least approximately, which aspects of the real world will be shared 
by the fictional world” (“Fiction” 415). Decoding a text, even when readers 
already know partly what to expect, consequently depends on the workings 
 C H A P T E R 8 •  173
of the principle of minimal departure and the cues readers receive from the 
text itself.
Yet genre, and the ways in which readers arrive at an understanding of sto-
ryworld, is also a matter of the accessibility relations employed by a narrative 
or genre. Accessibility relations, Ryan argues, are “trans-universe relations” 
that function as “the airline through which the sender reaches the world at 
the center of the textual universe” (“Possible Worlds” 558). She distinguishes 
nine possible relations that show how the textual actual world (TAW)—or 
storyworld in Herman’s and James’s words—is different from, or similar to, 
the actual world (AW):
 A. Properties: TAW can be accessed from AW if the objects in both worlds 
have the same properties.
 B. Inventory: TAW can be accessed from AW if they are furnished by the 
same objects.
 C. Compatibility of inventory: TAW can be accessed from AW if TAW 
includes all features (or “members”) of AW in addition to some “native 
members.”
 D. Chronological compatibility: TAW requires no temporal relocation for 
someone from AW in order to understand the entire history of TAW. This 
means that a TAW is still compatible with the AW if the textual world is 
set in the past (as in a historical novel), but not if the narrative is set in 
the future. In that case, readers cannot know the entire history of TAW, 
since they cannot look into the future.
 E. Physical compatibility: TAW can be accessed from AW if they share the 
same natural laws.
 F. Taxonomic compatibility: TAW can be accessed from AW if both worlds 
contain the same species, and these species have the same properties (i.e., 
dogs still act like dogs, and not suddenly like birds).
 G. Logical compatibility: TAW can be accessed from AW if both worlds 
do not contradict themselves. A nonsense narrative, for instance, is not 
compatible in this sense.
 H. Analytical compatibility: TAW can be accessed from AW “if objects 
designated by the same words have the same essential properties” 
(i.e., in both worlds, a table refers to the same object, with the same 
properties.)
 I. Linguistic compatibility: TAW can be accessed from AW if the language 
of TAW—and in which it is described—can be understood by someone 
from AW.
(paraphrased from Ryan, “Possible Worlds” 558–59)
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These nine types correspond to a typology of genres that Ryan provides, to 
which I add climate fiction to further define the genre and show which param-
eters play a part in its worldmaking. In order to illustrate the relation between 
climate fiction and a number of other genres, and to demonstrate how Ryan’s 
typology works, I present the table she provides in abbreviated form.15
TABLE 1. Relationship between Climate Fiction and Genre (from Ryan, “Possible Worlds,” 





























































Accurate nonfiction + + + + + + + + +
Realistic and historical fiction + − + + + + + + +
Science fiction +/* − +/* − + +/* + + +
Cli-fi + − + + +/ − + + + +
+: compatible
−: incompatible
*: used by Ryan because of a “−” on C (When the inventory of TAW is not the same as AW, it is likely that 
the objects common to both worlds do not have the same properties.)
As table 1 illustrates, realistic and historical fiction score nearly the same 
as accurate nonfiction with the exception of B, inventory, as the textual actual 
world or storyworld of a realistic or historic narrative is not necessarily fur-
nished with the same objects as the actual world. A historical novel set in 
1800 may be completely faithful to its historical reality if it doesn’t include 
iPads, even though the actual world does, which is why it scores negatively on 
element B. The difference between science fiction and climate fiction lies pri-
marily in C, D, E, and F. While Ryan suggests that the textual actual world of 
science fiction may be (hence the +/–) incompatible with the actual world in 
terms of its inventory and taxonomic compatibility, climate fiction depends 
on both worlds being so close together that these elements are compatible. 
In respect to E—physical compatibility—Ryan proposes that science fiction 
functions according to the same natural laws as the actual world. Yet it is 
 15. In the full table she includes thirteen genres: accurate nonfiction, true fiction, realistic 
and historical fiction, historical confabulation, realistic ahistorical fiction, anticipation, science 
fiction, fairy tale, legend, fantastic realism, nonsense rhymes, jabberwockyism and concrete 
poetry (“Possible Worlds” 560).
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precisely this aspect that climate fiction frequently plays on: climate crisis has 
circumstances that have worsened so much that old laws no longer apply or 
new ones kick in. As this is not necessarily always the case for a narrative to be 
defined as cli-fi, I accord this element the symbol +/– in the typology. Finally, 
the table shows the biggest difference between science fiction and climate fic-
tion in element D, chronological compatibility. The textual actual world, Ryan 
argues, cannot be set in the future—i.e., be older than the actual world—and 
still be accessible from the actual world. If it is older, the narrative is science 
fiction. Climate fiction, however, is set as close as possible to the present. Cli-
fi’s textual actual worlds, I argue, are consequently compatible with the actual 
world, since “climate fiction reflects on changes as they are in the process of 
occurring” as Garrard suggests (302, original italics). Indeed, the genre relies 
on its proximity to the present actual world and, as my examples below show, 
on readers barely being able to distinguish between the near future and the 
present of the actual world.
Expanding on Ryan’s principle of minimal departure, I propose that the 
genre of climate fiction puts the reader through a two-step process. Cli-fi 
depends on first depicting a textual actual world that is very close to readers’ 
actual world, providing cues that give them little reason to suspect that cir-
cumstances and developments might be different. Next, however, the narrative 
extends this familiar world into the unfamiliar, generally without the narrator 
stepping in to explicitly guide readers in navigating this new space. Instead, 
what happens is something akin to the myth of the frog who, placed in cold 
water and slowly boiled, does not jump out as its environment changes so 
gradually and imperceptibly. The two-step process of cli-fi is most successful 
when readers can barely tell apart the first and second step: as I explore below, 
both Flight Behavior and Odds Against Tomorrow combine the actual world 
and the textual actual world in such a way that it becomes almost impossible 
to tell apart what is real in the actual world and what is happening in the 
textual actual world. Consequently, by playing with type D in Ryan’s list of 
accessibility relations the narratives reflect something of the epistemological 
uncertainty that defines today’s unpredictable climate crisis, full of known and 
unknown qualities.
The textual actual world of Flight Behavior depicts protagonist Dellarobia 
Turnbow living with her husband and two young children on a struggling 
farm in rural Tennessee. The narrative provides several clues to emphasize 
that Flight Behavior is set in a world very close, or identical, to readers’ actual 
world in the early 2010s: Dellarobia’s husband Cub makes a joke about Al 
Gore (360), characters make references to Iraq and terrorism (62), and toward 
the end of the novel Dellarobia listens to a radio report about “[s]omething 
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beyond terrible in Japan, fire and flood” (591) that likely refers to the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami. Odds Against Tomorrow provides similar cues. In 
this narrative, Mitchell Zukor, a disaster specialist, comes to work for Future-
World, a company that calculates the risk of everything from disease to ter-
rorism to large-scale environmental collapse, thus enabling other companies 
to prepare for these crises or, through a loophole in the law, even insure them-
selves. This novel as well is set in a textual actual world roughly contemporary 
to readers’ actual world: the characters refer to the 9/11 attacks at the begin-
ning of the century, recall that Hurricane Sandy (2012) happened just a few 
years ago and experience existing contemporary fears of disease, eruption of 
the Yellowstone volcano, and rising sea levels. Cultural references furthermore 
conflate the textual actual and actual worlds: Mitchell’s father has seen the 
films Wall Street (1987), Die Hard (1988), and The Wizard of Oz (1939), and Bill 
McKibben’s book The End of Nature (1989) sits on Mitchell’s shelf.
Kingsolver’s novel slowly expands the readers’ actual world into a lesser 
known, yet still familiar, textual actual world. The narrator’s repeated refer-
ences to rain, for instance, are one of the first cues that tell readers that some-
thing is going on in the novel that goes beyond their known reality in the 
2010s. When the rain starts to take on apocalyptic proportions, the actual 
world morphs into the textual actual world. For the characters, though, the 
arrival of the thousands of monarch butterflies is the clearest clue that some-
thing fundamental is changing in their world—or, as Ovid Byron, the novel’s 
scientist, puts it, that they have entered a whole new world, a world in which, 
as Dellarobia ponders, “you could count on nothing you’d ever seen or trusted, 
that was no place you wanted to be” (449). Although monarch butterflies are 
increasingly threatened, the scale that is depicted in Flight Behavior has not 
yet occurred in the actual world of Kingsolver’s readers.
While Flight Behavior may seem realistic fiction to some readers unaware 
of the details of climate change and the fate of monarch butterflies, the step 
between the actual world and the textual actual world is slightly bigger in 
Odds Against Tomorrow.16 Yet it too blurs the boundaries between the actual 
and textual actual worlds in a number of ways. Moreover, the fictional events 
it depicts are generally close enough to real events in the actual world to be 
plausible and recognizable. The first disaster to happen in the novel is the 
Puget Sound Earthquake that devastates Seattle. The narrator notes that char-
acters could have expected this event, since “[a] significant earthquake struck 
northwestern Washington every twenty years, and a megathrust earthquake—
 16. Indeed, this gap is likely the reason why Garrard critiques Odds Against Tomorrow for 
not being climate fiction, but an apocalyptic narrative that “sacrifices nuanced representation 
of risk in favour of an emotive worst-case scenario” (301).
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greater than 9.0 on the Richter scale—every three or four centuries” (14). 
While (still) fictional, the chances of an earthquake happening near Seattle in 
the actual world of the novel’s first readers are considerable—experts believe 
that there is a 10 per cent chance of an earthquake with a magnitude of 8.7 
to 9.2 striking the Cascadia Subduction Zone in the Pacific Northwest in the 
next fifty years (Schulz, “The Really Big One” par. 14).17 FEMA officials pre-
dict that when this earthquake happens, nearly thirteen thousand people will 
die, twenty-seven thousand will be injured, and a million will be displaced 
(Schulz, “The Really Big One” par. 13). Some of the other possible disasters 
that Mitchell sketches in his job as a “futurologist” equally extend contem-
porary realities in the readers’ actual world, with some new elements added. 
Rather than Middle Eastern terrorists, the narrative presents the Chinese as 
a threat (59), and Mitchell predicts a Sino-American military conflict in the 
immanent future—alongside conflicts between Iran and Israel, Pakistan and 
India, and the Koreas more familiar in the actual world of the early twenty-
first century. Although Mitchell’s predictions sometimes run into the slightly 
absurd,18 the actual disaster that the novel revolves around, Hurricane Tammy, 
is eerily recognizable. Hurricane Tammy is a category 2 hurricane, described 
by the narrator in similar ways to Hurricane Sandy, a category 1 hurricane 
that hit the eastern United States in the readers’ actual world in October 2012. 
Superstorms and floods are well-known features of cli-fi, but most interest-
ing in respect to worldmaking is the way in which Odds Against Tomorrow 
creates epistemological uncertainty by blurring the boundaries between the 
actual and textual actual worlds. Such blurring, I’d argue, is central to the 
workings of the cli-fi genre and, importantly, the way in which the narratives 
enable readers to experience some of the epistemological uncertainty typical 
of climate crisis.
Odds Against Tomorrow demonstrates the workings of climate fiction par-
ticularly well when its readers are unsure whether what they are reading is 
part of their own actual world or of the novel’s textual actual world, and hence, 
whether events like Hurricane Tammy are quite as much a part of fiction as 
they would like. Two instances illustrate this particularly well, both contain-
ing events from the actual world of the 2010s and the textual actual world 
of the novel that cannot be told apart unless readers have additional knowl-
edge. In order to predict disasters as adequately as possible, Mitchell reads up 
 17. See Kathryn Schulz’s articles on “the Big One,” and this chart of activity on the Cas-
cadia Subduction Zone: http://www.newyorker.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Schulz-The-
Big-One-Map-41.png
 18. In one of his consultations, Mitchell sketches the scenario of people beginning to suffer 
from stigmata (78).
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on reports and articles. One day he receives a report from the World Health 
Organization titled “Dengue and Hemorrhagic Fever: An Emerging Public 
Health Threat in the United States,” a file containing new telemetric readings 
of unusual activity in the Yellowstone caldera, and an article from Nature titled 
“Recent Contributions of Glaciers and Ice Caps to Sea Level Rise” (65). While 
the first report does not exist in readers’ actual world, and the alert level for 
the Yellowstone volcano was “normal” in readers’ actual world at the time of 
writing this essay, the article on rising sea levels exists in readers’ actual world 
and was published in 2012 in Nature.19 A similar example is the heat wave that 
Mitchell mentions in the months before Hurricane Tammy strikes, with tem-
peratures reaching 102F in New York City. Over the past years in the actual 
world, New York has experienced several very hot summers, including the 
one in July 2012, some months before Hurricane Sandy. While temperatures in 
the actual world New York remained below 100F,20 readers may well confuse 
the fictional heat wave of the textual actual world with an actual heat wave 
in the actual world. These kinds of combinations, in which readers cannot 
determine at first glance what is true in the actual world and what only exists 
in the textual actual world, destabilize both the boundary between the two 
worlds as well as readers’ knowledge and sense of certainty. By creating uncer-
tainty about the chronology of the novel—relation D in Ryan’s typology—and 
blurring the line between the textual actual world on the one hand, and the 
actual worlds of readers in the 2010s on the other, climate fictions reflect the 
uncertainty at the heart of climate crisis. Rather than merely describing this 
uncertainty, readers experience some level of it themselves when constructing 
the storyworld, and in trying to make sense of its temporal setting.
In Flight Behavior, this blurring between the actual world and the tex-
tual actual world is frequently less obvious than in Rich’s novel. While this 
means that events of the scale depicted in Odds Against Tomorrow do not 
occur in the text, it also makes it more difficult for readers to gauge whether 
the world in the novel is really so different from the actual world, and whether 
they are not already experiencing the level of crisis that is fictionalized in the 
text. In other words, much like Dellarobia learns that she is living climate 
crisis, the ways in which the novel plays with its chronology also make the 
reader increasingly aware that they too might already be living it. This effect 
is achieved, for instance, when the novel presents a series of events that range 
 19. The Volcano Alert Level can be found on the website of the Yellowstone Volcano 
Observatory. https://volcanoes.usgs.gov/observatories/yvo/. Accessed 15 December 2016.
 20. See Jacob et al. For temperatures in New York in 2012, see graph in “New York Cen-
tral Park Daily Maximum/Minimum Temperatures for 2012”: https://www.climatestations.com/
images/stories/new-york/ny2012.gif.
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from the fictional to the actual in the world of the 2010s—all of which are hard 
to pinpoint as either being real or not. One of these is Ovid Byron’s descrip-
tion of droughts in Australia: “Walls of flames, Dellarobia. Traversing the land 
like freight trains, fed by dead trees and desiccated soil. In Victoria hundreds 
of people burned to death in one month, so many their prime minister called 
it hell on earth. This has not happened before. There is not an evacuation 
plan” (385). Although in readers’ actual world between 1997 and 2009 Aus-
tralia indeed faced the worst droughts in recorded history, the apocalyptic 
scenario sketched by Ovid has not (yet) taken place outside of the fictional 
context of the narrative. Earlier I referred to the radio report that Dellarobia 
hears toward the end of the novel that describes “[s]omething beyond terrible” 
happening in Japan (591). When Dellarobia subsequently looks out the win-
dow she sees that something has also happened to her own surroundings: the 
rain that has been falling for the past days has created a flood. Putting the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan in the actual world side-by-side with the 
flood that devastates her home in the novel’s textual actual world, and which 
forms the ending of the novel, makes both seem equally real, and equally plau-
sible. In another instance, though, the actual world has—eerily—caught up 
with the textual actual world. Explaining to Dellarobia that the maximum of 
carbon molecules the atmosphere can hold while maintaining normal thermal 
balance is 350 parts per million, Ovid tells her that in the textual actual world 
of the novel, that figure has risen to 390. In May 2018, that number was up to 
411.31 in readers’ actual world—making life stranger than fiction.21
Climate fiction, then, is about more than just depictions of what a world 
in crisis looks like. Its force—and potential in terms of affecting cultural 
change—lies in the genre’s mechanics, and especially, as I show in this chapter, 
its utilization of worldmaking strategies. Key to these is cli-fi’s use of the prin-
ciple of minimal departure to stretch the reader’s actual world to encompass 
the possibilities the textual world suggests. An econarratological approach 
foregrounds the interplay of the texts’ formal elements and the environment in 
crisis that they depict. It foregrounds the physical dimension of genres often 
overlooked by genre scholars, and moreover shows how an element central 
to both climate crisis and climate fiction—epistemological uncertainty—
becomes part of the reader’s experience of the novel through techniques such 
as the principle of minimal departure. At the same time, climate fictions also 
demonstrate to narratology the ways in which depictions of the environment 
and in particular climate crisis rely on, and extend, narratological categories, 
such as genre and matters of chronology. As such, my approach extends work 
 21. http://co2now.org/. Accessed 30 June 2018.
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in narratology, particularly the typology of texts set out by Ryan. The possi-
bilities of an econarratological approach to genre go beyond climate fiction, 
or indeed genre fiction in general. Environmental crisis is both one of the 
most pertinent problems and one of the most dominant narratives of the early 
twenty-first century. How we tell this story, which narratives and genres we 
choose, is a vital part of how we respond to it.
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Narrative in the Anthropocene
ERIN JAMES
W H E N S C H O L A R S speak of narrative and the Anthropocene, they tend to 
do so in one of two ways. The first is the conversation that dominates work 
in the environmental humanities and positions narrative as part of the prob-
lem of and solution to environmental crisis. Scholars such as Val Plumwood, 
Deborah Bird Rose, and Ursula Heise, among others, suggest that a key factor 
in today’s environmental challenges are the types of stories that we tell each 
other about the environment.1 The editors of the first issue of Environmental 
Humanities articulate this stance when they call for an “unsettling of domi-
nant narratives” and the popularization of “new narratives that are calibrated 
to the realities of our changing world” (Rose et al. 3). Change the stories, these 
scholars suggest, and change the damaging attitudes and behaviors that have 
brought us to this point.
Notably missing from this discussion are scholars of narrative theory, who 
have largely ignored the Anthropocene in their work. Perhaps this neglect 
stems in part from the claims of a second group of critics who link narrative 
 1. See Plumwood’s Environmental Culture and Heise’s “The Environmental Humanities 
and the Futures of the Human.” For further examples, see Global Ecologies and the Environ-
mental Humanities (edited by Elizabeth DeLoughrey, Jill Didur, and Anthony Carrigan), Ursula 
Kluwick’s “Talking About Climate Change,” Meina Pereira Savi’s “The Anthropocene (and) (in) 
the Humanities,” and Roy Scranton’s Learning to Die in the Anthropocene.
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and the Anthropocene in a much less optimistic way. Cultural theorists and 
literary critics steeped in deconstructivist philosophy, such as Claire Cole-
brook and Timothy Morton, suggest that narrative is a rhetorical mode deeply 
unsuited to our current epoch.2 In Death of the PostHuman, Colebrook argues 
that narrative is intimately tied to human perspectives and, as such, cannot 
adequately represent the broader timescales and wider conception of nonhu-
man lives that our current moment of environmental crisis demands. Stating 
that the climate change that defines the Anthropocene is “catastrophic for 
the human imaginary,” she argues that it “should not require us to return to 
modes of reading, comprehension and narrative communication but should 
awaken us from our human-all-to-human narrative slumbers” (10, 25). Simi-
larly, Morton’s recent work states that “global warming is a manifestation of 
the Anthropocene, the moment at which human history has intersected deci-
sively with geological time,” and that “philosophy is now tasked with bringing 
human thinking up to speed with this new reality” (“Poisoned Ground” 37). 
Out for Morton are art forms such as narrative that rely on a stable world 
informed by human categories such as “here” and “there,” “then” and “now.” In 
are forms such as Jackson Pollack’s drip paintings that call conceptualizations 
of stability into question to stress disjunctiveness and our inability to perceive 
the complete, stable whole.
My approach to narrative and the Anthropocene offers a third direction—
one that questions what contribution the Anthropocene stands to make to 
narrative studies and vice versa. This approach asks what an Anthropocene 
narrative theory might look like, or imagines a theory of narrative sensitive 
to matters commonly associated with the epoch.3 An Anthropocene narrative 
theory thus corrects two shortcomings: a lack of engagement with narrative 
theory within the environmental humanities, despite a keen interest in the 
role that narrative and storytelling might and should play in today’s environ-
mentalism, and the almost total absence of considerations of the environment 
in narrative studies, let alone more specific discussions of the Anthropocene 
and climate change. It also grapples with the contradiction, present in the 
conversation that I outline above, that the Anthropocene is both produced 
and mitigated by narratives and, at the same time, incapable of being nar-
 2. See also Timothy Clark’s Ecocriticism on the Edge and James J. Pulizzi’s “Predicting the 
End of History.”
 3. My discussion of narrative in the Anthropocene is inspired by Gerald Prince’s work 
in “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” in which he “wear[s] a set of postcolonial lenses to look at 
narrative” with the goal of sketching out a narratology “sensitive to matters commonly, if not 
uncontroversially, associated with the postcolonial (e.g., hybridity, migrancy, otherness, frag-
mentation, diversity, power relations)” (373).
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rated. I do this by thinking through various ideas and issues that we associate 
with our new geological epoch—especially those relevant to representations of 
narrative time and space and the processes of narrative production and inter-
pretation—and envisaging their possible narratological correspondents. My 
primary goal thus is not to analyze individual narratives about the Anthro-
pocene or global climate change by pointing to their strengths and short-
comings, nor to identify the parameters (or lack thereof) of the genre of the 
“Anthropocene narrative” or “climate change fiction” (“cli-fi”). Instead, I bring 
together the until now disparate conversations of the environmental humani-
ties and narrative studies to propose an “Anthropocene narrative theory,” or a 
theory of narrative sensitive to matters commonly associated with the epoch, 
to explore how narrative and the Anthropocene inform and are influenced by 
each other.
Such an exploration of the connection between narrative and the Anthro-
pocene poses the following questions: how does narrative help us think dif-
ferently about the Anthropocene? How do narratives provide us with safe 
contexts in which to explore how humans make and inhabit worlds in their 
own image? How does the reading of geological strata, tree rings, and ice 
cores, which are themselves material representations of sequences of events, 
challenge our most basic definitions of narrative and narration? How do the 
new conceptions of time and space associated with the Anthropocene diversify 
models of narrative chronologies and spatializations? How does the awareness 
of collective agency associated with the Anthropocene shed new light on types 
of narration? Indeed, how does the Anthropocene help us think differently 
about narrative? How does it inspire new structures that push against tradi-
tional narrative forms?
An Anthropocene narrative theory explores various ideas and issues that 
we associate with our new geological epoch and envisages their possible nar-
ratological correspondents. It considers narrative modalities via an Anthro-
pocene lens to better account for the ways in which narratives—all narratives, 
both existing and possible—make sense. Such an approach to narrative and 
the Anthropocene stands to enrich a universal model of narrative by incorpo-
rating ideas pertinent to this new epoch and developing a richer vocabulary 
for analyzing individual narratives in the age of the Anthropocene. It also 
makes a case for narrative in the Anthropocene—for narrative as the domi-
nant rhetorical mode of this epoch—by tracing the similarities between the 
two. It thus argues that, contrary to what some suggest, we stand to under-
stand better the current state of the world and our relationship to it by engag-
ing with narrative.
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NARRATIVE AND THE ANTHROPOCENE:
HUMANS WRITING WORLDS
An Anthropocene narrative theory begins by addressing head on the idea that 
narrative is incapable of representing the epoch. In addition to the disagree-
ing perspectives that I outline above, a separate group of scholars is debat-
ing the ability of one particular type of narrative—the novel—to represent 
the epoch. In Anthropocene Fictions: The Novel in a Time of Climate Change, 
Adam Trexler disagrees with Colebrook’s and Morton’s claim that the epoch 
cannot be narrated. At the heart of Trexler’s project is a diachronic study of 
the novel that tracks how it is evolving in the Anthropocene to represent new 
material and social realities. He argues that the formal qualities of the novel 
make it “a privileged form to explore what it means to live in the Anthropo-
cene moment,” most notably because of its heteroglossia and its interest in 
“assembl[ing] heterogeneous characters and things into a narrative sequence” 
(27, 14). Similarly, Stephanie LeMenager sees the novel as the rhetorical mode 
well suited to representing the Anthropocene. She argues that climate change 
represents “among other things, an assault on the everyday” that lends itself 
to the novel because of the latter’s investment in the everyday, in “probable, 
cyclical, and even trivial experience” (221). Furthermore, she turns to the 
novel because of its successful history of offering “opportunities for trying out 
and testing material and social relations” (236). Amitav Ghosh’s consideration 
of climate change novels represents the flip side of these arguments. Indeed, 
for Ghosh, the very phrase “climate change novel” is oxymoronic. He argues 
that the climate changes of the Anthropocene are vicious and extreme and, 
as such, they pose a major problem for writers of “serious” fiction because 
the very form of the novel, in its interest in individual human lives, relies 
upon a certain predictability that conceals the “unheard-of and the improb-
able” (27). He states that modern changes in climate are “too powerful, too 
grotesque, too dangerous, and too accusatory to be written about in a lyrical, 
or elegiac, or romantic vein”; the Anthropocene “defies both literary fiction 
and contemporary common sense” via its “very high degree of improbability” 
(32–33, 26). Ghosh ultimately concludes that a successful climate change novel 
does not exist because it cannot exist. The novel, he argues, is too rigidly tied 
to predictable patterns to accommodate adequately the startling events of the 
Anthropocene.
An Anthropocene narrative theory weighs in on these disagreements by 
foregrounding the ability of narrative to shift and change as does the world 
in which it is produced. In particular, it highlights the ways in which narra-
tives have grappled with precisely the unpredictable timelines, broad spatial 
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scales, and nonhuman perspectives that concern scholars such as Colebrook, 
Morton, and Ghosh. Elana Gomel’s work in Narrative Space and Time: Rep-
resenting Impossible Topologies in Literature speaks to the ability of narrative 
to accommodate temporal and spatial scales beyond those familiar to human 
experience. Her interest lies in “textual topologies that defy the Newtonian-
Euclidean paradigm of homogenous, uniform, three-dimensional spatiality,” 
and she roots such representations in narratives dating back to the Victorian 
era, especially in the work of Charles Dickens (3). Furthermore, she argues 
that “in many ways, narrative is ahead of science, providing a semantic arma-
ture for imagining and representing new forms of space and time” (24). The 
discussion of nonhuman narrators by Lars Bernaerts, Marco Caracciolo, Luc 
Herman, and Bart Vervaeck suggests that narrative, while an anthropogenic 
rhetorical mode, is not blinded totally by human myopia. In “The Storied 
Lives of Nonhuman Narrators,” Bernaerts and his colleagues argue that such 
narrators can encourage readers to empathize with fictional autobiographical 
nonhuman storytellers while they reflect on their own humanness. Likewise, 
David Herman’s “Narratology Beyond the Human” suggests that narrative is 
an important imaginative tool for perceiving the interconnections between 
humans in wider biotic communities.4 This work not only foregrounds the 
fluid nature of narrative—the way that it can adapt to changing real-world 
contexts—but also calls into question the claims of narrative rigidity that 
Colebrook, Morton, and Ghosh make.
Perhaps more powerfully, an Anthropocene narrative theory also illumi-
nates similarities between narrative and the Anthropocene. The most strik-
ing similarity is that both narrative and the Anthropocene are products of 
humans writing worlds. Narrative theorists such as Herman have long cel-
ebrated the worldmaking power of narratives, such that his very definition of 
narrative relies heavily upon the concept of storyworlds, or “mental models of 
who did what to whom, when, where, why, and in what fashion in the world 
to which interpreters relocate .  .  . as they work to comprehend a narrative” 
(“Storyworld” 570). Herman argues that storyworlds are one of the four basic 
elements of narrative and, as such, narratives provide readers with essential 
blueprints for worldmaking (Basic). Likewise, we distinguish the Anthropo-
cene from the Holocene by acknowledging the capability of humans to irre-
 4. For a selection of further examples of narrative theory that grapples with environmen-
tal issues, see David Herman’s “Animal Autobiography; Or, Narration Beyond the Human” and 
“Storyworld/Umwelt: Nonhuman Experiences in Graphic Novels,” Suzanne Keen’s “Fast Tracks 
to Narrative Empathy: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization in Graphic Novels,” Alexa 
Weik von Mossner’s Affective Ecologies, and Nancy Easterlin’s A Biocultural Approach to Literary 
Theory and Interpretation.
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coverably change the world. Humans in this epoch have rewritten the world to 
reflect their own activities and attitudes toward themselves and other species 
and matter. We literally see the effects of this rewriting in the inscription of 
human activity in geological strata. A similar sense of worldmaking is funda-
mental to narrative. This is a mode by which humans write worlds in which to 
immerse themselves—a mode by which we create and then emotionally and 
cognitively inhabit new time- and spacescapes and experiences. Understand-
ing that process will surely give us insight into the ways in which we enact 
similar processes of world-creation and inhabitation in material, nonnarrative 
realms in this epoch. Cognitive narrative scholars have long made the argu-
ment that narratives provide readers with safe contexts in which to simulate, 
or “try on,” the emotional states of others. Blakey Vermuele is explicit about 
this feature of narratives when she speaks of narrative as “emotional prosthe-
sis”: “Narrative can be seen as a vehicle by which people test scenarios without 
risking too much” (41, 47).5 Given their world-creating power, we can similarly 
position narratives as potent simulations of the processes that have created 
the Anthropocene. Just as they provide us with safe contexts within which to 
experience the emotional states of others, narratives also provide us with safe 
contexts in which to study the worldmaking processes that define this epoch. 
We thus stand to understand our destructive role in the latter by grappling 
with the worldmaking power of the former.
Viewing narrative as a worldmaking rhetorical mode in light of the special 
characteristics of the novel helps to explain the importance of this particular 
type of narrative in the Anthropocene. The fundamental role that the novel 
has played and does play in imaginations of the Anthropocene should not 
surprise us given the historical overlaps between this mode and the epoch. 
Although geologists are still debating the official “onset” of the Anthropocene, 
many date the epoch as beginning with the rise of industrialization and colo-
nization—right around the time that Daniel Defoe first published Robinson 
Crusoe (1719).6 Of course, the rise of the novel and the onset of the Anthro-
 5. See similar arguments in Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction.
 6. Since the introduction of the concept, geologists have debated the date of the begin-
ning of the Anthropocene. Crutzen and Stoermer’s original proposal looked to an important 
historical juncture such as the Industrial Revolution for the origin of the epoch. Simon L. Lewis 
and Mark A. Maslin, in their Nature article “Defining the Anthropocene,” examine global syn-
chronous geological marks on an annual or decadal scale to point to 1610 and 1964 as possible 
start dates. They prefer 1610 as the origin date because of its connection to nautical exploration 
and colonization, noting that “the transoceanic movement of species is a clear and permanent 
geological change to the Earth system” (177). This date, they suggest, also “mark[s] Earth’s last 
globally synchronous cool period before the long-term global warmth of the Anthropocene 
Epoch” (177).
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pocene result from the same set of conditions: early secularism, scientific 
enlightenment, empiricism, capitalism, materialism, national consolidation, 
and the rise of the middle class.7
The characteristics of the novel also suggest similarities between it and 
the Anthropocene. Ralph W. Rader’s definition of the novel as “a work which 
offers the reader a focal illusion of characters acting autonomously as if in 
the world of real experience within a subsidiary awareness of an underlying 
constructive authorial purpose” echoes several hallmarks of the Anthropo-
cene: this epoch is one in which we perceive the illusion of human agents as 
acting autonomously, and one in which the world is written by an underlying 
human agent (72). Novels offer readers worlds dominated by human agents 
as created by human agents, and thus simulate humans’ real-life perspective 
of and relationship to the world around them in the Anthropocene. Cath-
erine Gallagher’s assertion that, unlike romances and allegories that “assume 
a correspondence between a proper name in the believable narrative and an 
embodied individual in the real world,” the novel that is about no one in par-
ticular also stresses a common link between it and the Anthropocene. Gal-
lagher argues that early novels referred to a whole class of people in general 
because their fictional names had no real-world counterparts. “The founding 
claim of the form,” she states, “was a nonreferentiality that could be seen as a 
greater referentiality” (342). She cites Henry Fielding’s Joseph Andrews (1742) 
as illustrative of this new form—a text in which the narrator states that his 
story describes “not men, but manners; not an individual, but a species” (qtd. 
in Gallagher 341). Obviously this narrator’s notion of the human “species” is 
markedly more limited than the conceptualization of the human species as 
collective agent so fundamental to the Anthropocene that I discuss below in 
more detail. The characters in Fielding’s novel are located culturally, economi-
cally, and geographically, and thus do not and cannot speak for the entirety of 
the human species. Yet Gallagher’s argument that early novels placed empha-
sis on the general instead of the specific individual speaks to the notions of 
collectivity that are so integral to our understanding of the Anthropocene. 
Indeed, an Anthropocene narrative theory argues that all novels have built 
into their foundations the attitudes and ideologies that produced the Anthro-
pocene and climate change and thus, in this sense, are all representative of the 
epoch in their form. It suggests that the novel does not just reflect the social 
and material changes that produce the Anthropocene, but offers a particu-
 7. I list here the conditions in England that Ian Watt cites as leading to the popularization 
of the novel, or “formal realism” in The Rise of the Novel.
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larly rich testing ground for imaginatively exploring the implications of these 
behaviors in the word.
MATERIAL
Although narrative theory does not often appear in environmental humani-
ties scholarship, a significant vein of that scholarship does concern itself with 
narration. Posthumanism and new materialism scholars such as Jane Ben-
nett and Karen Barad have long encouraged their readers to consider the 
experiences and agency of nonhuman forces and matter. Material ecocritics 
Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann take this idea one step further, refer-
ring to the “narrative agency of matter” in their arguments that all matter 
is “storied” and thus capable of producing its own narratives (8). They state: 
“The world’s material phenomena are knots in a vast network of agencies, 
which can be ‘read’ and interpreted as forming narratives, stories” (“Intro-
duction” 8, 1). An Anthropocene narrative theory calls this claim into ques-
tion, given the inherently anthropogenic nature of narrative as a rhetorical 
mode. Indeed, when we place the idea of matter’s agency within the context 
of narrative theory, we recognize its incompatibility with a rhetorical mode 
that involves, to cite James Phelan’s definition of narrative, “somebody tell-
ing someone else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something 
happened” (Living 18). Phelan’s definition points to the fundamental anthro-
pogenic nature of this mode of communication—the rhetorical situation of 
narrative demands not only a speaker capable of wielding language in such a 
way as to describe events, but also a receiver of this language that the speaker 
attempts to persuade. The narrator and narratee may not be human in a given 
text, but by definition they must be human enough to tell and comprehend a 
story, respectively.
Furthermore, an Anthropocene narrative theory draws upon scholar-
ship on comparative cognition and the evolution of narrative to highlight the 
anthropogenic nature of this mode of communication. Cognitive anthropolo-
gist Merlin Donald argues that it is the capacity for narrative construction and 
interpretation that sets humans apart from their closest genetic relatives. “Our 
genes may be largely identical to those of a chimp or gorilla,” he writes, “but 
our cognitive architecture is not. . . . Our minds function on several phyloge-
netically new representational planes, none of which are available to animals” 
(382). Social psychologist Jerome Bruner agrees, arguing that humans “enter 
into meaning” by making narrative sense of the world around them, and that 
the innate disposition to narrative organization is so essential to human cog-
 C H A P T E R 9 •  191
nition that it is a precursor to language acquisition (68). Narrative theorist H. 
Porter Abbott also sees narrative as essential to human cognition and argues 
that the development of narrative meaning-making has allowed humans to 
exist in their own constructed realities: “If hominids found themselves, like all 
other creatures, thrown into a world governed by the seemingly eternal regu-
larities of days and seasons, they found in narrative a way to impose shapes of 
their own devising back on the universe” (250). Taken together, this work sug-
gests that narrative not only foregrounds human communication but that the 
capacity for narrative thought is uniquely human and provides humans with 
a distinctive relationship to themselves and the world around them.8
But we need not necessarily understand narrative’s emphasis on the human 
as running counter to the critique of human exceptionalism that is so essential 
to Anthropocene scholarship. As Iovino and Oppermann themselves argue, to 
be anthropogenic is not necessarily to be anthropocentric (“Material” 82). An 
Anthropocene narrative theory takes inspiration from the idea of matter’s nar-
rative agency to explore how the Anthropocene challenges the very definition 
of narrative itself, especially in terms of what narrative is and where we find 
it. It pays particular attention to environmental representations of sequences 
of events such as those we find in geological strata, ice cores, and tree rings to 
posit an alternative conceptualization of material narrative agency that posi-
tions matter not as narrating but as possessing a basic degree of narrativity. An 
Anthropocene narrative theory, while acknowledging the anthropogenic basis 
of narrative, is also sensitive to ways in which fragments of narrativity appear 
in nonhuman material and can, in turn, inspire human narratives.
An Anthropocene narrative theory suggests that geological strata, ice 
cores, and tree rings offer us a representation of a sequence of events and, as 
such, display a minimal amount of narrativity. It is inappropriate to classify 
the rocks, cores, and rings as full-blown narratives because on their own they 
lack other basic elements of narrative, such as a narrator and/or narratee, an 
occasion for telling, an articulation of qualia, and a representation of a sto-
ryworld that human readers can model mentally and inhabit emotionally. In 
other words, rocks, ice, and trees are capable of representing sequences of 
events, but rock, ice, and tree material is incapable of producing other hall-
marks of narrativity, such as focalization, the representation of the conscious-
ness and emotional state of characters, metalepsis, free indirect discourse, and 
heteroglossia, to name a but a few. They are also not capable of representing 
changes in chronology or temporality; geologic strata, ice core, and tree ring 
 8. For more on narrative and comparative cognition, see my essay “Nonhuman Fictional 
Characters and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis.”
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time sequences progress steadily, with no analepsis or prolepsis to complicate 
the annual recording of events. But they do suggest the possibility of col-
laboration between human storytellers and nonhuman material. We see this 
idea in light of actual geological strata, ice cores, and tree rings, and espe-
cially geologist Jan Zalasiewicz’s argument in The Earth After Us that the strata 
“contain within themselves countless narrative possibilities of the histories of 
former oceans and rivers, of lakes and shorelines and arid deserts” (17–18). We 
also see this idea in narratives that use such material fragments of narrativity 
as blueprints, including the “Good Oak” chapter of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand 
County Almanac and Richard Powers’s novel Overstory.
TIME
When discussing time and narrative, narrative theorists tend to distinguish 
between the timeline of the told (story time, relating to the fabula) and the 
timeline of the telling (discourse time, relating to the syuzhet). In his semi-
nal 1980 book Narrative Discourse, Gérard Genette outlines a model of dis-
course time that still dominates narratology today. Genette’s model identifies 
and codifies three types of chronologies common in narratives—order, dura-
tion, and frequency—and introduces key terms to narratives studies, such as 
analepsis and prolepsis (order), acceleration, deceleration, stasis, and ellipses 
(duration), as well as singulative, repetitive, and iterative (frequency). Since 
then, Brian Richardson has expanded Genette’s model to better account for 
discourse time in postmodern narratives. Admitting that in most cases order, 
duration, and frequency are “all that is required,” Richardson cites narratives 
such as James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, Virginia Woolf ’s Orlando, and John 
Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman to introduce six new temporal cat-
egories: circular (endings that return to beginnings), contradictory (incom-
patible and irreconcilable versions of the same story), antinomic (narratives 
that move backward in time), differential (one chronology is superimposed 
on another, larger one), conflated (apparently different temporal zones fail to 
remain distinct), and dual or multiple (different plotlines, though beginning 
and ending in the same moment, take different timelines to unfold) (“Beyond” 
48–53). Richardson is eager to point out that, given the uncanny nature of 
such timelines, these temporalities are anti-mimetic and occur only in fic-
tional narratives.
By definition, the Anthropocene relies upon an imagination of extremely 
long chronologies. An Anthropocene narrative theory takes on representa-
tions of these chronologies, both considering what they would look like in 
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a narrative and exploring the challenges that they pose to popular models 
of narrative time. Of particular interest here is Rob Nixon’s notion of slow 
violence, or a “violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of 
delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space” that he argues is 
central to the environmental injustice of the Anthropocene (2). Nixon sug-
gests that such durations tend to accompany specific narrative structures—the 
narratives that he sees as featuring slow violence are “slow paced and open 
ended” and “elud[e] . . . tidy closure . . . [and] containment” (6)—but does not 
himself identify these structures. We find an intriguing representation of slow 
violence in Cherie Dimaline’s recent dystopian novel The Marrow Thieves. This 
narrative creatively confuses timelines of the past, present, and future to draw 
attention to the slow violence of the Canadian residential school system and 
its accompanying environmental racism, suggesting that there may be more 
ways to represent the slow violence of the Anthropocene than the slow paced 
and open-ended techniques to which Nixon points. Similarly, David Mitch-
ell’s Cloud Atlas features a circular timeline to highlight the slow violence of 
slavery and class oppression. The representation of slow violence in both of 
these narratives suggests that we can no longer think of Richardson’s catego-
ries of narrative time as purely anti-mimetic. The timelines of slow violence 
function so that, à la Richardson, “apparently different temporal zones fail to 
remain distinct, and slide or spill into one another” (“Beyond” 50). Conflated 
temporalities are a part of our everyday, “natural,” nonfictional reality in the 
Anthropocene.
It is difficult to situate slow violence within Genette’s model of narrative 
temporality, as it exists between two of the categories that Genette uses to 
determine duration: “scene” and “ellipses.” This violence does not occur in 
quick, catastrophic events, but accumulates quietly in the background over 
long periods of time. In appearing off the page or in the background, the 
extremely slow durations of slow violence challenge the basic separation of 
description and plot that is fundamental to narrative theory. In “Boundar-
ies of Narrative,” Genette makes a clear distinction between narration and 
description. He writes that every narrative contains two types of representa-
tions: “representations of actions and events, which constitute the narration 
properly speaking, and representations of objects or people, which make up 
the act of what we today call ‘description’” (5). He continues to write that these 
two antithetical categories correspond largely to considerations of time and 
space. Narration is “more active” while description is “more contemplative”; 
narration “links itself to actions of events” and thus “puts emphasis on the 
temporal or dramatic aspects of narration,” while description “lingers over 
objects” and thus “seems to suspend the flow of time and to contribute to 
194 •  E R I N J A M E S 
the spreading out of narrative in space” (7). Various scholars have since com-
plicated Genette’s binary. Harold G. Mosher, Jr., introduces the categories of 
descriptivized narration and narrativized description to highlight the ways in 
which Genette’s two categories are often intertwined and exist not as separate 
poles but along a continuum. Labelling description as “a neglected stepchild in 
a very large family of narratological concepts,” Monika Fludernik and Suzanne 
Keen explore the complicated relationship between narrative perspectives and 
descriptions of interior spaces in literature in a special issue of Style (“Intro-
duction” 454). For Fludernik and Keen, representations of houses, drawing 
rooms, and halls from the perspective of individual characters complicates the 
idea that description is the “other against which narrative proper [i]s defined 
by juxtaposition” (454). Narrative scholars have long been engaged in a project 
that surveys a continuum of narration and description, or time and space. But 
slow violence tasks us with doing away with the continuum altogether, such 
that we must now recognize plots that are so slow as to be imperceptible to 
human experience. An Anthropocene narrative theory would thus recognize 
the importance of descriptive plots in this epoch.
SPACE
Just as the Anthropocene suggests that we expand notions of narrative time, 
so does it encourage us to thicken our understanding of narrative space. Cog-
nitive narrative theorists such as Herman and Marie-Laure Ryan make a case 
for the importance of spatialization in narrative by suggesting that a text’s 
narrativity increases with an appropriate amount of spatializing information, 
as such details can help readers create mental models of a character’s context. 
Building on former work, most notably Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the chro-
notope, Herman’s spatialization model in Story Logic offers us the most robust 
account of narrative space. The model establishes six categories of spatializing 
information: deictic shift (the relocation of readers from the here and now 
of their reading environment to the virtual world of a narrative); figures ver-
sus grounds (located objects versus reference objects, respectively); regions, 
landmarks, and paths; projective versus topological locations (inherent versus 
viewer-related locations, respectively); motion verbs, which exist along a con-
tinuum of “come” and “go”; and what linguists call the What/Where systems 
(nouns versus spatial prepositions).
An Anthropocene narrative theory refines and adds to this model. None 
of Herman’s categories are particularly useful for tracking the representation 
of unstable spaces, such as aquatic space. Water is essential to our understand-
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ing of the Anthropocene, whether it be via models of rising sea levels, concern 
for severe coral bleaching in the Great Barrier Reef, or the increasing fre-
quency of extreme and violent water-based events on land, such as tsunamis, 
hurricanes, and floods. To understand the current status of our world and its 
potential future in the Anthropocene, we must become better at analyzing the 
way that we imagine and interact with the water that surrounds us. And yet 
water, in its instability and fluidity, doesn’t easily fit into these categories. A 
cluster of recent scholarship on water by scholars interested in the Anthropo-
cene stresses this instability by positioning water as spaceless. Stacy Alaimo’s 
work notes that, because they largely exist beyond state borders, “open seas 
have long been considered empty space” (234). Furthermore, she suggests that 
many imaginations of water as spaceless are informed by perceptions of the 
disorienting deep sea. Such spaces, because of their lack of light and solid 
blackness, deny viewers “any sense of scale, perspective, or depth. The flat wall 
of blackness denies us any foundation, direction, or orientation toward a hori-
zon” (241). As such, these “unnervingly violet-black seas .  .  . renounce mas-
tery, transcendence, and stable, terrestrial frames of reference” (245). Astrid 
Neimanis’s work on water and human bodies agrees. Drawing on the French 
feminist celebration of fluidity as an inherently female imagination, Neimanis 
argues that imaginations of water “torqu[e] many of our accepted cartogra-
phies of space .  .  . and implicate[ ] a specifically watery movement of differ-
ence and repetition” (6).
The instability of water poses significant problems for models of narra-
tive space. Concepts such as regions, landmarks, and paths, as well as bird’s-
eye views vs. on-the-ground views are useful for analyzing representations of 
static or stable space, but less convenient for discussing spaces that constantly 
shift and change, such as those underwater. The old proverb that “you never 
step into the same river twice” illustrates just how difficult it is to speak of 
stable spaces within aquatic environments. In his writing on narrative time, 
Herman introduces the concept of fuzzy temporality, or temporal sequencing 
that is strategically inexact and thus difficult to chart along a clear timeline. 
An Anthropocene narrative theory sensitive to the changes brought about by 
rising sea levels and an abundance of water develops a corresponding category 
of “unspatialization,” or spatializing information that is strategically unclear or 
unchartable. We find a fine example of unspatialization in Marina Vitaglione’s 
short speculative narrative about rising sea levels in Venice, Solastalgia. In this 
text, narrated by the city itself, almost all spatializing cues produce confusion 
for readers because the narrator itself is confused about space: the submerged 
city unsuccessfully attempts to maintain its terranean identity while telling its 
story after being subsumed by the Adriatic Sea.
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Unspatialization allows literary scholars to better read the aquatic envi-
ronments so essential to the Anthropocene, and recognize the ways in which 
they often illustrate key Anthropocene ideas about change—that nothing is 
stable in a world that is changing unpredictably. But while inspired by the 
instability of water, unspatialization is an idea that is not restricted to watery 
environments alone. As the title of Vitaglione’s narrative suggests, this cat-
egory of narrative spatialization better equips narrative and environmental 
humanities scholars to discuss all of the unstable and changing environments 
in the Anthropocene, not just aquatic ones. Environmental philosopher Glenn 
Albrecht defines solastalgia as “the pain experienced when there is a recogni-
tion that the place where one resides and that one loves is under immediate 
assault . . . a form of homesickness one gets when one is still at ‘home’” (96). 
For Albrecht, solastalgia is a new form of psychoterratic illness linked to a 
negative relationship between humans and their support environment. For the 
purposes of an Anthropocene narrative theory, solastalgia is a useful reminder 
that terrestrial environments in the Anthropocene have taken on the instabil-
ity of their aquatic peers. We can no longer step into the same anywhere twice 
in this era defined by radical, total, and complete change. Richard McGuire’s 
graphic novel Here, which represents the corner of one room over geologic 
time, illustrates this concept nicely.
NARRATION
New imaginations of the human species in the Anthropocene—of the col-
lective agency of humans as a species—pose various challenges to our cur-
rent understanding of narrative and narrative structures. Historian Dipesh 
Chakrabarty calls for the need for humans to perceive themselves as agents 
that have, collectively, created a new world in the Anthropocene. He discusses 
how humans have produced the climate crisis by becoming “a force of nature 
in the geological sense,” and looks at the massive global changes that have 
resulted from industrialization to suggest that we best now think of humans 
as a collective agent, acting together and on a grand, planetary scale (207). 
He thus argues that it makes little sense to only think of divisions between 
humans—the inequalities that are the focus of much historical scholarship. 
He states that the Anthropocene demands that we must now also have a sec-
ond notion of humans as having a collective history that registers at the level 
of species. Chakrabarty also acknowledges that this imagination is unattain-
able, given that “species” is an impossible ontological subject position for an 
individual human to hold. Yet he argues that various narratives and forms will 
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produce the imaginative work that will help humans navigate the ecological 
crisis.
Like Nixon and slow violence, Chakrabarty does not specify which nar-
rative structures will help readers come closer to imagining species agency. 
An Anthropocene narrative theory would take up his call for new structures 
and recognize the ways in which they challenge the agency of certain types of 
narrators—most notably omniscient narrators. Jonathan Culler defines omni-
science via an analogy between God and the author: “The author creates the 
world of the novel as God created our world, and just as the world holds no 
secrets for God, so the novelist knows everything that is to be known about 
the world of the novel” (“Omniscience” 23). Omniscient narrators exhibit what 
Culler refers to as “Total Information Awareness”; in practice, they tend to tell 
their stories at one level removed from the action of the storyworld, access-
ing “a vast store of knowledge, in excess of what might be expressed” (22, 23). 
An Anthropocene narrative theory asks: is it possible, in this new epoch, to 
narrate a story from a singular, all-knowing subject position that is not also a 
participant in the storyworld? Is it possible for one person to author a world 
so completely in this epoch? Chakrabarty’s work answers “no.” The Anthro-
pocene points to the impossibility of the omniscient narrator by calling atten-
tion to the difficulty with which one tells a story from a singular, all-knowing 
position. No one human acts as an individual at the species level. In addition, 
species agency calls into question the traditional omniscient narrator’s god-
like distance from the events they narrate. No one in this epoch cannot not 
experience the Anthropocene. It is impossible to tell a story of others that is 
also not the story of yourself.
An Anthropocene narrative theory thus develops an understanding of 
narrative structures that, unlike omniscience, represent the collective agency 
of larger groups to author or create new worlds. One type of collective action 
that illustrates Chakrabarty’s notion of species agency is that of the “we” nar-
rator. In her 2017 essay on “We-Narratives,” Natalya Bekhta argues that the 
we-narrator “creates a holistic supraindividual level that supersedes a mere 
aggregation of individual characters and thus cannot be identified or reduced 
to an “I” speaking on behalf of such a group” (165). Her prime example of this 
we-narrator appears in Joshua Ferris’s Then We Came to the End, in which an 
entire office of white-collar workers narrate their fear of being laid off. We 
find an even more apt representation of collective agency in the Anthropo-
cene in Chang-Rae Lee’s climate change novel On Such a Full Sea, in which 
the community of B-Mor (a future dystopic Baltimore populated only by the 
working-class descendants of Chinese immigrants) narrates the myth of one 
of their own members.
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Indeed, “we” narration is particularly useful for illustrating species agency 
because of the way it not only represents the supraindividual level of collective 
agents but also foregrounds the incompleteness of that group and the exis-
tence of other, sometimes unacknowledged groups outside of this aggregate. 
In the wake of Chakrabarty’s essay, environmental humanities scholars inter-
ested in social and environmental justice have called into question the totality 
of the “we” of species agency, noting that only some humans are agents in the 
destructive behaviors and industries driving climate change. In her writing 
on climate change fiction, LeMenager notes that discussions of the emerging 
genre too often assume an all-inclusive “we”: “For now, ‘we’ is the European 
American subject, comfortable enough in wealth, contemplating not only the 
loss of self-sovereignty but also the end of a kind of culture that has exceeded 
its ecological carrying capacity” (231). In LeMenager’s model of the human 
species in this epoch, the collective agency of some humans has done more 
than others to create our new world. Some human communities are agents 
of the activity that drives climate change, while others are witnesses to the 
changes their fellow humans produce. All ultimately live in this new world 
but, because of structural inequalities, only a privileged few write that world. 
It is their actions that masquerade as universal.
“We” narrators implicitly call attention to the limits of their collectives, or 
the incomplete nature of their narrating agent. Of course, by definition a “we” 
must exist within a context that also includes a “them.” In Ferris’s novel, the 
“them” are those coworkers that are not a part of the narrating “we.” In Lee’s 
novel, the “them” are anyone outside of B-Mor, including the rich residents 
of gated communities whose appetites drive the environmental devastation in 
which B-Mor residents must live. In Unnatural Voices, Richardson points out 
that “we” narrators are a powerful trope in many postcolonial novels, and in 
these texts, “we” is often a powerful collective identity that stands in contrast 
to “them” of imperial authority. He concludes that “we” narration most often 
appears in texts seeking to emphasize the construction and maintenance of 
a powerful collective identity, and argues that “the vast majority of ‘we’ texts 
valorize collective identity in no uncertain terms.  .  .  . ‘We’ is almost always 
a favored term and a desirable subject position that is to be sought out and 
inhabited” (50). Within the context of the Anthropocene, “we” narrators call 
attention to the epoch’s sociopolitical and material inequities by pointing to 
the fact that all collectives necessarily are defined by their difference to other 
groups. Furthermore, the prominent role that “we” narration plays in postco-
lonial and ethnic literature such as Lee’s novel provides readers with essen-
tial correctives to the idea that the European American subject implied in 
Chakrabarty’s notion of “we” is the only collective agent of the Anthropocene, 
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and thus the only group who gets to tell the story of this epoch. In texts such 
as On Such a Full Sea, the “we” who narrates is not the “we” who has created 
the dystopic conditions in which the story unfolds. This “we” is thus able to 
offer a crucially important counternarrative to the “we” who typically narrates 
the world in the Anthropocene.
In this essay, I’ve identified several directions of an Anthropocene narra-
tive theory. Other paths remain open. Such an approach to narrative in this 
epoch might also ask: How do the digital materials that we associate with the 
Great Acceleration of the Anthropocene, which media scholars such as Nicho-
las Carr argue literally are rewiring our brains, change the way that readers 
interact with narrative? How do notions of distant futures and the possible 
extinction of humans, often represented in narratives via far-future narratees, 
open up new possibilities for models of narrative audience? How do climate 
scientists use (or not) narratives in communicating their work with the pub-
lic? And how might empirical research on the reading process shed light on 
the potential of environmental narratives in the Anthropocene to shift the 
real-life attitudes, behaviors, and values of readers? In pursuing these ques-
tions and those that I explore above in more detail, an Anthropocene narrative 
theory not only provides us with invaluable insight into how stories shape that 
world in which we live, but also into how the Anthropocene is changing the 
very nature of narrative today.
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A F T E R W O R D
Econarratology for the Future
URSULA K. HEISE
IN 2015,  I started teaching a new undergraduate course called “Environment 
and Narrative” at my home institution, UCLA. The idea for this class came out 
of three impulses. First, it seemed to me imperative to show undergraduates 
with an interest in environmental issues and activism how environmentalist 
discourse is underwritten by particular narrative patterns: for example, how 
ideas about ecological conservation and restoration are often associated with 
storylines from the pastoral tradition, or how debates about climate change 
have been shaped by the genre conventions of disaster movies and novels. Sec-
ond, the class aimed to foreground the idea that these underlying story pat-
terns differ historically and by cultural community, so that North American 
narratives are only part of the broad spectrum of stories about humans’ inter-
actions with nature. For instance, North American stories about the inevitable 
degradation that comes from human interference with a natural world that is 
at its best untouched clash with narratives from indigenous communities that 
cast nature as a kind of house or garden that will fall into disrepair if humans 
do not take care of it. And third, the course encouraged students to begin to 
tell their own stories about environmental issues: sometimes new stories and 
sometimes old stories in new media such as short videos or graphic novels, on 
the grounds that some environmental stories have been told so often that they 
have come to be taken for granted and lost much of their persuasive power, 
while many other environmental stories remain untold.
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The course readings combined fiction and nonfiction across text, image, 
and film with narrative theory. In teaching narratology along with environ-
mental thought, I ran into several of the challenges that the essays in this vol-
ume highlight. Sophisticated experiments with story and discourse were less 
crucial to most of the texts we discussed than their constructions of narrative 
spaces and more broadly of storyworlds. Narration and focalization strategies 
turned out to be important for both fictional and nonfictional works, and also 
raised the question of how nonhuman or even inanimate forms of agency 
should be theorized. Questions of factuality and fictionality raised intricate 
problems for works that sought to combine scientific, historical, or political 
data with narrative. Emotions, particularly empathy, melancholy, anger, out-
rage, and despair, loomed large in students’ engagement with the readings 
as well as with the creative assignments that forced them to anticipate their 
intended audience’s reactions. A collection of essays such as this one would 
have been enormously helpful—and certainly will be in the future—in dis-
cussing these issues, because it highlights where narrative theory needs to be 
revised and expanded to address the dimensions of storytelling that particu-
larly matter for environmentalism. I’ll briefly focus here on three dimensions: 
story templates, the concept of the actant, and the question of temporal and 
spatial scales.
Narrative theory has mostly focused on two types of storytelling: on one 
hand, conversational storytelling undertaken on a daily basis by most peo-
ple, which has been analyzed by theorists ranging from William Labov in the 
1970s to Monika Fludernik in the 1990s; on the other hand, highly elaborate 
fictional storytelling as it occurs in short stories, novels, and feature films, 
which has been theorized over the last half-century in accounts ranging from 
structuralism and feminism to affect theory and cognitive science. Neither of 
these modes of theorization works unproblematically with works such as John 
Muir’s My First Summer in the Sierra, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Cherríe 
Moraga’s Heroes and Saints, Davis Guggenheim’s An Inconvenient Truth, or 
Zacharias Kunuk and Ian Mauro’s Qapirangajuq: Inuit Knowledge and Climate 
Change. All of these works rely on powerful story templates about humans 
and natural environments, but these are only partly addressed by either con-
versational or literary/cinematic theories of narrative. In fact, I came to rely on 
the concept of “story templates,” ready-made narratives that form part of the 
repertoire of a particular cultural community and are deployed particularly 
in the confrontation with new situations and crises: a twist on the concept of 
cultural “masterplots” that Porter Abbott discusses briefly in his Cambridge 
Introduction to Narrative (46–49).
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Some story templates resemble the “genres” of literary theory, whose com-
plicated relationship with narrative theory Astrid Bracke astutely outlines in 
this volume: Muir’s use of pastoral or Carson’s of apocalyptic narrative are 
cases in point. But the equally recognizable story template of the turn to a 
simple life in texts ranging from Henry David Thoreau’s Walden to Colin Bea-
van’s No Impact Man does not constitute a genre in the traditional sense. And 
stories about environmental justice often mobilize one of two divergent story 
templates, neither of which corresponds to a well-established genre: “What’s 
good for the land is good for the people” narratives align the interests of 
environmentalism with the social struggles of disempowered communities, 
whereas “green imperialism” stories focus on the conflicting goals of affluent 
conservation communities in the global North and poor local communities in 
the global South. It is such story templates that cut across fiction and nonfic-
tion in environmental texts and films, and their cultural specificity highlights 
different visions of desirable and undesirable ways of inhabiting natural envi-
ronments on the part of different societies. Some of the most productive con-
nections between narrative theory and ecocriticism, in other words, emerge 
from the combination of the analysis of plot structure with genre theory and 
with the more specific study of default narratives that are commonly mobi-
lized in particular communities.
Such story templates do not always adhere to a realistic portrayal of the 
world, at least not as this phrase would be understood by average North 
Americans and West Europeans. Recent explorations of “unnatural narratives” 
whose cognitive and emotional impact relies on their divergence from real-
ism—stories with mutually exclusive plot lines, reversed time lines, or nonhu-
man speakers, for example—have done much to highlight how far individual 
narratives as well as what I call story templates can deviate from a simple 
mirroring of the world outside the text. Yet the phrase “unnatural narrative” 
remains complicated for any connection with ecocriticism, as the analyses by 
Jon Hegglund and Marco Caracciolo in this volume highlight. Ideas about 
what is natural or realist are highly variable by culture and historical moment: 
whether a story told by the ghost of a deceased person, for example, as in 
Ryūnosuke Akutagawa’s short story “In a Grove” (1922) and the film version 
Rashōmon by Akira Kurosawa (1950), defies the parameters of the natural is 
a question whose answer depends on the historical and cultural location of 
the storytelling. Many of the oldest narrative genres—myths, cosmologies, 
and folktales, including indigenous ones—do not conform to contemporary 
definitions of the natural and the real, so that “unnatural” narrative probably 
constitutes the bulk of human storytelling, with European-style realism (itself 
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based on a highly artificial set of conventions, as Roland Barthes’s S/Z demon-
strated decades ago) the numerical exception rather than the rule.
In addition, some elements of “unnatural” narrative, such as speaking ani-
mals or natural forces with a will of their own, question conventional boundar-
ies between nature and nonnature in ways that have been explored in a wave 
of posthumanist and new materialist theories over the last two decades, as 
Hegglund’s essay highlights—and some of these theories have precisely aimed 
to redefine nature and the natural from an environmentalist perspective. This 
does not invalidate Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Brian Richardson, and Henrik 
Skov Nielsen’s criticism of narratological approaches that privilege mimetic 
texts and models of reading that rely on the construction of correspondences 
between nontextual and textual worlds. But it does mean that the ideas of 
reality, nature, and mimesis that underlie this criticism have to be carefully 
nuanced by cultural context and varying moments of narrative production and 
reception. Hegglund, in this volume, foregrounds that the Anthropocene, as a 
concept that emphasizes comprehensive human interventions into the natural 
world, has over the last two decades highlighted the “weirdness” of the nature 
of which humans now form part, from genetically engineered animals and 
plastic particles that pervade the oceans to unprecedented weather events. In 
this sense, stable and shared assumptions about what constitutes the natu-
ral world outside the text and what might be unnatural in a particular sto-
ryworld can no longer be taken for granted, and the narrative substance and 
form of Jeff VanderMeer’s Southern Reach trilogy foregrounds this ambiguity 
in Hegglund’s perceptive and detailed analysis.
But in a different way, such slippage in assumptions about what consti-
tutes the natural reality of the extratextual world has always accompanied 
narrative analysis across cultural or historical boundaries. Understandings 
of the ontological status of dead people, to name just one obvious example, 
has varied widely over the course of history and continues to vary cultur-
ally in the present, and determines whether ghosts, spirits, séances, or other 
communications with the dead are approached as parts of the normal order 
of nature or as deviations from it in storytelling. Similarly, reasoning about 
the resemblances and differences between human identity and the identity of 
animals and plants has varied and continues to vary across a wide spectrum, 
determining whether certain behaviors on the part of animal or tree charac-
ters in a narrative are understood as natural or unnatural. It would be useful, 
therefore, to broaden Hegglund’s critique of unnatural narratology beyond the 
“weird realism” that the Anthropocene calls for so as to include such culturally 
and historically conditioned differences and slippages in the understanding 
of nature—including humans. The concept of unnatural narrative might be a 
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useful tool in the analysis of environmental storytelling, in other words, but 
only if such differences are taken into account. Nature has certainly turned 
“weird” in the perception of many Europeans and North Americans in ways 
that the concept of the Anthropocene usefully summarizes. But nature has 
always been weird when readers from one historical or cultural community 
have encountered stories about nature from another.
The concept of the actant might be another useful analytical tool for eco-
narratology in the Anthropocene, in that it goes beyond conventional dis-
tinctions between human and nonhuman or animate and inanimate types of 
agency. The term was coined in 1966 by the structuralist theorist Algirdas 
Julien Greimas, whose “actantial model” of narrative, based on earlier stud-
ies by Vladimir Propp and Etienne Souriau, was meant to capture the cen-
tral roles that structure a particular type of narrative: for example, the roles 
of the hero, the villain as the hero’s opponent, the object of the hero’s quest, 
the hero’s helper, and the sender who initiates the quest in a folktale (“Elé-
ments”; “La structure”). Actants do not line up with characters, since several 
characters can occupy the role of the same actant (Rosencrantz and Guilden-
stern in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, for example), and neither are they limited to 
humans: divinities, earthquakes, or machines can function as actants as much 
as human individuals in a narrative. Unlike the notion of character, the con-
cept of the actant does not focus on human or human-like agents, but rather 
on the more abstract question of what forces and transformations move a 
narrative plot forward.
Today, the concept of the actant is more closely associated with Bruno 
Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory than with Greimas’s narratology. Actor-
Network-Theory (ANT) analyzes semiotic and material processes in a social 
network and does not accept categorical distinctions between human and 
nonhuman or animate and inanimate actors. Latour has explicitly acknowl-
edged that he borrowed the idea of the actant from narrative theory:
To break away from the influence of what could be called “figurative soci-
ology,” ANT uses the technical word actant that comes from the study of 
literature.  .  .  . Because they deal with fiction, literary theorists have been 
much freer in their enquiries about figuration than any social scientist, 
especially when they have used semiotics or the various narrative sciences. 
This is because, for instance in a fable, the same actant can be made to act 
through the agency of a magic wand, a dwarf, a thought in the fairy’s mind, 
or a knight killing two dozen dragons. . . . It is not that sociology is fiction 
or because literary theorists would know more than sociologists, but because 
the diversity of the worlds of fiction invented on paper allow enquirers to 
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gain as much pliability and range as those they have to study in the real 
world. (53–54)
For Latour, then, the concept of the actant enables a clearer look at the 
underlying structures of semiotic and material interactions in the social 
realm. It becomes a way of identifying vectors of agency and causation with-
out regard for intentionality, and of leveling the differences between human 
and nonhuman, individual and collective, concrete and abstract agents that 
are fundamental in other forms of anthropology and sociology. This way of 
looking at the social world as if it were a kind of narrative has made its way 
into other paradigms in philosophy and the social sciences, such as political 
ecology and new materialisms. It may also at this point be useful to reimport 
it into econarratology, less as a way of mapping the logical structure of plots 
than of understanding whose agency counts and whose does not in the story 
templates that different cultural communities use for communicating about 
nature, and how these story templates shift over time.
The clashing stories about the agency of tigers in Amitav Ghosh’s well-
known environmental novel The Hungry Tide are a case in point. Villagers 
living in the tidal mangrove forests on the Bay of Bengal burn a live tiger 
that has killed several residents; they see the animal as the manifestation of 
a demon hostile to humans who demonstrates his desire to die by visiting 
the village. Visiting American biologist Piyali Roy, by contrast, is outraged by 
what she sees as a pointless act of vengeance against an animal incapable of 
human or superhuman agency. Whether one construes the actant in this event 
to be a more-than-human spirit being or a less-than-human animal crucially 
shapes its narrative and ecological meaning. This example also highlights that 
attributing agency to nonhuman entities, as new materialists such as Serenella 
Iovino and Serpil Oppermann encourage us to do, does not inevitably lead to 
outcomes that environmentalists in the global North would embrace (see also 
Erin James’s perceptive criticism of the attribution of “narrative agency” to 
nonhumans in this volume). An econarratological perspective needs to regis-
ter these different actant structures in mapping such divergent stories about 
the more-than-human world.
Kate Rigby provides a different, historically oriented example in her 
book Dancing with Disaster. Natural occurrences such as droughts, floods, 
and plagues were considered divine punishments by European societies until 
the middle of the eighteenth century. The disastrous Lisbon earthquake in 
1755, however, began to shift cultural perceptions from God’s agency to that 
of Nature, which enabled the modern concept of “natural disaster” and legiti-
mated helping disaster victims. But in the context of twenty-first-century 
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disasters, Rigby argues, this concept may no longer do justice to the human 
actions that trigger natural disasters associated with climate change. This shift 
might usefully be envisioned as a change in who or what functions as actant 
in European and North American disaster story templates, and consequently 
in the cultural practices shaped by these default narratives.
Beyond questions of agency, climate change and the Anthropocene have 
loomed large in recent discussions of environmental stories because of the 
challenges they pose in terms of temporal and spatial scales, and several 
essays in this volume engage masterfully with these debates. Amitav Ghosh 
has recently contributed to them with a volume of three essays entitled The 
Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (2016), one of which 
focuses explicitly on storytelling. The realist novel as it emerged in Europe in 
the eighteenth century, he argues, is incapable of dealing with the realities 
of climate change: it is concerned with everyday people and ordinary affairs 
rather than the improbable and extraordinary events that climate change is 
likely to bring about; it is keyed to the scale of the individual, the family, and 
the nation, not the globe; and it is structured so as to separate human culture 
from nonhuman processes and forms of agency, which are relegated to the 
natural sciences. All of this, Ghosh argues, makes the mainstream novel unfit 
to deal with the new ecological realities of the Anthropocene. He also dis-
cards science fiction, a genre better equipped to deal with these realities, on 
the grounds that its worlds are always located in a temporal or spatial other 
realm, not the here and now.1
This is a curiously literal understanding of science fiction and specula-
tive fiction, whose future or alternative times and spaces have always served 
as metaphors for the here and now, as theorists of science fiction such as 
Raymond Williams and Fredric Jameson have shown. In fact, science fiction 
understood as a perpetuation of elements of epic into the age of the novel (an 
argument that I have made in greater detail in Imagining Extinction) is pre-
cisely concerned with the present in the context of large spatial scales, long 
temporal durations, and extraordinary historical events. It often deals with 
planet Earth as a whole, or even planetary societies in the plural; it engages 
with groundbreaking technological and social innovations; and it has not 
shied away from plot lines that stretch over thousands or even millions of 
years, as narratives from Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men (1930) and Isaac 
Asimov’s Foundation series of novels (1950s-1980s) to Neal Stephenson’s Sev-
eneves (2015) show. I therefore share Erin James’s contention that claims about 
 1. For a more detailed engagement with Ghosh’s arguments, see Heise, “Climate Stories” 
and “Science Fiction and the Time Scales of the Anthropocene.”
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the inability of narrative to address the Anthropocene are premature, underes-
timating as they do the number and variety of narrative strategies and experi-
ments beyond mainstream realist fiction. Stories about humans’ multifarious 
entanglements with the more-than-human world, with species, places, and 
climates, will surely continue to proliferate, and as Alexa Weik von Mossner’s 
exemplary analysis in this volume shows, how these stories mobilize affect 
is as crucial to their architecture and their real-world impacts as the way in 
which they present factual insights into the functioning of ecologies. Econar-
ratology will have an important role to play in analyzing and mapping this 
universe of stories about nature, and this collection of essays marks an impor-
tant first step in this exciting intellectual venture.
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